The activities of Francisco Morazan embodied the most characteristic features of the initial stage of independence of the peoples of Central America. For South America, the culmination of this phase (the Wars of Independence) It was the victory in the Battle of Ayacucho (1824) that ended the rule of the Spanish colonialists . In Central America, the circumstances were different. Its path to political independence has been more peaceful. As a result, the forces of local reaction closely associated with the colonial regime suffered the smallest losses. And so, after the declaration of independence in 1821 of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, which united the Central American colonies of Spain, their peoples needed more than two decades of struggle against the latifundist oligarchs and churchmen who tried to preserve the foundations of the old regime, even if "without a mother country". In the course of this struggle, Morazan led the liberals who advocated progressive transformation, representing the interests of the commercial and emerging industrial bourgeoisie, artisans, and generally the broad urban strata.

The most extensive literature on Morazan and its time is written by Latin American authors, primarily historians from Central America .2 A number of biographies of both Dorasan's closest associates and his opponents from the conservative camp have also been published. The most interesting of them were prepared thanks to the activities of the Sacerti Cultural and educational society, which united progressive intellectuals during the revolution in Guatemala (1944-1954). These studies are characterized by objectivity in presenting facts, the desire to evaluate events from the point of view of the class struggle waged in the interests of the working masses. In the same spirit, publications on the history of Central America, which are published in Nicaragua after the victory of the Sandinista popular Revolution in this country, are also sustained. It is significant that the publications on this subject published in Guatemala after the counterrevolutionary coup of 1954 are full of: apologies for reactionary figures-opponents of Morazan 3 .

1 See K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 14, pp. 176-177.

2 См. Moreno L. Historia de las Relaciones Interestatales de Centroamerica. Madrid 1928; Duron - y - Camero R. E. Historia de Honduras desde su independecia hasta nuestros dias (1821 - 1829). T.1. Tegusigalpa. 1956; Villacorta C. A. Historia de la Republica de Guatemala (1821 - 1921). Guatemala. 1960; Valladares Rubio M. Estudios Historicos. Guatemala. 1961.

3 Salazar R. A. Manuel Jose Arce. Guatemala. 1952; ejusd. Mariano de Aycinena. Guatemala. 1952; Escritos del doctor Pedro Molina. Tt. 1 - 3. Guatemala. 1954; Humberto Montes A. Morazan y la Federacion Centroamericana. Mexico. 1958; Ricardo Duenas V. S. Biografia del general Francisco Morazan. San Salvador. 1961; Montufar L. Morazan. San Jose. 1978; Fonseca С. Bajo la bandera del Sandinismo (textos politicos). Managua. 1981; Wheelock Roman J. Raices indigenas de la lucha anticolonialista en Nicaragua. Managua. 1981.

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Several fundamental works devoted to Morazan and the problems of the formation of a single Central American state were written by American scientists. Publications on this topic periodically appear on the pages of the Hispanic American Historical Review, one of the main mouthpieces of Latin American studies in the United States. A common drawback of these works is the bourgeois historical science's emphasis on an extra-class approach, as well as a glancing disregard for the place of the "banana republics" in world history .4
On the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the declaration of independence of Central America, special editions of documentaries about various periods of Central American history were published in some countries of the sub-region. The greatest interest among them is caused by the periodically published memoirs of the main participants in the events of that era (including Morazan himself) and its eyewitnesses .5
Soviet scientists, relying on Karl Marx's assessment of the class struggle in Spain in the first half of the nineteenth century, similar to the Central American ones, 6 have already given a class assessment of Morazan's activity .7 However, so far in our science there is no special research about it. This article, without claiming to address the question of his role in Central American history, deliberately limits the scope of the material under consideration to the time when, moving to the peak of his military and political career, he objectively contributed to strengthening the unity of the Central American countries.

The city of Tegucigalpa, where Morazan was born in 1792 (his father was a native of Italy, and his mother was a Creole), was a major center of the intendencia of Honduras 8, which was part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala. In addition to Honduras, the Captaincy General included the intendencies of Chiapas (later united with independent Mexico), San Salvador, Nicaragua, and the Governorate of Costa Rica. At the turn of the XVIII - XIX centuries, about 2 million people lived here, including about 150 thousand whites, i.e. Spaniards, Creoles and those who managed to buy documents confirming the" purity " of their European blood, about 320 thousand Ladinos (as Mestizos are traditionally called in Central America) and up to 1.5 million Indians as well as several thousand negroes 9 .

Racial characteristics determined a person's social status. At the very top of the social ladder were native Spaniards sent from the mother country, who held senior positions in the colonial administration, the army, and the church apparatus. Whites of local origin-Creoles-could apply for an obe-

4 Karnes T. L. The Failure of Union. Central America. 1824 - 1975. Tempe. 1976; Rodriguez M. The Cadiz Experiment in Central America 1808 - 1826. Berkely. 1978; see also the Hispanic American Historical Review for the 1950s and 1980s.

5 Valle R. H. La anexion de Centro America a Mexico (documentos y escritos de 1821 -1822). Mexico. 1927; Manuel Jose Arce. Memorias. Guatemala. 1959; Games J. D. Gerardo Barrios ante la posterioridad. San Salvador. 1965; Melendez Chaverri C. La Ilustracion en el antiguo Reino de Guatemala. San Jose. 1970; Textos de la Independencia Centroamericana. San Jose. 1971; Zelaya C. Nicaragua en la Independencia. San Jose. 1971; Dunn H. Guatemala, or the Ripublic of Central America in 1827 - 1828. Detroit (Michigan). 1981; see also memoirs of F. Morazan in the appendix to the book V. S. Ricardo Duenas. (Op. cit.).

6 See K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 10, pp. 423-480.

7 See Alperovich M. S. War for the Independence of Mexico (1810-1824), Moscow, 1964; Alperovich M. S., Slezkin L. Yu. Formation of independent states in Latin America (1804 - 1903), Moscow, 1966; their. History of Latin America, M. 1981; National processes in Central America and Mexico, M. 1974; Leonov N. S. Essays on the new and recent history of the countries of Central America, M. 1975.

8 Intendencies in the colonial era were relatively independent territorial units similar to the Spanish provinces.

9 National Processes, pp. 101-106.

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minor positions in the administration, command posts in the local militia. Slightly better prospects awaited Creoles who chose a spiritual career. Almost unlimited opportunities opened up for them in the economic sphere. Many Creoles became the richest landlords, they controlled wholesale trade, were miners, lawyers, people of the so-called liberal professions-doctors (they also belonged to this category at that time), teachers, etc. Below the Creoles on the social ladder were Ladinos-small merchants, artisans, soldiers, servants and sailors, in short, the bulk of the amateur population. And at the very bottom were the Indians, the most oppressed part of the population, almost excluded from any form of social life in the colony. Negroes - mostly former slaves-worked as longshoremen in ports on the Atlantic coast, were servants in rich homes.

Tegucigalpa was a city of Creoles and Ladinos. Its commercial and artisan population was very different from the prim population of Comayagua, the capital of the intendencia, where Spanish officials-the richest Creole landlords - lived and where the Honduran diocese was located. Both cities contested each other's championship in Honduras.

The policy of the Spanish King Charles III (1750-1788) contributed to the fact that, as A. Humboldt wrote, the age of Enlightenment settled even in the virgin American countryside .10 The works of Rousseau, Voltaire, Diderot, La Mettrie, Raynaud, Hobbes, and Helvetius were found even in the possession of colonial officials, and they were found in the libraries of all people of any education .11 One of these libraries belonged to Dionisio Herrera, who was known among the inhabitants of Tagucigalpa for his enlightenment. It was there that the young Morazan, who aspired to knowledge, became a source of education. He had to learn to read and write almost independently. Reading (especially the books of Voltaire, who became his spiritual teacher) replaced Francisco's systematic education .12
Together with his merchant father, Morazan traveled around the country. He saw the world early. The poverty that prevailed all around was the result of the deep economic crisis that the Captaincy General of Guatemala had been in since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Spain, at that time, the Bourbon monarchy collapsed under the onslaught of Napoleon's troops. These events could not but have an impact on Central America.

On March 14, 1811, Captain-General Antonio González Molínedo of Guatemala, when handing over his powers to Jose Bustamente y Guerra, said that in the lands under his control "there is no change like in the neighbors." 13 He was referring to the creation of government bodies independent of Spain in Caracas, Buenos Aires, and Santiago (April-September 1810) and the revolt led by Hidalgo, who called on Mexicans to fight for independence (September 16, 1810). A little more than six months after the statement of Molinedo, and on November 5, 1811, in San Francisco, Mexico, and the United States of America.- El Salvador, the capital of one of Guatemala's intendencies, hosted the first anti-Spanish demonstration ("Cry from Merced"). Then, in late 1811 - early 1812, armed uprisings broke out in the cities of Leon and Granada (Intendencia of Nicaragua). The authorities suppressed them with some difficulty. But in 1813, already in the capital of the general captaincy itself, a plot against the colonialists was uncovered ("The Plot in Belen"; it got its name from the monastery where the conspirators gathered). And in 1814, the Salvadorans rebelled again.

10 See Melendez Chaverri, Op. cit., pp. 23, 128, 130.

11 Ibid., pp. 144, 236.

12 Ricardo Duenas V. S. Op. cit., p. 45.

13 Moreno L. Op. cit., p. 20.

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These first Central American pro-independence demonstrations were fragmented, lacking a clear program. And so the authorities always managed to gain the upper hand in the end. Freedom fighters were executed, many of them exiled to royal prisons in Spain and its colonies in Africa .14 The Church supported the authorities with its authority. Addressing his rebellious congregation, the vicar of Granada, Jose Antonio Chamorro, said:: "He betrays God who denies the Holy Scriptures, which instruct us to obey our kings and masters." 15
As the liberation movement grew in strength, society became polarized. The confrontation between the two political lines - supporters of independence and defenders of the existing regime, which formed the parties of patriots and royalists-became obvious. Their struggle became particularly acute by the beginning of 1821, when the first reports of the success of the uprising against the Spanish yoke began to arrive from Mexico, which played the role of a "sub-metropolis" in relation to the Central American colonies (the conquistadors mainly came to the lands of the American Isthmus from Mexico already conquered by them).

The Plan of Iguala (adopted on February 24, 1821) and the Treaty of Cordoba (concluded on August 24, 1821) fixed the compromise nature of the victory of the Mexican patriots. On the one hand, they proclaimed the independence of Mexico, on the other - the power in the country was to pass into the hands of a prince from the Spanish Bourbon dynasty who was pleasing to Madrid. This guaranteed the preservation of the privileges of the Catholic Church and those from Spain, who, however, were equal in rights with the local Creole oligarchy. On this basis, a new ruling Spanish - Creole bloc emerged in Mexico City. He had openly expansionist goals - to create a so-called American monarchy out of the former colonies of Spain in the New World, relying on the resources of Mexico. According to the authors of these plans, it was supposed to include Central America .16
The events in Mexico caused confusion among the then Captain General of Guatemala, Gabino Gainsa. The authorities clearly feared that the masses would declare secession from Spain. This prompted Gainsa to publish the Act of Independence on September 15, 1821, "in order to forestall the possible grave consequences of its proclamation by the people themselves." These words from the preamble of the Act of Independence emphasized its general focus on preserving the existing authorities (Articles 7 and 8 of the Act). The privileges of the Catholic Church were also preserved (article 11). The future fate of the captaincy General was to be decided by the Congress of Central America convened (1 deputy from 15 thousand inhabitants) (Articles 2 and 3). By decree of 17 September, any attempt on the unity of the provinces of the Captaincy General was punishable by death .17 The newspaper Genio de la Libertad, published in Guatemala City by the ardent patriot Pedro Molina, came out in those days with a pathetic appeal to the newly independent country: "Is it possible, my beloved homeland, that my eyes have seen you independent?" 18
A week later, news of the events of September 15 reached the city of San Salvador. The streets of this city - the cradle of the "cry from Merced" - were filled with crowds of cheering people. The enthusiasm of Salvadorans was due to the prevailing patriotic sentiment among them. Without delay, representatives of the authorities and estates gathered in the cathedral.-

14 Leonov N. S. UK. soch., pp. 11-13.

15 Textos de la Independencia, p. 14.

16 Alperovich M. S. UK. soch., p. 282.

17 Textos de la Independencia, pp. 242 - 243, 252.

18 Escritos del doctor Pedro Molina. Op. cit. T. 3, р. 773.

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bor is a city where they swore to support independence and fight for it. A week later, on September 28, the quartermaster and military Governor of Honduras, Jose Gregorio Tinoco de Contreras, received a message at his residence in Comayagua about the proclamation of the Act of Independence in the capital of the Captaincy General. At a subsequent meeting, the Honduran authorities decided to adopt their act of independence "in accordance with the Iguala plan." This reflected the desire of local royalists and separatists to gain a foothold in monarchical Mexico against not only the Republican patriots, but also the centralizing policies of the Guatemalan government. 19
A peculiar act of independence was adopted by Nicaraguans who gathered in the city of Leon. First of all, they declared their independence from... Guatemala (Article 1). But not knowing much about the late and third-hand reports from Guatemala, they decided, declaring independence from Spain as well (Article 2), that this decision would take effect when "the fog of uncertainty clears". The document adopted in Leon was called the Tumanov Act 20 . A little later, Costa Ricans joined the Nicaraguans.

Thus, the content of the acts of independence adopted by the Central American provinces revealed serious contradictions that undermined their unity. In the political life of the former captain-general, there was clearly a confrontation between two parties-patriots and royalists. Moreover, the latter now performed, as a rule, under anti-Guatemalan and pro-Mexican slogans. Soon the royalists received a new name-imperials, because the Spanish King Ferdinand VII refused to recognize the Iguala plan and the Treaty of Cordoba on February 13, 1822; on May 19 of the same year, the Spanish-Creole bloc proclaimed the creation of the Mexican Empire. Agustin Iturbide, one of the founders of this new oligarchic bloc, became emperor. The plans of the empire that replaced the "American Monarchy" for Central America remained, however, the same. In the face of the impending annexation, Pedro Molina, on behalf of the patriots, warned the Imperials who were looking for a new foreign master in the pages of his newspaper: "After three centuries of slavery, we crave independence, not the Mexican yoke." 21
The issues of high politics that were being addressed in the capital cities of Madrid, Mexico City and Guatemala may not have been entirely clear to the residents of provincial Tegucigalpa. However, as one unfriendly contemporary noted, they "wildly and madly threw themselves into the arms of independence." 22 There were good reasons for this. After all, this allowed the Tegucigalpaans, by supporting Gainsa, to defy the Comayagua authorities, on which the imperials, led by Tinoco de Contreras, who supported joining the Mexican Empire, relied. The old rivalry between the first two cities of Honduras has received a new impetus.

The struggle between the Quartermaster of Honduras and Tegucigalpa has become open. Initially, success accompanied the Komayagua Imperials. Concentrating up to a thousand soldiers, Tinoco de Contreras captured strategically important points on the Atlantic coast of the American Isthmus-Omoa Fortress and Trujillo port. Any resistance to his orders was punishable by death. Despite this, officials of the payoff department in Tegucigalpa, supported by their fellow citizens, refused to give the head of the quartermaster's office the stored documents.

19 Textos de la Independencia, pp. 267, 270.

20 Ibid., p. 273.

21 Textos de la Independencia, p. 275.

22 Montufar L. Op. cit., p. XIV.

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they have government funds. After that, fighting broke out between the patriots of Tegucigalpa and the imperial Comayagua.

Morazan was 29 years old at the time. As a minor clerk for the well-known Tegucigalpa lawyer Leon Vasquez, he did little business in the law office. He almost did not show himself in the field of public activity. However, several times Mor asan spoke at meetings of the cabildo (council, or Duma) his hometown in defense of the rights of the poor. Like every Tegucigalpaan, Morazan wanted to get even with the Comayagua aristocrats. And so, when the Tegucigalpaans decided to create an armed force to fight Tinoco de Contreras (they were called national companies), Francisco did not hesitate to change his civilian dress for the uniform of a lieutenant of the 1st National Company. Soon he became an adjutant of the 1st battalion of the city militia (a position similar to that of Chief of Staff).

Soon the situation in the country as a whole changed. First of all, Tinoco de Contreras lost the upper hand in power. This happened after the troops sent by Gainsa from Guatemala under the command of Justo Miglia arrived in Tegucigalpa (on the advice of D. Herrera, his fellow patriots turned to the central government for help to fight against the imperials and immediately received it). Then the patriot revolts won in the previously captured imperial cities of Omoa and Trujillo. Deprived of material resources and a preponderance in the armed forces, and finally losing its strategic advantages, Tinoco de Contreras found itself in a hopeless situation. He was defeated. This allowed Tegucigalpa to form an independent province, independent of Comayagua. Shortly thereafter, Gainsa appointed Herrera, as an active supporter of an alliance with the central authorities, as the head of political power in that province. [23 ]

However, the patriots of Honduras unexpectedly turned into subjects of Iturbide. This paradox was explained by the fact that in the end, Gainsa, suppressing separatist movements, decided to join the imperials and promote the inclusion of Central America in the Mexican Empire. The ambivalence of Gainsa's policies stemmed from the ambivalence of his position as a Spaniard and a former captain General of Guatemala, who found himself at the head of an independent state in which he represented the recent colonial past. Gainsa was considered by his contemporaries to be "a pragmatist to the core." 24 And so it is quite possible that, reflecting on his position, he has come to the conclusion that he will most likely be able to negotiate with a kindred spirit of the imperial regime.

Gainsa's strong ally in implementing his pro-American plans was the Guatemalan aristocracy, which wanted to create a strong government. This was to ensure that it retained its leading place in the political and economic life of Central America. After the declaration of independence, the local oligarchic families of Pavon, Batres, García Granados, Montufar, Aixinena and others (almost all of them were related to each other, which is why they were called "family") 25 decided that their time had come. The last, highest rung of power was released, where previously they were not allowed to be sent from Spain by Bourbon officials. (Those from the mother country despised the Creole elite; they saw the local aristocracy only as Plebeians who had become rich in the New World. And there were reasons for this. For example, the first Icinena to come to Guatemala

23 Duron-y-Gamero R. E. Op. cit., p. 53.

24 Moreno L. Op. cit., p. 33.

25 Woodward R. L. Origins of the Guatemalan Political Parties. - Hispanic American Historical Reviw, 1965, N 4, p. 566.

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In the middle of the 18th century, he was a shepherd in his native Navarre. But his descendants, who had already settled in Central America, became the most prominent family of the captaincy general and received the title of Marquis from the king. 26)

The political instability and civil strife that the declaration of independence brought with it really threatened the well-being of the oligarchic "family". Under these circumstances, the Iturbide Empire seemed to guarantee firm power and security .27 It should also be noted that the emperor of Mexico was not only socially, but also morally close to the Creole elite of Central America. He was responding to her vain requests, her desire to become an imperial noble and finally forget his common ancestry. There is every reason to refer Marx's words about Spanish feudal reaction to its Creole epigones. The" family " of the Guatemalan aristocracy was eager to appear in the arena of history, dressed up in the clothes of Calderon heroes who took imaginary greatness for true. However, to her dismay, she was unable to move one step closer to independence without simultaneously approaching freedom .28 Therefore, the "family" preferred a new foreign yoke to the loss of its privileges, and the Union of Gainsa and the Guatemalan oligarchy consecrated the church in the person of Archbishop Casaus y Torres.

On January 5, 1822, the provisional Consultative Council of Gains decided to incorporate Central America into the Mexican Empire. The imperials who dominated the council did so, despite the vigorous protests of the patriotic minority, on whose behalf Jose Cecilio del Valle (a relative of Morazan, married to Herrera's sister) spoke 29. On June 12, 1822, the troops of General Filisola entered Guatemala, the capital of the Eastern Provinces annexed to Mexico - as they now began to call Central America. whom Iturbide appointed as his governor there. Gainsa had to resign his commission and go to Mexico City. I went to Mexico City and Tinoco de Contreras.

The establishment of Mexican rule was accompanied by anti-imperial uprisings in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. It generally turned out to be extremely short-lived. Already in mid-March 1823, a Republican uprising ended the Iturbide regime in Mexico itself. Upon learning of this, Filisola advised the representatives of the major cities to convene a national congress, in accordance with the Act of Independence of September 15, 1821. In response, the now former Imperials suggested that Filisola stay in power. They hoped, with the help of his soldiers, to secure control over the deputies elected to Congress, fearing a victory in the patriot elections .30 However, Filisola, like Gainsa once, understood the ambivalence of his position and believed that he would not have had the strength to carry out this plan. Moreover, deputies from El Salvador and other provinces refused to come to the capital of Central America until it was cleared by the troops of the former Mexican governor.

Only on June 24, 1823, after Filisola and his soldiers left for Mexico, 64 deputies of the National Constituent Assembly convened in Guatemala City were able to begin their first meeting in the chapel of the University of San Carlos at 31 Capuchin Street . The National Constituent Assembly became the scene of a struggle between two political groups that had already developed in Central America.

26 Salazar R. A. Mariano de Aycinena, p. 21.

27 Montufar L. Op. cit., p. 445.

28 See K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 10, pp. 445, 451.

29 Valle R. H. Op. cit., p. 19.

30 Leonov N. S. UK. soch., p. 21.

31 Villacorta S. J. A. Op. cit., p. 57.

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One of them was the conservatives-former royalists and imperials-who represented the interests of the Creole oligarchy and the ecclesiastical elite. They were opposed by patriots, supporters of progressive transformation, who were called liberals. The liberals were followed by the bourgeoisie, artisans, and city dwellers.

At first, it seemed that the Conservatives ' worst fears about establishing liberal dominance were beginning to come true. The long-time leader of the Salvadoran patriots, Jose Mathias Delgado, who led the anti-Spanish and anti-Mexican protests of his fellow citizens, was elected President of the assembly. Then, clearly in defiance of the former royalists and imperials, a special committee of the assembly passed a "Decision on Full and Absolute Independence" that revoked the annexation of Central America by Mexico. The Decree on the absolute Independence of the provinces of Central America (July 1, 1823) was also approved. It was only on April 17, 1824, that they were able to approve the Abolition of Slavery Act (with very large restrictions).

The Assembly did not have any actual power .32 And its situation only worsened after the adoption of the first constitution of independent Central America on November 22, 1824. Under this constitution, the Federal Republic of Central America was created, consisting of five States - Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador. Each of them had its own parliament, army, and finances. Federal authorities and the army were also created. The Constitution established the contradictory nature of relations between the central authorities and the Governments of the federation States. Most of the federation's members were particularly displeased with Guatemala's privileged position. The most populous and economically developed part of Central America, Guatemala held a majority of seats in the federal Parliament created by the Constitution of 1824. Its decisions were binding on all members of the federation. The authorities of Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and El Salvador suspected Guatemala, as the former center of the entire colony, of hegemonic aspirations, not without reason.

The first president of the federation was Manuel Jose Arce, a Salvadoran landowner who was elected by the liberal vote. However, he found himself constrained in his actions by the Constitution, which, in his words, "instead of establishing a political system of freedom and order, establishes anarchy." 33 Especially acute were his conflicts with the liberals in power in Guatemala, who were considered the leading force of the entire liberal movement in the federation. The head of the Guatemalan government, Juan Barrundia, openly expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the capital of Guatemala has also become the capital of the federation, that is, that it has a second, or rather a new first owner. Sometimes passions flared up around seemingly insignificant questions. For example, anti-clerical liberals challenged Arce for a more honorable place during solemn services in the Cathedral of Guatemala city .34
Behind the petty disputes over prestige were more serious contradictions over the issue of church policy. The liberals insisted on secularizing the spiritual life of society, nationalizing the property of monasteries, etc.But Arse, who became president thanks to the liberals, was in no hurry to implement their demands. Meanwhile the constant skirmishes with the Barrundia were driving Arce further and further away from Liber-

32 Textos de la Independencia, pp. 403, 420; Moreno L. Op. cit., p. 44; Karnes T. L. Op. cit., pp. 46 - 47.

33 Salazar R. A. Manuel Jose Arce, pp. 11, 17.

34 Ibid., p. 55.

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fishing. Another acute crisis has arisen around the former officer of the Napoleonic army, Nicolas Raoul, who was invited by the liberals to serve in the artillery of the federation. Arce saw this as an attempt to deprive him of a foothold in the federal armed forces. This led to a formal breakup. On August 16, 1826, the Assembly of Guatemala authorized its Government not to recognize the authority of the President of the federal republic. Three weeks later, Arce struck back 35 .

On the night of September 5, 1826, he ordered the federal army units in Guatemala City to be put on alert. At night, his loyal troops took to the streets of the city. They occupied the central square of the capital, where guns were placed, at which gunners with lighted wicks were located. By the morning of September 6, Arce's supporters had captured the city's main barracks, weapons and ammunition depots. Juan Barrundia and his followers were arrested 36 times . The anti-liberal terror began. By order of Arce, the commander-in-chief of the Guatemalan army, Lieutenant Colonel Pierson S. Flores, Barrundia's deputy, was shot and tried to organize resistance to the coup in Quezaltenango. But a crowd of religious fanatics, incited by the Franciscans, tore him to pieces in the local cathedral, shouting: "Long live religion! Down with the heretics!"

The monks ' involvement in the murder of S. Flores was not accidental. The Church became a natural ally of the coup organizers. Arce bought her help from the Archbishop of Casaus y Torres with a promise to keep the church's privileges intact. Monks and policemen went home together, looking for dissidents, forbidden books .37 The population was intimidated. Visiting Guatemala a year later, the English merchant G. Dunn wrote that the country he saw least resembled a democratic republic. It was a typical theocracy, where everyone was in awe of the church authorities. The Englishman was particularly struck by the fact that passers-by bowed in the streets as the Archbishop's empty carriage passed by.

Guatemala's oligarchy also supported the coup. It decided to use Arce's desire to create a strong central government to try to re-establish a form of government that was favorable to itself. A representative of the "family" Mariano de Icinen became the head of the new government of Guatemala, (For Arce, this was not an accident: after all, he himself was part of the oligarchic elite of El Salvador). However, Arce understood that he was gaining a dangerous ally, always ready to eliminate him if the situation and the interests of the "family"demanded it. But the president of the federation hoped that he would be able to lead Aisinena. This rickety little man, who was always ill, seemed to know nothing but prayers. And here Arce seriously miscalculated. Mariano de Aicinena burned with the fire of religious fanaticism, which was assiduously supported by his sister, a Carmelite nun, and his brother, a Dominican priest. And he wasn't going to turn into Arce 39's puppet at all .

In the events of 1821-1826. Morazan played a rather modest role. His field of activity was provincial compared to the capital of Guatemala, Tegucigalpa. At that time, he was rather known as a relative of Herrera, for whom it was a time of great success.

35 Mоrеnо L. Op. cit., p. 67.

36 Leonov N. S. UK. soch., p. 30; Salazar R. A. Manuel Jose Arce, p. 58.

37 Salazar R. A. Manuel Jose Arce, pp. 73 - 74, 80.

38 Dunn H. Op. cit., p. 80.

39 Salazar R. A. Mariano de Aycinena, p. 77.

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political success. By achieving the independence of Tegucigalpa from Comayagua, he fulfilled the long-held dream of his fellow citizens and became their recognized leader. By the summer of 1824, Herrera had further consolidated his position, as he was able to reach an agreement with the leaders of Comayagua on the restoration of a unified Honduras, of which he became the head. His second-in-command was Justo Miglia, the same Guatemalan officer who had once brought relief troops to Tegucigalpa to fight the Comayagua royalists.

In September 1824, Morazan joined the Honduran Government as Secretary General and head of the Office of the Head of State. He also took an active part in drafting the first constitution in the country's history. In the fall of 1825, Herrera's government moved to Comayagua. This was one of the conditions for the unification of Honduras - the alternate stay of the governing bodies of the reunited state in the old capital of intendencia and in Tegucigalpa. A part of Tegucigalpa residents were dissatisfied with this. Rumours and songs were being circulated in the city that disgraced Herrera. At the head of the discontented was a certain Lagos, who even tried to provoke riots in the city. This threatened the recently achieved unity of the country. Only Morazan's vigorous intervention saved the day. He returned to Tegucigalpa and arrested Lagos. In three days, the unrest, which turned into an open mutiny, was stopped 40 . The subsequent period of calm allowed the Government to adopt a constitution on December 11, 1825. Morazan also signed it. For his services to the State, he was elected President of the upper house of the Honduran Parliament, the Council of Representatives 41 .

But the peace that prevailed in Honduras was too short-lived, although the liberal government of Herrera wanted to calm the minds of his countrymen. Herrera himself, speaking in early 1826 at one of the meetings of the legislative Assembly of the country (the lower house of the Honduran parliament), called on all political groups to tolerate each other. Five years of strife, he said, cost Honduras 400 thousand pesos, while the entire budget of the country for the current year does not reach even 1 / 5 of this amount. And that's why Honduras needs peace. Otherwise, complete ruin is inevitable 42 .

However, already in the spring of 1826, the conservatives provoked a serious crisis of the newly organized government: they refused to hold public offices or elected posts. This obstruction threatened to paralyze the activities of the government apparatus. In an effort to find popular support, Herrera issued a law on April 15 establishing patriotic societies to rally the general population in support of the Government. But the conservatives, encouraged by the anti-liberal policies of Federal President Arce, continued to attack the Herrera government. They declared that the power of the head of State of Honduras is illegal, since Herrera was appointed to this post before the adoption of the constitution. The Council of Representatives headed by Morazan decided that such statements were groundless. Then the discussion of the issue was transferred to the federal legislative bodies. This brought Herrera success, as the liberal majority of the Federation Congress supported him in defiance of Arce.

Having exhausted legal methods of struggle, the reaction of Honduras became increasingly militant. The September coup d'etat

40 Duron -y- Gamero R. E. Op. cit., pp. 109, 145; Montufar L. Op. cit., p. XV.

41 Ricardo Duenas V. S. Op . cit., pp. 48 - 51.

42 Duron - y - Gamero R. E. Op. cit., pp. 161 - 173.

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Arce in the federation capital, spurred her on. The conservative shock troops were priests who blotted out Herrera and his supporters in their sermons. At the head of them was the locum tenens of the episcopal see in Comayagua, Jose Nicolas Irias - at one time a confidant of Tinoco de Contreras, a month after the start of the bloody terror in Guatemala, Irias called on the Honduran faithful to deal with the" freemason: and heretic " Herrera.. In this tense situation, Herrera's deputy, Justo Miglia, left his post and left for Guatemala. This weakened the Government at a critical time. The position of the liberal authorities became increasingly precarious.

On the night of November 2, 1826, unknown persons tried to kill Herrera. The windows of his home in Comayagua were shelled. But Herrera was not injured 43 . It wasn't hard to guess whose hand was directing the terrorists ' actions. And the government hit back. On November 7, Morazan entered Comayagua at the head of government troops. A state of emergency was declared in the country. Irias was arrested. During the investigation launched in the case of the assassination attempt on November 2, it turned out that a certain Siriaco Velasquez, who had previously been involved in attempts to remove Herrera from the post of head of the Honduran state, took part in it. The existence of an internal armed opposition was particularly dangerous for the liberal government at this time, when a military conflict was brewing with the central authorities of the federation, that is, with Arce, because the liberals of Honduras did not recognize the legitimacy of the regime created by Arce after the coup. Moreover, they entered into an alliance with other liberal governments of the federation's member states, which saw behind Arce's back the hegemonic aspirations of the "family" of the Guatemalan oligarchy. Herrera wrote to his cousin Jose Cecilio del Valle that this alliance of liberals is being formed under the slogan of protecting the violated federal constitution .44 It was obvious to everyone that a civil war was just around the corner.

At this point, Irias decided to cheer up Herrera's opponents. From his conclusion, the leader of the Honduran reaction at the end of 1826 betrayed the liberal government of Herrera to the ecclesiastical curse. Soon Sciatica managed to escape from prison in Belize. He took with him from the Cathedral of Comayagua valuable contributions of parishioners, which were sold to the authorities of this English colony. With the proceeds, Irias organized an invasion in the winter of 1827 that was repulsed by the Honduran government. In the future, this representative of the militant church actively participated in all plots against liberals45 . Already in March 1827, the liberals were reminded of him again, when the federal army units led by Justo Miglia, who had invaded Honduras on Arce's orders, were greeted with open arms by the residents of the departments of Gracias and Santa Barbara, who worshipped Irias.

In the complex environment of conspiracies and betrayals that accompanied the success of the interventionists, Herrera acted hesitantly. Against Morazan's advice, he locked himself and all available forces in Comayagua, awaiting military assistance from El Salvador. On April 4, Miglia's troops laid siege to the city. On April 21, soldiers of the federal army began preparing for a decisive assault. But an unexpected and very energetic attack by a detachment recruited by Morazan in Tegucigalpa on the rear of the besiegers (the battle of Maradiaga) delayed the fall of Comayagua. Together with Colonel R. Diaz, Morazan overturned the enemy's barriers. However, their squad was too small and managed to disperse it. Afterwards

43 Вumgartner L. E. The Attempted Assassination of Honduran President Dionisio de Herrera, November, 1826. - Hispanic American Historical Review, 1962, N 1, p. 61.

44 Ibid., p. 62; Duron - у - Gamero R. E. Op. cit., pp. 206 - 209.

45 Duron - v - Gamero R. E. Op. cit., p. 223.

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two weeks later, on May 5, the city surrendered. The captured Herrera was escorted to Guatemala .46
Upon learning of this, Cleto Ordonez, who commanded the Salvadoran troops moving to Herrera's aid, decided to retreat. Morazan joined the Salvadorans who were leaving Honduras, along with other liberals who feared reprisals from the victors. However, an incident soon occurred that forced him to abandon Ordoniea's retreating column. Salvadoran officers, who were looting with the connivance of their commander, killed and robbed a Spanish merchant, passing off the robbery as a patriotic action. This shocked Morazan. Under the influence of the incident, he sent a letter to H. Millier, in which he promised the commander of the Conservative forces to stop the political struggle if he and his family were not persecuted. This letter was motivated by a sense of deep despair, which caused Morazan not so much the defeat of the liberals in Honduras, but the fact that the sacred concepts for him, as it turned out, could be completely freely manipulated by ordinary criminals.

Miglia sent a security letter. Relying on him, especially since they were connected by almost five years of joint work in the Honduran government, Morazan left for his estate Ojohona near Tegucigalpa, where he intended to live with his family. But even before they were unpacked, Lieutenant Salvador Landaberry of the Federal Army, known for his brutality against liberals, arrived in Ojohona. He brought an arrest warrant for Morazan. Incarcerated in a Tegucigalpa prison, he ended up in the hands of Ciriaco Velasquez, who was now one of the main instigators of conservatives. Morazan could not expect anything good from his old enemy. He managed, however, to escape, and after several days of wandering through mountain and forest trails, Morazan found himself in Nicaragua. Here, under the ruler of Leon, Juan Arguello, Honduran liberals found shelter .47
Arguello supported the liberals, as he fought against his cousin, who ruled Granada, the second capital of Nicaragua, who supported the conservatives .48 However, Morazan did not stay in Leon. He was too depressed by the misfortunes that had followed him, and now he was also concerned about the fate of his abandoned family .49 A small group of Honduran exiles, including Diaz, was not very inspiring. The liberals ' hopes for a speedy return to their homeland flared up with renewed vigor, then went out. The defeat of Arce's army at Milingo near the walls of San Salvador (May 18, 1827) drained the main strike force of the Conservatives - the federal troops. However, a few days later, at Sabanagranda (Honduras), Miglia defeated the Salvadorans, who tried to organize another offensive on Tegucigalpa.

The news caught Morazan in the Salvadoran port of La Union, where he was about to set sail for Mexico. However, this was prevented by his meeting with Mariano Vidaurre, who was sent to Nicaragua by the liberal government of San Salvador to help Arguello in his fight against Granada. Vidaurra managed to dissuade Morazan from leaving for Mexico. The Salvadoran proved to him that in Herrera's absence, Morazan was responsible for the fate of Honduras. With Vidaurre, a very different Morazan returned to Leon. In a matter of days, he organized a squad of Honduran liberals with Diaz's help,

46 Montufar L. Op. cit., pp. XV - XVII.

47 Duron-y-Gamero R. E. Op. cit., pp. 232-236.

48 Zelaya C. Op. cit., pp. 244 - 245.

40 Ricardo Duenas V. S. Op. cit., p. 52.

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the remnants of Salvadoran troops defeated at Sabanagranda and Leonese supporters of Arguello. There were only 135 people in the squad, but its core was made up of immigrants from Honduras who were returning to their homes. For them, victory or death in battle was an honorable lot compared to the emigrant vegetating in a foreign land .50
The winter campaign of 1827-1828, which Morazan brilliantly conducted against the Conservative troops, turned him into the undisputed military and political leader of Honduras. On November 1, 1827, at the village of La Trinidad, the vanguard of Morazan's detachment attacked the advanced posts of the troops under the command of Miglia with such fervor that panic seized their main forces, who fled. 51 On November 12, Morazan's column entered Tegucigalpa, the inhabitants of which gave an enthusiastic welcome to their compatriot. On January 26, the Liberals under Diaz captured Omoa, giving them the key to the entire Atlantic coast of Honduras. At the same time, in Comayagua, Morazan was elected, according to the Constitution, head of the Honduran State as the highest official (Chairman of the Council of Representatives) capable of performing this function at that time.

In the summer of 1828, the Honduran liberals gathered a significant force and dealt a serious blow to the federal army, which again invaded El Salvador. 52 On July 5, near the town of Gualcho, the Honduran army under the command of Morazan attacked the troops commanded by Guatemalan Colonel Manuel de Arsu. Both sides suffered serious losses in this battle, de Ars had to, although Morazan withdrew to the territory of Honduras, interrupt his offensive on San Salvador.

The Guatemalan aristocracy finally took over the federal government by the start of this summer's campaign in El Salvador. As early as February 14, 1828, Arce, under pressure from Aisinena, resigned from the presidency. The" family " of Guatemalan oligarchs was not satisfied with his attempts to negotiate with the liberals. (After the failure at Milingo, the President of the Federation released Herrera; he also allowed Isidore Saget, a federal army officer known for his liberal views, to join the Salvadoran army; Arce then established contacts with his uncle and longtime associate, Jose Mathias Delgado, the spiritual leader of the San Salvador Liberals for many years.) A hesitant Arce was replaced by Mariano Beltranena, one of the members of the "family". However, Beltranena was a figurehead, since Aicinena was in charge of everything, acting at the behest of the Archbishop of Casaus y Torres. Thus, the division of power between the federal and Guatemalan governments, which was already very conditional, turned into a pure fiction that covered up the domination of the church. However, this did not put an end to the politicking of Arce, who, taking refuge in his Santa Ana estate in El Salvador, addressed hypocritical appeals to the warring parties to stop hostilities. He clearly expected to play the role of a kind of arbiter in disputes between conservatives and liberals .53 But his hopes were not to be realized.

In the autumn of 1828, Morazan's Honduran army won a decisive victory in El Salvador over de Arsu's troops in the double battle of Mexicanos and San Antonio. De Arsu capitulated. This weakened the military potential of Guatemala (together with de Arsu, many members of the "family" were captured: the Montufar brothers, the Garcia Granados brothers, etc.). On October 23, F. Morazan entered San Salvador, who met him as a deliverer from the impending occupation of Guatemalan territories.

50 Montufar L, Op. cit., p. XVI; Umberto Montes A. Op. cit., p. 111.

51 Ricardo Duenas V. S. Op. cit., p. 122.

52 In fact, it was the Guatemalan army (see Leonov N. S. UK. soch., p. 35).

53 Valladares Rubio M. Op. cit., pp. 320, 382.

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troops 54 . Grateful Salvadorans and Hondurans, all the liberals of Central America, proclaimed their victorious general a general.

Morazan spent the end of the year reorganizing the troops of Honduras and El Salvador into a single Allied Army - the defender of the law. Morazan then sent his relative and former patron Herrera to Nicaragua. He was going to replace Arguello. The ruler of Leon finally won, with the help of the Hondurans, his cousin. However, the victors established a regime of terror in Nicaragua and literally flooded the whole country with blood. At the same time, Arguello increasingly showed signs of insanity, a maniacal desire to kill. Nicaragua was on the verge of a general uprising. This would certainly have been used by the conservatives in order to strike at the rear of the upcoming attack of the Honduran - Salvadoran army on Guatemala. Herrera managed to arrest Arguello, who died shortly afterwards in a San Salvador madhouse. [55 ]

Having strengthened his army and secured his rear, Morazan set foot on the land of Guatemala at the beginning of 1829 at the head of the Allied Army - defenders of the law. On February 5, his troops surrounded the Guatemalan capital, where Mariano de Icinena was entrenched. After the battles of Misko, San Miguelito and Las Charcas, which were fought with varying success, both sides entered into negotiations. Morazan's rather soft position in the negotiations, which agreed to keep Aisinen in power, was ready for mutual reduction of the armed forces and oblivion of hostile actions, Aisinen took as a sign of weakness of the liberals and refused to reconcile 56 . Then the army of Morazan began to storm the city. The hopeless situation forced Aisinen to send a letter to Morazan on April 11, 1829, offering an armistice. Rejecting it, Morazan demanded an immediate surrender. The Conservatives ' efforts to stall for time were fruitless.

On April 12, officers of the besieged army, Manuel de Arsu and Manuel Francisco Pavon, arrived at Morazan's headquarters (shortly before de Arsu was released by Morazan from captivity). Representatives of Aisinena signed a surrender agreement with the Allied Army command, under the terms of which military operations ceased (Article 1). Soldiers of the surrendered troops could join the ranks of the Allied Army if they wished (Article 8). They were guaranteed life and freedom, as well as the opportunity to leave the city with passports (Articles 6 and 7) 57 . However, Aishinena couldn't come to terms with the defeat. Therefore, while the Conservative emissaries were negotiating, he provoked riots in the part of the city occupied by his troops. The confusion that prevailed there helped detachments of the most implacable conservatives to fight their way out of the city. Aisinen himself took refuge in the archbishop's palace.

After the city was restored to order, it turned out that the weapons handed over by the capitulating troops were useless, and the rest of the weapons, including several hundred new muskets, disappeared without a trace. 58 The violation of the terms of capitulation by the Conservatives was obvious. On April 19, Morazan invited the Guatemalan nobleman to the presidential palace he occupied. All the leading political figures, government officials-in short, the whole "family" rushed there. Co Officer-

54 Montufar L. Op. cit., pp. 33 - 34; Ricardo Duenas V. S. Op. cit., p. 134.

55 Leonov N. S. Central America in the struggle for independence. - New and recent history, 1970, N 1, p. 77.

56 Ricardo Duenas V. S. Op. cit., pp. 141 - 146.

57 Montufar L. Op. cit., pp. 23 - 31.

58 Ibid., pp. 36-38.

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The Southern Army informed them that they were to be arrested on the General's orders .59
In the decree of April 20, Morazan explained his actions by saying that the behavior of the conservatives on April 13 itself annulled the terms of surrender. Morazan's decisive actions significantly improved the situation. The political head of the "family" was cut off. The Congresses of Guatemala and the Federation, purged of conservatives, put Jose Francisco Barrundia, the brother of Juan Barrundia, who was deposed in 1826, temporarily in charge of the state bodies. Morazan himself remained commander-in-chief of the Allied Army, which was transformed into the federal Army. All federal and Guatemalan laws passed after September 5, 1826, were repealed. Officials were obliged to return to the state treasury the salary received during this period 60 .

The decisive measures of the liberals accelerated the growth of resistance to the reaction according to the already familiar scenario - the place of political and military leaders of the conservatives was taken by church hierarchs led by Archbishop Casaus y Torres. Soon it became known that the churchmen kept weapons. It was supposed to be used in an uprising prepared by: conservatives. A search of the Dominican monastery confirmed this. The same muskets that disappeared on April 13 during the surrender of Aisinena's troops were found .61 The Guatemalan Congress immediately responded with a decree of June 9: "Considering this an absolute necessity, the following measures are being taken to preserve order and protect it from troublemakers:: 1. The Government is authorized to restore order by all necessary means. 2. These powers may be transferred for the time deemed necessary to a trustworthy person."

Such a person: became Morasan. On the night of July 10-11, he ordered all Dominicans, Franciscans, and members of almost all other monastic orders to be arrested and expelled from the country, along with Archbishop Casaus y Torres and previously detained Conservative political leaders (Aicinena, Arce, and others) .62 But it was only by March 1830 that the situation in the federation was so stable that it was possible to hold presidential elections. They brought victory to Morazan. On September 11, 1830, J. F. Barrundia installed him as president at a meeting of the Federal Congress. The "age of Morazan" (1830-1839) began in the history of Central America .63
The ten years of Morazan's rule were filled with a relentless struggle against external (English colonialists and Yankee adventurers) and especially internal enemies. Morazan's military victory over the Guatemalan Conservatives brought double results. First, it summed up the results of the civil war, during which the Guatemalan oligarchy lost its monopoly on political and economic power in Central America, which it inherited from colonial times. Second, through the intricacies of conspiracies, uprisings, and civil war battles, the revolutionary content of the triumph of the allied forces of El Salvador and Honduras is revealed. Their victory provided the conditions for the creation of liberal governments in the member states of the federation (for example, M. Galvez in Guatemala and D. Herrera in Nicaragua), which began to implement fundamental reforms aimed at overcoming the backwardness of a society that retained its essentially colonial content.

59 Manuel Jose Arce. Memorias, p. 181.

60 Karnes T. L. Op. cit., p. 71.

61 Montufar L. Op. cit., pp. 67, 119.

62 Ibid., pp. 111, 120.

63 Moreno L. Op. cit., p. 73.

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These reforms stemmed from a general democratic and liberal-bourgeois platform inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment. It included, first of all, anti-clerical measures aimed at undermining the dominance of the church in the spiritual life of society (the introduction of freedom of religion, civil marriage and divorce, etc.). They were closely associated with reforms and innovations in the field of education and enlightenment: the system of universal primary secular education, the creation of new higher educational institutions, etc. He founded universities in Nicaragua and El Salvador. An attempt was made to reform the judicial system. However, the liberals did not dare to raise a hand against the existing socio-economic relations. This was reflected in the narrowness inherent in the policy of bourgeois reformism, blind adherence to the "sacred" principle of inviolability of private property. (Morazan actively fought against the Creole aristocracy, against the church's interference in public and political life, sometimes confiscating the fortunes of some of the conservative leaders. But he never attacked the economic foundations of the power of the church and the landlords.)

As a result, the popular masses did not follow the liberals, who did not offer much specifically to improve the situation of the Indians, who made up the bulk of the population. Indian peasants often opposed the authorities, usually under the slogans of protecting religion, since the anti-clericalism of liberals caused discontent among religious Indians. But the main reason for the revolts of the Indian masses during the liberal government was rooted in the aggravation of class contradictions. As Jaime Wheelock Roman, one of the leaders of Sandinista Nicaragua, wrote, the declaration of independence helped to dispel many of the illusions and prejudices of the Indians associated with the paternalistic policies of the colonial administration, and in the newly created government they saw their oppressors, their class enemies. 64
This was ably used - with the help of the church - by the conservatives, who corrected the social protest of the masses against Morazan and the liberals. As a result, his government fell, and the united Central American federation was torn apart into fiefdoms-states by oligarchic families and separatist movements. Morazan's attempt to restore the federation in 1842 ended in his death. Carlos Fonseca, one of the greatest revolutionary leaders in Central America, a popular hero of Nicaragua and the founder and permanent leader (until his death in November 1976) of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, compared the tragic end of Morazan's fate to the equally tragic end of the lives of Bolivar, Cespedes, Zapata and Villa .65
With the death of Morazan, a period of the so-called dark thirty years has come for the countries of the American Isthmus. "The history of Central America during this period is particularly full of 'revolutions and dictators'. " 66 The established dominance of landlords-feudal lords and church hierarchs contributed to the penetration of foreign (initially English, and then American) capital into Central American countries. This is how the union of internal and external reaction was formed, which still strives to maintain its dominant position in the sub-region. Under these circumstances, the Morazan tradition of fighting for the unity of Central America is intertwined with the traditions of the popular struggle against imperialism and its local clientele.

64 Wheelock Roman L. Op. cit., p. 89.

65 Sandino's Ideological Heritage, Moscow, 1982, p. 214.

66 Foster, W. Z. Essay on the Political History of America, Moscow, 1953, p. 403.

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For centuries, Central America has been on the periphery of world civilization, far from the main routes of human historical development. But now this once remote corner of the Spanish colonial possessions, the former backwater of the "banana republics" - vassals of American imperialism, has become an arena of active social action, a hot spot on the planet. This is due to the fact that at the turn of the 70s and 80s, Central America became the epicenter of class struggle in the western hemisphere. The victorious Sandinista popular Revolution in Nicaragua (July 19, 1979) was a catalyst for the growth of a popular movement in the countries of this sub-region, which is aimed at destroying the semi-feudal rule of the local oligarchy and its imperialist masters. And at present, the process of the rise of the revolutionary wave in Central America has not fully exhausted its potential. This is evidenced by the further deepening and expansion of the civil war in El Salvador, which the patriotic forces of this country are waging against the puppet pro-American regime. The growing guerrilla movement in Guatemala, which the country's rulers are unable to cope with, has actually led to a crisis of state power structures and, as its direct consequence, a leapfrog of successive dictatorships. The "democratic" facade of the reactionary Government in Honduras also collapsed. In Costa Rica, a country with the most stable and historically established traditions of bourgeois democracy, local tycoons, supported by the United States, were forced to put social reformist politicians in power in order to reduce the intensity of the popular struggle.

The general process of growing class struggle in the sub-region, including the armed struggle, is accompanied by an aggravation of ideological confrontation. The Reaction is making every effort to take advantage of the revolutionary heritage of the peoples of Central America. In El Salvador, the puppet government named one of the punitive battalions trained in the United States after the national hero of the country, the Atlacatl Indian chief, who led a heroic struggle against the Spanish colonialists. And this is not an isolated case. Therefore, K. Fonseca was right when he wrote that in the historical past of the people it is necessary to look for manifestations of patriotism directed against exploitation. It is the widespread propaganda of such manifestations that, in his opinion, gives weight to the most resolute calls for class struggle .67 And first among the political and military figures who represent this tradition of patriotism in Central America is Francisco Morazan.

67 Fonse, p. Op. cit., p. 303.

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