In the early morning hours of October 25, 1983, radio listeners in Central and South America heard the announcer of Radio Free Grenada broadcast: "The homeland is in danger! Interventionists are attacking it from the north and southwest." And from that moment on, the word "Grenada" - the name of a small island nation in the Caribbean Sea-was heard on the airwaves on many waves. From the reports of the telegraph agencies, it became known that the invasion began with the landing of marines from helicopters launched from the US Navy helicopter carrier Guam, and then from military transport aircraft arriving from Barbados at Perls airfield, near the town of Grenville in the north-east of the island. After 36 minutes Two battalions of rangers from the 75th Division of the US Army were parachuted onto the runway of the Point Salines International Airport, which was being built in the south-west of Grenada, after which helicopters and transport planes with interventionists began to land. Part of the Marines landed from the sea in the area of the Grenadian capital of St. Georges 1 .

So the US Marine Corps and the Rangers, who were "famous" for their atrocities back in Vietnam, with the support of attack aircraft, helicopter gunships and an armada of warships, including an aircraft carrier, helicopter carrier, missile cruiser, destroyers, frigates and amphibious ships, launched a rogue operation codenamed "Argent Fury" ("Flash of Rage"). The US aggression against a tiny state whose population could fit into four skyscrapers in New York, and the territory is almost three times smaller than the area of this city, has caused outrage among the world community. That same morning, President Reagan appeared at 9 o'clock. accompanied by Dominic Eugenia, the Prime Minister of the Eastern Caribbean state, Charles told reporters invited to the White House that " armed forces of six Caribbean countries and the United States have landed on the island of Grenada." According to him, the "invasion" was undertaken in order to "protect the lives of American citizens" after the coup d'etat there and the assassination of Grenadian Prime Minister M. Bishop. "The nightmare with our hostages in Iran," the head of the White House said, " must never happen again." The second goal of the invasion, he said, was to "prevent an increase in chaos" in Grenada and restore "law and order" and "government institutions in accordance with the will of the people." 2
On October 27, Reagan went on television to elaborate on the reasons for the invasion. However, he now avoided the term, replacing it with the words "rescue mission" 3 . In addition, the heroic, several-day resistance of the Grenadian people's army (numbering about 700 fighters, which did not have tanks, aircraft or heavy artillery) to the aggressor armed to the teeth thwarted Washington's plans to complete the invasion operation in a few hours and put the world community in front of a fait accompli. The White House's blatant disregard for the norms of international law, the UN and OAS charters, which prohibit unprovoked armed intervention in the affairs of other countries "for whatever reason", caused such a negative reaction around the world, among some of them

1 The Gardian, 5. XI. 1983; Time, November 7, 1983, p. 12; Newsweek, November 7, 1983, pp. 22, 23. By November, the number of interventionists on the island had reached 7,355 (International Herald Tribune, 17-18. XI. 1983) . military personnel on the ships of the squadron - more than 15 thousand.

2 The New York Times, 26.X.1983; International Herald Tribune, 26.X.1983; Washington Post, 27.X.1983; Time, November 7, 1983, pp. 13, 20, 33.

3 Political Affairs, December 1983, vol. 62, N 12, p. 33.

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members of Congress , as well as in the US press, said that Reagan now needed legal camouflage for his actions. This led him to pay particular attention to the request for "assistance" from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) member States.

Justifying the US intervention as an alleged "threat to the lives of American citizens" in Grenada, Reagan, however, did not provide any facts confirming the real existence of such a threat, and again referred to events related to the death of the Prime Minister of Grenada and the coming to power of the Revolutionary Military Council there. He reported the following: "In the early hours of Saturday morning, I was woken up and told that six members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, along with Jamaica and Barbados, were urgently requesting that we join them in conducting a military operation to restore order and democracy in Grenada. Three of these countries have no armies at all." Then the head of the White House said that Grenada has become "a Soviet-Cuban colony, prepared as an important military bastion designed to export terrorism and undermine democracy." U.S. forces there "found a prepared base with weapons and communications equipment that clearly shows that a Cuban occupation of the island was planned." 5
Commenting on this speech, the Washington Post newspaper on October 28, 1983 noted that the topic of Cuba's participation "sounded like a crescendo", whereas in the initial statements of officials Cuba was not mentioned at all and it was only about protecting US citizens. "The President did not mention Cuba or the Soviet Union in his initial explanation of the invasion of Grenada," wrote the New York Times columnist E. Lewis," but by the time he addressed the country on television, these points already had a defining and ominous meaning in his speech. " 6 To convince the whole world that the request of Caribbean countries for" help " for the US president who was on vacation was "unexpected", which got him out of bed at 5 o'clock. In the morning, the White House sent out photos of Reagan in his pajamas, talking with Secretary of State John Kerry, to newspaper offices and television stations. Schultz and National Security Aide R. McFarlane, and then on the phone with Washington 7 .

All these actions from the very beginning were lies that do not stand up to comparison with real facts. And the latter irrefutably indicate that the "crusade" against the people of Grenada, who committed the second popular revolution in the Caribbean after the Cuban one on March 13, 1979, began immediately as soon as the People's Revolutionary Government headed by the leader of the New Movement JEWEL (NDD) party, M. Bishop, took power there. Washington has used an extensive arsenal of methods for this purpose - from diplomatic, economic, military and political blackmail, "psychological warfare" and threats to acts of sabotage, sabotage, terrorism and preparation of direct armed intervention.

The very next day after the overthrow of the reactionary regime of E. Geiri, nicknamed by analogy with the Haitian tyrant F. Duvalier," Pope Doc of the English-speaking West Indies, " said the US State Department expressed "grave concern about the incident." At the beginning of April 1979, the American Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean countries (with residence in Barbados) F. Ortiz, visiting the capital of Grenada, handed Bishop a statement demanding to avoid "close ties with Cuba." As for the economic aid promised earlier to Grenada, he said that it can only be about $ 5,000 for each of the projects listed by its leaders. 8 Bishop rejected Washington's claims: "Grenada is a sovereign and independent country, and although it is barely visible on the world map, no state has the right to do so." rights to dictate

4 For more information, see: Nitoburg E. L. Bandit action against Grenada. - Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 1984, No. 1.

5 Washington Post, 28.X.1983; Time, November 7, 1983, p 30; U. S. News and World Report, November 7, 1983, pp. 24, 31.

6 Cit. by: Za rubezhom, 11. XI. 1983, N 46, p. 9.

7 Time, November 7, 1983, pp. 24, 31; U. S. News and World Report, November 7,1983.

8 Bishop M. Selected Speeches, 1979 - 1981. Habana. 1983, pp. 8 - 9, 50; Canadian Tribune, 17.VIII.1981.

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tell us what we should do and with whom to maintain friendly relations... We would rather give our lives than compromise, sell or betray our sovereignty, independence and the right of our people to national self-determination and social progress. " 9
Then, in May 1979, fires broke out in St. George's almost simultaneously: the building of commercial firms and the tourist center caught fire. The first arson attack was supposed to cause discontent among the business community and in the middle strata, the second-to scare away tourists and stop the influx of foreign currency. Ortiz, during an April visit to St. Georges, threatened that Grenada could lose 10 tourists . At the same time, an anti-Grenadian campaign was launched in the US press, and ex-dictator Geary, warmed by Washington, was allowed to recruit counter-revolutionaries and mercenaries to organize sabotage and an armed invasion of Grenada .11 An interagency task force on Caribbean affairs was set up in Washington to destabilize Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Dominica in order to replace the progressive governments that were in power there in 1979, move these English-speaking Caribbean countries to the right, and then use them to fight the revolutionary Grenada. At the same time, the CIA's Pyramid plan came into effect, which called for the organization of a naval blockade, an economic boycott, and subversive activities against Grenada .12
In the spring of 1980. The US National Security Council discussed the issue of conducting "special operations" in Grenada. The administration of President D. Carter refused to accept the ambassador of this country, Desima Williams, and the Reagan administration, which replaced her, refused to accept the new Ambassador D. Emanuel. Washington has not accredited its own ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean countries in Grenada .13 An attempt by US diplomacy at the eleventh session of the OAS General Assembly in December 1981 to persuade its delegates to take action against Grenada failed. Washington also failed at the 3rd Conference of Heads of State of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)-an organization of English - speaking Caribbean countries - in November 1982 to achieve the exclusion of Grenada from this organization. After a trip to Washington in June 1983, where Bishop, without abandoning the principled course of the people's government policy, held talks with US Assistant to the President for National Security W. Clark and First Deputy Secretary of State C. Dam, he reported that the White House clearly did not want to normalize relations with Grenada .14
During the years of the people's power on the island, the CIA organized a series of counter-revolutionary plots in Grenada, as well as attempts on Bishop's life. The first conspiracies were discovered in October-November 1979. The central figure in them was a career CIA agent S. Cyrus, who worked as a teacher in one of the rural schools in Grenada. Among the conspirators were former prominent politicians, police officers and soldiers of the Geiri regime. Relying on local reactionaries, Cyrus led the preparation of the coup, recruited its participants, helped to illegally import weapons into the country and draw up anti-government leaflets. During the arrest, the conspirators were found to have a large number of firearms and ammunition, large amounts of money, and documents confirming the CIA's involvement in the coup plot .15
In March-April 1980, an attempted coup organized by the "ultra-left" of the Grenada People's Army was uncovered. On June 19, an explosion occurred at a rally in St. Georges dedicated to the memory of freedom fighters, under the podium where members of the government were sitting .16 On the machinations of the counter-revolution Narodnoye re-

9 Bishop M. Op. cit., p. 15; Granma, 16.IV.1979.

10 Вishор M. Op. cit., pp. 8, 23.

11 Amsterdam News, N. Y., 29.X.1983.

12 Bishop M. Op. cit., pp. 22 - 23; Canadian Tribune, 21.VI.1979; El Dia, Mejico 11, 12.VI.1981; New Perspectives, June 1981, p. 13.

13 Washington Post, 22.IV.1983.

14 The New York Times, 1.VI.1983; Granma, 6, 11.VI.1983; Washington Post, 30 X. 1983

15 El Tiempo, Bogota, 5.XI.1979; Granma, 5, 9, 10, 23.XI.1979; Canadian Tribune 19.XI, 10.XII.1979; Bishop M. Op. cit., pp. 78, 136.

16 El Tiempo, 3.V.1980; Bishop M. Op. cit., pp. 132, 135, 142, 204; La Nacion Buenos Aires, 21.VI.1980; International Herald Tribune, 21, 22.VI.1980.

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The revolutionary government responded by calling on the country's citizens to " Join the people's militia to defend the motherland!"and opened points for the recruitment of volunteers for the formation of reserve units 17 .

When attempts to physically destroy the leaders of Grenada failed, the CIA put Geary in touch with the leader of a mercenary gang, M. Perdue, who was supposed to invade Grenada. Then, in May 1981, Bishop stated that CIA agents and local reactionaries operating on the island were resorting to sabotage and sabotage, trying to use criminal and declassified elements to prepare the conditions for the invasion of mercenaries. Less than a month later, a new plot was uncovered by Grenada's security forces, and the printing office of an illegal newspaper calling for the overthrow of the Popular Revolutionary Government was discovered. The 26 people arrested during the operation were connected to the CIA through E. Wills, then the first secretary of the US Embassy in Barbados, who repeatedly visited Grenada .18 In early 1983, the public learned that in 1981, the CIA had developed another plan that included creating artificial economic difficulties in Grenada, organizing sabotage and sabotage. Only at the last moment was its implementation canceled, because the US Congress considered this plan adventurous .19
Military and political blackmail has also been used since the summer of 1979. Spy planes and helicopters from US warships in the Caribbean have appeared in Grenada's airspace. Grenada's maritime borders were also violated, and "unidentified" submarines appeared in its waters .20 In 1980, the United States established the headquarters of the Caribbean Task Force on the southern tip of Florida to conduct subversive activities against progressive countries in this region. In August-October 1981, during the maneuvers of the American Fleet in the Caribbean Sea, the landing operation on Vieques Island (near Puerto Rico) was practiced, which was a rehearsal for the invasion of Grenada. This was evidenced both by the choice of location and the composition of the units participating in it (the 2nd battalion of paratroopers of the 75th Division Rangers and the Marine Corps), and by the task assigned to them - "saving 30 American citizens taken hostage" by local authorities, overthrowing the "unfriendly government", occupying the island, establishing there a "friendly regime" and the establishment of a" democracy " modeled on the United States 21 . The Government of Grenada appealed to the UN to expose the purpose of the maneuvers, citing secret US documents. "We know," said its Foreign Minister, Yu. Whiteman, "that the US is actively looking for an excuse to invade." 22 At the same time, the Ministry of Defense of Grenada called on the population to be ready to repel aggression. Washington, meanwhile, continued to flex its muscles in the Caribbean. In November 1981, the creation of a regional command of the US armed forces in the Caribbean was announced, with broad powers to prepare military operations in the region. During the maneuvers in April 1982, an operation was again carried out with the release of parachutists to "capture the enemy island", and again it was Vieques.

In 1981, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States was created, which included six English-speaking independent countries and two British possessions in the Caribbean. In the fall of 1982, a military bloc was formed in the Caribbean Sea under the name "Regional Security and Defense System", which included Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia. Grenada was not allowed in. The true purpose of this "defense system" was revealed by the Prime Minister of Antigua, W. Baird, who said that it could be used to stop "attempts to overthrow governments" in the countries of the bloc. "We cannot allow another Cuba or Grenada to appear in our region, -

17 Bishop M. Op. cit., pp. 141 - 144; Financial Times, 21.VI. 1980.

18 Canadian Tribune, 8.V.1981; Granma, 12.VII.1981; Daily World, 23.VI, 10.IX.1981; Bishop M. Op. cit., pp. 196, 218 - 219, 278.

19 Izvestia, 28. II. 1983; Pravda, 29. II. 1983.

20 Granma, 1.VIII.1979.

21 El Dia, 20, 21.VIII.1981; Canadian Tribune, 31.VHI.1981; Bishop M. Op. cit., p. 279; Grenada: the World against the Crime. Habana. 1983, pp. 68 - 69.

22 Morning Star, 2.XI.1983; Daily World, 14.XII.1983; People's World., 29.X.1983.

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"The idea is to let people know that even if they are successful in their own country, they will have to deal with troops from other islands." 23 In March 1983, during regular maneuvers involving 77 combat vessels, a landing ship with US Marines on board cruised in the immediate vicinity of Grenada 24 .

In parallel to diplomatic and military pressure, Washington used economic levers. The State Department recommended that U.S. travel agencies discourage people from traveling to Grenada, and nearly half of these agencies refused to serve people who wanted to go there. At the same time, the US press reported that the beaches in Grenada are fenced with barbed wire and patrolled by armed soldiers and police. In 1980, the influx of tourists from the United States to Grenada decreased by 25%, in 1981-even more than 25 . In addition, for several years, the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which is run by the United States, denied Grenada loans. The White House and State Department also pressured Western European countries not to provide economic assistance to Grenada. A White House envoy to the Common Market headquarters in the spring of 1981 sought to end aid to Grenada from the EEC, although as a member of the Loma Convention (an economic association of 60 developing countries with a Common Market) it was entitled to a guaranteed minimum of 26 financial assistance .

In the same year, Washington tried to get member States of the Caribbean Development Bank to remove Grenada from the list of recipients of financial assistance distributed through this bank. In February 1982, Washington announced Reagan's "Caribbean Initiative" - the allocation of several hundred million dollars for the implementation of the Caribbean development Plan. The lion's share was allocated to El Salvador and Honduras, while Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Guyana were excluded from the plan. Describing this initiative as aimed at undermining the cooperation of Caribbean countries and protecting imperialist interests in the region, the French monthly noted that it "for all its economic cover... it was primarily political in nature." Former Prime Minister of Jamaica M. Manley stated: "To understand the real purpose and extent of the political cynicism of this plan, it is necessary to compare those who are included in it and those who are left out of it." 27 Under pressure from the United States, a number of Western banks refused to participate in the implementation of economic projects proposed by Grenada. In their offensive against the Grenadian economy, the imperialists also used their control over the markets for agricultural products.

A special place was given to psychological warfare to create perverse ideas about revolutionary Grenada. The "crusade" against a small country was accompanied by a disinformation campaign on VOA, Deutsche Welle, and in print. There was a lot of hype in the US press about the " Marxist tumor on the Carib body." A West German magazine claimed that a base for Soviet submarines had been built on the island of Carriacou, Grenada. The American magazine lamented the "tragic fate awaiting Grenada" of becoming "the first English-speaking socialist state in the world." The reactionary press of some English-speaking Caribbean countries joined the campaign. Up to 170 articles were published monthly in the Western bourgeois press, which distorted the essence of the transformations that were taking place in Grenada .28
Leading figures in the United States took an active part in this campaign. Reagan repeatedly made statements that Grenada was caught in the net of the " left totali-

23 Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik, Januar 1984, N 1, S. 52; Caribbean Contact, Barbados, April 1983, p. 13.

24 Daily World, 18.III, 14.XII.1983; Granma, 22.III.1983.

25 Granma, 1, 12. IV. 1981; New Perspectives, June 1981, p. 15; Canadian Tribune, 17. VIII. 1981; Abroad, 7. VIII. 1981, N 32, p. 17.

26 Canadian Tribune, 20.IV.1981; Bishop M. Op. cit., pp. 211 - 212, 267 - 268.

27 Latin American Weekly Report, August 3, 1981; International Herald Tribune, 2.XII.1983; Le Monde diplomatique, Decembre 1983, p. 9; New African, May 1982, p. 44.

28 Bishop M. Op. cit, p. 210; International Herald Tribune, 10. XI. 1982; Newsweek, March 31, 1980, p. 18; Abroad, 24. V. 1981, N 22, p. 16; 18. III. 1983, N 12, p. 13.

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and supplies weapons" to the patriots of El Salvador. When he visited Barbados in April 1982, he said that "the virus of communism is spreading from Grenada." On March 10, 1983, at the annual meeting of the National Association of Industrialists of the United States, he claimed that Grenada was becoming a "Soviet-Cuban base" that threatened the US oil supply routes in the southern Caribbean; "The Caribbean Sea and Central America are our fourth border, and we must defend ourselves"; a few days later, he declared that " the Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada can only be seen as a show of force in the region." 29
Reagan repeatedly mentioned the fact that Grenada is building an airport with a long runway, capable of handling heavy jet aircraft. Photos captured by a spy satellite were shown. They were shown in March 1983 to members of the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs by the Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States of America, John F. Kennedy. Icle. However, it soon became clear that next to the airport under construction are dormitories founded in 1977 in Grenada by a billionaire American medical school (which was attended by 630 students), the teaching staff and administration of which are US citizens. And these students usually train in running just on the runway, and photos of them, as well as the airport under construction, were published in the press. In addition, not only Cubans took part in the construction of the airport, but also specialists from other Latin American and Western European countries, Canada, the English firm Plessis Airport30, and the US firm Lane Dredging . In addition, Barbados, Antigua, Saint Lucia, Trinidad and Curacao have long had similar international airports, some with even longer runways. US Congressman R. Dellams told a House subcommittee that, in the opinion of employees of the Ministry of Defense and the US Navy Command, Grenada, even with a new airport, does not pose any threat to the United States. The Plessis company, which was awarded the contract for the airport's equipment, said that the airport was designed as a tourist destination, that it did not have military equipment; that the British government had guaranteed financial participation in the project, which it would not have done if the airport had military significance .31
Slanderous attacks against Grenada continued in the following months. The propaganda war was especially intensified in the summer of 1983, when American agencies flooded the Caribbean press with reports about the "erosion" of the revolutionary process in Grenada, about sharp disagreements in the leadership of the NDP party and the People's Revolutionary Government .32 Bishop exposed this kind of fiction in a speech on Grenada Radio as early as September 18, 197933 . But the US intelligence agencies continued, and since the summer of 1983, sharply increased the disinformation campaign.

As the US press noted in late October 1983, the Reagan administration had been demanding that CARICOM countries "isolate" Grenada and consider military action against it since the summer of 1983. At the same time, the Grenadian counter-revolutionary emigration to Barbados became more active. One of the leaders of the so-called Grenada Democratic Movement, F. Alexis, bluntly stated that the first action of the future government of Grenada, if he heads it, will be "breaking relations with the USSR, Cuba and Libya." 34 In August 1983, Geary arrived in Barbados, announcing that he would soon return to power in St. George's .35 The facts show that the decision to invade Grenada was the completion of a long and carefully prepared plan.-

29 International Herald Tribune 10.XI.1982; Time, November 7, 1983, pp. 13, 19; Department of States Bulletin, May 1983, vol. 83, N 2074, p. 6; Granma, 22, 23.III.1983.

30 Le nouvel observateur, Octobre 29, 1983; U. S. News and World Report, November 7, 1983, p. 12; Daily World, 4.V1.1981; Sunday Express, 31.X.1983.

31 Daily World, 4.VI.1981; The Times, 1.XI.1983; Nation, November 12, 1983, p. 468; Granma, 24.I V. 1983; Political Affairs, December 1983, p. 37; The New York Times, 3 XI 1983

32 The New York Times, 7, 10.VIII.1983; Time, October 31, 1983, p. 33; U. S. News and World Report. October 31, 1983.

33 Bishop M. Op. cit., p. 63; Political Affairs, March 1980, vol. LIX, N 3, p. 40.

34 Novoe vremya, 4. XI. 1983, N 45, p. 13.

35 Izvestia, 15. IX. 1983; Komsomolskaya Pravda, 18. IX. 1983; The New York Times, 1, 3. XI. 1983.

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share price. It is no coincidence that the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, T. O'Neill, referring to information he received from former Secretary of State A. Hague, said after the invasion that Reagan "for two years was looking for an opportunity to invade Grenada. I believe the excuse was found when Bishop was killed. " 36
The differences that emerged in the Grenadian leadership concerned the pace of development of the country and the methods of leading the revolutionary process. In the summer of 1983, discussions in the Central Committee of the NDD were complicated by personal contradictions and turned into a conflict. The US special services played a role in inciting it 37 . Washington was only waiting for the right moment for an invasion. It came in the autumn of 1983, when the split in the leadership of the party and the State deepened in Grenada .38 In late September and early October, Bishop was on a business visit to Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, from September 23 to October 2, in the vicinity of Efrat (USA), paratroopers of the 2nd battalion of the 75th Division, in an atmosphere of special secrecy, practiced the invasion operation in conditions that reproduce the situation in the area of the completed Grenada airport at Point Salines .39
By the time Bishop returned to Grenada on October 8, the divisions in the Grenadian leadership had reached their limit. Bishop, who was removed from his party post, was placed under house arrest on October 12,40 This served as a signal to Washington to immediately prepare for an invasion. Coordination of joint actions with Caribbean leaders, in particular with the Prime Minister of Barbados D. Adams, who has long been associated (as the Washington magazine "Covert Action" reported in May 1980) with the CIA, began on October 15 .41 Recall: Reagan said after the invasion that he learned about the "request of the Caribbean countries" only when he was "woken up in the early morning" on October 22. Shortly after the invasion, the US Ambassador to France, I. Galbraith, let slip in a television interview that it "was an action launched two weeks ago." Then he said that he "misspoke". But the State Department official had to admit the next day that discussions with the Eastern Caribbean countries about the invasion of Grenada had begun on October 15 , 42 thus refuting the statements made on October 25 and 27 by the US President and Secretary of State that the question of the invasion arose in Washington only after the death of Bishop on October 19.

Nevertheless, the same representative tried to convince the public that "the idea that the United States inspired a request from Caribbean countries is not true." 43 But this lie was also exposed on October 30, 1983 by The New York Times, which reported that "after a week of diplomatic correspondence" on this issue, " the wording of the request was drawn up in Washington and transmitted to the Caribbean leaders by special American emissaries." This role was taken over by the then Chairman of the DECR Yu. Charles, who "arrived at the meeting (of the leaders of the OVKG. - E. N.) already provided with a corresponding letter to the US administration, prepared in advance by the US State Department. The leaders of the Caribbean States had only to sign it. " 44
In mid-October, as Adams claimed immediately after the invasion, he received a letter from the Governor-General of Grenada, P. Scone, who represented the British army there.

36 The New York Times, 3.XI.1983.

37 South, December 1983, p. 14; New Left Review, December 1983, pp. 93-94; Canadian Tribune, 9. I. 1984 (see about this: Nitoburg E. L., Rovinskaya E. L. Grenada: the Fate of the Big Revolution in a small country. - New and recent History, 1983, N 5, p. 142-143).

38 Declaraciones de Cuba sobre los sucesos de Granada. Octubre 1983. Habana. 1983, pp. 1 - 2; Time, October 31, 1983, p. 33; Newsweek, October 31, 1983; The Times, 1. X. 1983; South, December 1983, pp. 13 - 16; Freedomways, 1983, vol. 23, N 4, pp. 274 - 275; Canadian Tribune, 9.I.1984.

39 People's World, 12.XI.1983.

40 Ibid., 29.X.1983; Freedomways, 1983, vol. 23, N 4, p. 275; New Left Review, December 1983, p. 94.

41 Daily World, 10.II.1981; Le Monde diplomatique, Decembre 1983, p. 9; The New York Times, 28.X.1983; Washington Post, 30.X.1983.

42 The New York Times, 30.X., 6.XI.1983; Washington Post, 28.X.1983; San Francisco Chronicle, 2.XI.1983: The Times, 23.XI 1983.

43 The New York Times, 30.X.1983.

44 Blätter für deutsche und Internationale Politik, Januar 1984, N 1, S. 51.

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the Crown, with a request to "friendly countries to land on Grenada and restore order," after which he consulted with the leaders of the DECR member countries. The non-member Government of Barbados then decided, ostensibly to "rescue Bishop" while in custody, to cooperate with "Eastern Caribbean and some of the larger countries that have the resources necessary to carry out such a complex operation" .45 The cynicism of the invented excuse was that it was about "saving" a person whom the White House had previously supported in every possible way for several years. But this version was another lie, because Skoon's letter to Adams about "help" was dated October 24 (and came to Barbados not through diplomatic channels), and the request of the OVKG for" help " to Washington - on October 22, when Bishop had already died. In addition, Skun legally had no authority to ask for such "help". The London Cabinet and Buckingham Palace said that they had not received any requests from Skoon and had not been given any instructions of this kind. The Observer, an English newspaper, noted on October 30, 1983, that Skoon had not sent any letter of "help" at all before the invasion, and if he had written it, it was later, when the interventionists transported him from the island to their helicopter carrier Guam .46
As you know, on October 19, in support of Bishop, whose authority among the masses was very high, his supporters organized a demonstration in St. George's se. They released the Prime Minister from house arrest and moved through the city to Fort Rupert, located on the outskirts of the capital, where the arsenal and headquarters of the armed forces were located. They were joined by more demonstrators, and several thousand people came to the fort. According to foreign press reports, there was a shootout 47 . On the evening of October 19, the death of Bishop, Minister of Education, Youth Affairs and Social Affairs J. Kreft, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu. Whiteman, Housing Minister N. Bain, and union leaders W. Noel and F. Bain 48 . In an effort to prevent the people from turning the funeral of the leader of the revolution into a mass demonstration, the enemies of Grenada secretly removed his body to an unknown destination.

On May 23, 1984, the newspaper Le Monde published an article by its correspondent in St. Georges, which quotes the opinion of a surviving associate of Bishop, one of the founders and leaders of the New JEWEL Movement party, and the Minister of Justice of the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, K. K. Bishop. The raid code. The latter stated: "It is possible that the Central Committee of our movement was infiltrated by CIA agents... It was clear that the Americans got the excuse they had been waiting for for a long time." Some foreign journalists and political figures in the first weeks after the US attack on Grenada drew attention to the " incomprehensible coordination of all the events of October 19, raising the question of the involvement of the US special services in them. This was reported in November 1983 by the San Francisco Chronicle columnist I. Carroll, the son of the vice-rector of the American Medical School in Grenada P. Burne, the leader of the People's National Party of Jamaica and the Prime Minister of this country in 1972-1980 M. Manley49 .

In December 1983, a number of new facts were published showing that the CIA was directly involved in Bishop's murder. A center was set up at the U.S. Embassy in Barbados to coordinate operations against Grenada, headed by a CIA resident named Harrge. His subordinates, including E. Wills, who visited Grenada, established contacts with some local military, security and police officers who had previously been trained in the United States and England. The head of the Prime Minister's personal security was recruited.-

45 The New York Times, 28.X.1983.

46 See also: International Herald Tribune, 29-30. X. 1983; The Times, 10, 23. X. 1983.

47 Washington Post, 20.X.1983; Newsweek, October, 31, 1983, pp. 35 - 36; Morning Star, 11.XI.1983; Canadian Tribune, 12.XII.1983; 9.I.1984.

48 Declaraciones de Cuba, p. 3; Morning Star, 11.XI.1983; Time, November 7, 1983, p. 19.

49 San Francisco Chronicle, 7. XI.1983; Los Angeles Times, 6.XI.1983; Nation, November 12, 1983, p. 468.

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ra S. St. Paul and one of his subordinates 50 . In February 1984, an article by Helen Ray and B. Schapp appeared about the activities of American intelligence agencies in Grenada. It reported that it was E. Wills who, during the landing of the interventionists, while on the Guam helicopter carrier, corrected the actions of the invasion forces from there. Bishop guessed that there were CIA agents in his entourage, as well as among the medical school students. At the time of the invasion, one of these students was broadcasting information to the interventionists about the situation in the area of St. Georges and the airport. This was also reported by the author of an article in the American weekly "Newsweek", who found out that the specified student was a graduate of the West Point Military Academy and a former US consul in Laos during the years of American aggression in Indochina. On February 24, the Indian newspaper Patriot in the article "CIA in Grenada" additionally cited a number of facts indicating the subversive activities of the US special services. C. Myers, a Grenadian Army officer who led the mob attempt on Fort Rupert on October 19, was also a CIA agent .51 British journalist Hugh O'Shaughnessy, in an article published by the London Observer newspaper, said that this officer had previously served in the US Army and was in the garrison of West Berlin. Shortly before the invasion of Grenada, the head of the US delegation to the UN, J. Kirkpatrick, said at one of the meetings in the presence of the president: "We are tired of using blank cartridges. It's time to teach this pack of jackals a lesson, and we should start with Bishop. " 52 Already on the day of his death, the State Department formed a special group headed by Deputy Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs M. Motley to monitor the course of events in Grenada, and the US Navy destroyer, which was in the territorial waters of St. Vincent, began patrolling its maritime border.

On October 20, a 16-member Revolutionary Military Council was formed in Grenada, headed by General X. Austin. He took power into his own hands. A curfew was imposed. In the evening, at a meeting of the situation group convened at the White House, Reagan ordered the preparation of military units of the invasion and ordered the US squadron of nine ships sent to Lebanon the day before, led by the aircraft carrier Independence with 70 aircraft on board, to set a course for Grenada, as well as strengthen them with an amphibious commando group. Officially, this should have been explained as a "precautionary measure" taken to "protect the lives of American citizens" on island 53 . On the same day, the Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, D. Compton, after meeting with his Barbadian counterpart Adams, asked the Chairman of CARICOM, D. Chambers, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, to urgently convene a meeting of the Heads of Government of the CARICOM member countries in Barbados (Chambers organized it on 22 October in Trinidad, but Adams said that he did not will be able to attend "as the JCCC military invasion of Grenada is being prepared") 54 .

On October 21, right-wing DECR leaders gathered in Barbados and asked for "help" from the United States, England and DECR associate member Jamaica. The leading role was played there by Jamaican Prime Minister E. Siaga 55 . The Washington farce-makers were not bothered by the fact that none of the articles of the treaty establishing the JCPOA has conditions that would allow military intervention of this organization or part of its members in the affairs of any of its member countries. As for Article 8 of the JCCC Charter, on the basis of which the "request for assistance" was formulated, it refers to "collective security measures against external aggression" and emphasizes that decisions on such measures, as in other articles regarding any military action, "must be taken unanimously". Meanwhile, DECR member Grenada was not invited to this meeting, and representatives of the British possessions of Saint Christopher Nevis and Montserrat belonging to the DECR did not participate in the voting-

50 New Wave, New Delhi, 18.XII.1983.

51 Covert Action, Information Bulletin, February 1984; Granma, 11.III.1984.

52 Patriot, New Delhi, 24.II.1984.

53 Washington Post, 21.X.1983; People's World, 29.X.1S83; The New York Times, 30.X.1983; Granma, 31.X.1983; Time, November 7, 1983, p. 19; The Economist, March 20, 1984.

54 The New York Times, 28.X.1983.

55 Washington Post, 27.X.1983; The Times, 28.X.1983; The New York Times, 28.X. 1983.

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Get out. Thus, the decision on the" request " made by five of the eight members of the OECS was a violation of the treaty and had no legal force. Later, the Permanent Council of the OAS explicitly qualified both him and the invasion of Grenada as a violation of international law. 56
At an extraordinary meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government meeting in Trinidad on 22 October, only 6 out of 13 members voted in favour of military action in Grenada: representatives of Guyana and Trinidad opposed intervention; representatives of the Bahamas and Belize abstained; and representatives of the two British possessions did not participate. Disputes continued on 23 October; it was decided to temporarily exclude Grenada from CARICOM and impose economic sanctions against it .57
Direct planning for the invasion operation in Washington began a few days before the meetings of the OECS and CARICOM leaders. This was confirmed by Jamaican Prime Minister Siaga, who said that " American officials were negotiating with Caribbean countries... even before they turned to the United States for military assistance to invade Grenada. " 58 By the time of the meetings, operation development and preparations were well underway. Marine Corps and Ranger units focused on Puerto Rico have begun moving to Barbados. On October 21, the squadron headed for the coast of Lebanon, turned to Grenada. On the same day, Washington began receiving fresh "intelligence necessary to prepare for the landing on Grenada," 59 and in the evening, Reagan left Washington to "spend a weekend" in Augusta, Georgia, and "play golf." 60 In order to disguise the Pentagon's plans .

All this happened even before, according to the official version, on Saturday, October 22, Reagan was" roused from his bed at five o'clock in the morning "and informed of the" request " of the Caribbean states. Meanwhile, on that Saturday, at the request of Charles Modica, the rector of the American Medical School in Grenada, whose students ' lives Reagan allegedly worried about, several members of the US Congress visited them on the island and were convinced that there was no threat to the students. Modica himself and his deputy, D. Bournet, announced that there was no danger to the students despite pressure from the US Ambassador to Barbados M. Bichat to American correspondents on their return home. The same thing was said by the American diplomat K. Carez, who arrived in Grenada on October 23 at the invitation of the Revolutionary Military Council to study the situation of students. "We," he said, "did not advise students to leave Grenada." 61 The same opinion was expressed by the parents of students who sent a telegram to Reagan asking him not to allow the US invasion of Grenada and not to endanger the lives of their children .62
Later, the school's treasurer, US citizen G. Solin, who has lived in Grenada for seven years, in turn, refuting the Washington administration's claims about a military "rescue mission" in Grenada, said that during his meeting with " General Hudson Austin... he guaranteed the safety of the students." "Our security has never been under threat," Solin said in an interview with the newspaper's correspondent. "We were used by our Government as an excuse to invade Grenada. They needed an excuse, and we proved to be such an excuse for them." 63 On October 22, at a press conference at the State Department, reporters

56 The New York Times, 26.X.1983; People's World, 29.X.1983; Time, November 7, 1983, p. 34.

57 The New York Times, 28.X.1983; Washington Post, 30.X.1983.

58 Washington Post, 27.X.1983; The Economist, March 20, 1984.

59 The New York Times, 22, 28. X. 1983; Granma, 31. X. 1983; Abroad, 28. X. 1983, N 44, p. 10.

60 Time, November 7, 1983, p. 19; U. S. News and World Report, November 7, 1983, p. 11.

61 The Times, 28.X.1983; International Herald Tribune, 28.X.1983; People's World, 29.X.1983; Le nouvel observateur, Octobre 29, 1983; Newsweek, October 31, 1983, p. 34; The Nation, November 5, 1983, p. 420; Grenada: the World against the Crime, p. 19; San Francisco Chronicle, -2.XI.1983; Le Monde diplomatique, Decembre 1983, p. 3.

62 Granma, 25.X.1983; People's World, 29.X.1983.

63 International Herald Tribune, 29 - 30.X.1983.

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It was officially stated that American citizens in Grenada were not harmed or in any danger at all. Finally, at the same time, Washington received a message from the Cuban Government inviting it to establish contact and cooperate in case there are difficulties in Grenada related to the safety of foreigners there, especially citizens of the United States and Cuba .64
In the meantime, Reagan continued the weekend to avoid speculation about his sudden return to the capital. And in Washington, at 9 a.m., under the chairmanship of Vice President Bush, a meeting of the US National Security Council began on the invasion of Grenada. One of the participants summed up the results with the words: "One-two, we got it!" 65 . The warships were on their way to Grenada, and it was decided not to hurry with the answer to Cuba; it was given after the invasion began .66
On Sunday, October 23, Reagan was woken up in Augusta at night and informed of the explosion at the US Embassy in Beirut and the death of more than 200 Americans there. After the phone calls, it's at 7 o'clock. I flew to Washington in the morning. Several meetings of the National Security Council were held there: the President together with Secretary of State D. Schultz, Pentagon Chief K. Weinberger, CIA Director W. Bush, and others. Casey and the other members of the council agreed on the main aspects of Operation Fury Flash. "The Lebanese tragedy," Time noted, "provided an opportunity to keep the immediate preparations for the invasion secret. " 67 On the same day, 23 representatives of UNESCO and other UN organizations, as well as CARICOM, flew from Perls airfield in a special plane from Grenada.

On October 24, the Revolutionary Military Council announced the lifting of the curfew in Grenada and the resumption of normal operations of enterprises, as well as the Perls airfield. Four planes took off that day, and among the dozens of passengers were U.S. citizens .68 At the same time, the U.S. Embassy in Barbados received a telegram from the Revolutionary Military Council, which announced that a civilian government would be established in Grenada within the next two weeks, and guaranteed that "the life, welfare, and property of every American citizen, as well as of any citizen of any country located in Grenada, will be completely inviolate." The Revolutionary Military Council suggested that the United States, if they wish, evacuate its citizens from the island of 69 . But the Reagan administration ignored this reassurance because it "did not feel that it could be trusted." 70 The squadron was already approaching Grenada, military transport planes with American Marines on board were landing on Barbados one by one, and the American nuclear-powered missile carrier Stonewall Jackson appeared off its coast.

Meanwhile, the explosion in Beirut, which was a consequence of Washington's imperialist, interventionist policy, caused a storm in the United States. This circumstance further strengthened the head of the White House and his advisers in their desire to quickly strike back, but in such a way that it would bring political dividends without risk and with the maximum chance of success. Grenada provided just such an opportunity. Reagan, the French newspaper Le Monde noted with some irony on November 5, 1983, "did not send his troops to Lebanon, Cuba, or Nicaragua... He chose a tiny, inconspicuous island... In any case, Grenada is located 2,400 kilometers from the American coast."

On the afternoon of October 24, the final meeting was held in Washington, where the invasion plan received the final approval of the President. In the evening, Reagan signed an order for its implementation. The White House had

64 San Francisco Chronicle, 2.XI.1983; Declaraciones du Cuba, pp. 9 - 10.

65 Time, November 7, 1983, p. 19.

66 Declaraciones de Cuba, pp. 13 - 15; Castro F. Una victoria militar pirrica у una proiunda derrota moral. Habana. 1983, pp. 13, 16 - 17.

67 Time, November 7, 1983, p. 20; U. S. News and World Report, November 7, 1983, p. 11.

68 San Francisco Chronicle, 2.XI.1983; The Times, 23.XI.1983; Christian Science Monitor, 1.XI.1983.

69 Granma, 25.X.1983; International Herald Tribune, 29 - 30.X.I 983; Christian Science Monitor, 1.XI.1983.

70 Time, November 7, 1983, p. 20.

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five congressional leaders were urgently invited, and they were shown through a rarely used entrance so that newspaper correspondents would not find out about it ahead of time. When the President finished announcing the administration's decision to invade Grenada and said that the operation would begin at five-thirty in the morning, they sat in silence. "No one asked for our advice," the Speaker of the House of Commons, T. O'Neill, later said of the meeting . The only one of the leaders of the governments of the US-allied NATO countries, whose opinion the head of the White House decided to find out, was British Prime Minister Thatcher. She spoke in favor of economic sanctions, but against military action 72 . Reagan wasn't deterred. And when White House Press Secretary L. Spix was asked by correspondents that same evening whether an American invasion of Grenada was expected, he replied:: "Absurd!" 73 .

The invasion operation was carefully hidden from the press. On October 25, the Pentagon sealed off Grenada, setting up a 50-mile military zone around it. For several days, correspondents were not allowed on the island at all, telegraph, telephone and other communications were interrupted with it. The New York Black newspaper Amsterdam News called the official American information about Grenada a "big lie." 74
Already during and especially after the invasion, not only the progressive, but also the bourgeois European and American press published materials exposing its organizers. For example, the London Sunday Times reported on October 31, 1983, that the airport on Grenada was civilian, not military, and was funded and built with the approval of the British government. Another English newspaper, in an article entitled "Why Washington Lied," called the pretexts put forward by Washington to justify the intervention a "blatant lie." 75 The French magazine in the article "The charms of disinformation", written by a correspondent who visited Grenada, exposing the falsity of the statements of Washington leaders about a certain threat to the lives of American citizens in Grenada, turning it into a "Soviet-Cuban military base", "a thousand Cuban troops" on the island, etc., concluded: "The Pentagon with great hype distributed a lot of "reports" that turned out to be refuted in a few days. " 76
"Administration officials and military authorities, "The New York Times stated," have been spreading a lot of false information. They made unsubstantiated claims, while concealing important facts and making it difficult for journalists to verify the accuracy of official statements. Some of these statements are deliberate misrepresentations and deliberately false accounts of events. This continued for a long time after the invasion began." The author of this article went on to give about a dozen examples of such "deliberate distortions" and "false statements." 77 The well-known American historian A. Schlesinger wrote even more sharply about this: "The administration, which threw mud at Bishop during his lifetime, suddenly, for no reason at all, makes a tragedy out of his death. Poor old Bishop probably didn't know how dear he was to us. Behind all these false arguments lies the simple fact that our president decided to demonstrate American power by launching a sneak attack on a regime that irritated him, which was so weak and isolated that it could be attacked with impunity. " 78
An impressive list of false statements of this kind was given by F. Castro on November 14, 1983, in a speech at a rally in memory of 24 Cuban internationalists who died heroically in Grenada. The U.S. government and its representatives, said

71 U. S. News and World Report, November 7, 1983, p. 11; Time, November 7, 1983, p. 20.

72 Time, November 7, 1983, p. 20.

73 Washington Post, 28.X.1983; U. S. News and World Report, November 7, 1983, p. 11.

74 Amsterdam News, 29.X.1983.

75 The Observer, 30.X.1983.

76 Le Monde diplomatique, Decembre 1983, p. 9.

77 The New York Times, 6.XI. 1983.

78 Wall Street Journal, 9.XI.1983, p. 30.

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they lied when, in an attempt to justify the invasion of Grenada, they claimed: "1. That Cuba was responsible for the coup d'etat and Bishop's death; 2. That American students were in danger of being turned into hostages; 3. That the main purpose of the invasion was to protect the lives of American citizens; 4. That the invasion was a" multinational operation " allegedly undertaken at the request of Mr. Skoon and Eastern Caribbean countries; 5. That Cuba planned invasion and occupation of Grenada; 6. That Grenada was becoming an important "Soviet-Cuban military base"; 7. That the airport under construction was not a civilian one, but a military one; 8. That weapons in Grenada were intended to "export subversive activities and terrorism"; 9. That the Cubans were the first to open fire; 10. That there were more than a thousand Cubans in Grenada; 11. That most Cubans were not construction workers, but professional soldiers; 12. That the invading forces sought to avoid destruction and civilian casualties; 13. That American troops will stay in Grenada for one week; 14. That rocket silos were being built in Grenada; 15. That the Vietnam Eroico was carrying "special weapons"; 16. That Cuba was warned of the invasion; 17. That 500 Cubans are allegedly fighting in the mountains; 18. That Cuba has ordered "reprisals" against American citizens; 19. That members of the press were not allowed (to enter Grenada) solely for the "safety of journalists" 79 . None of these claims, 2/3 of which were made personally by the US President, "has been proven, and absolutely all of them have been refuted by facts. Such a cynical use of lies to justify invading a small country is reminiscent of the methods used by Adolf Hitler during the years when the Second World War was being prepared and unleashed. " 80
For the current Washington administration, the principle of "the end justifies the means" seems to be central to its policy. It is no coincidence that when the UN General Assembly condemned the US aggression against Grenada by 108 votes to 9, Reagan said:: "One hundred countries in the United Nations disagree with us on almost every issue that is presented to them, whenever we are involved, but this does not take away my appetite." 81 But it is also no coincidence that, after carefully studying official documents of the State Department and other materials related to American-Grenadian relations, experts of the Washington research organization "Council on Western Hemisphere Affairs" came to the conclusion that none of the arguments used by the Reagan administration to justify aggression against Grenada does not stand up to criticism, because they are all false, because they aim to justify the open robbery of the United States in the international arena.

79 Castro F. Op, cit., pp. 1 - 12.

80 Ihid., p. 12.

81 The New York Times, 4.XI.1983.

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