The strong positions that militarism continues to hold in the social and political life of a number of Latin American countries, the role that international imperialism and local reaction assign to it in their attempts to restrain the revolutionary liberation movement of Latin American peoples, make it very important and urgent to study this problem in depth and comprehensively. The evolution of militarism in its specifically Latin American forms and manifestations largely explains the multiplicity of civil wars and coups d'etat that took place in the countries of the continent in the XIX-XX centuries, the frequent use of violence, particularly cruel methods of oppression of the masses and reprisals against popular movements.

The problem of Latin American militarism has already been studied to a certain extent in Soviet historiology1, but the works that have appeared so far have dealt primarily with the relationship between "army and politics" and most often with the history of Latin American countries after World War II. In one way or another, the problem of militarism was also addressed in numerous general works on the history of Latin America. However, the origins and early stages of the evolution of the phenomenon itself remained out of the field of view of our researchers. Some attention to these issues, especially in the last two decades, has been paid by American and Latin American authors, who most often consider the problem within the framework of a single country2 .

This article attempts to analyze the genesis and first stages of the evolution of Latin American militarism. The choice of a theme only partially developed in Soviet and foreign historiography is also explained by the fact that many specific features of Latin American militarism were already evident at the early stages of the development of the countries of this region, namely, during the conquest (Spanish

1 See A. F. Shulgovsky, Latin America: Army and Liberation Movement, Moscow, 1972. Army and Politics in Latin America, Moscow, 1979; Antonov Yu. A. Brazil: Army and Politics, Moscow, 1973.

2 Velazquez M. El Estacio de Guerre en Nueva Espana, 1760 - 1808. Mexico. 1950; Gutierrez Santos D. Historia militar de Mexico. 1325 - 1810. Mexico. 1961; Villanueva V. El militarismo en el Peru. Lima. 1962; Johnson J. J. The Military and Society in Latin America. Stanford. 1964; Gilmore R. L. Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela. 1810-1910. Athens. 1964; Lozova J. A. El Ejercito Mexicano. Mexico. 1970; Mc. AIister L. The Reorganization of the Army. In: History of Latin American Civilization. Vol. 1. Boston. 1973; Campbell L. G. The Military and Society in Colonial Peru. 1750 - 1810. Philadelphia. 1978; Kuethe A. J. The Development of the Cuban Military as a Sociopolitical Elite. 1763 - 1783. - Hispanic American Historical Review, Durham, November 1981, Vol. 61, N 4.

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during the colonial period of Latin American history (the beginning of the XVI - beginning of the XIX century) and in the first decades after the conquest of political independence by its countries.

The discovery and beginning of the conquest of America by the Spanish "Catholic kings" was considered by the papacy as an unprecedented crusade, because in America the Vatican saw the similarity of the vast Muslim world - the traditional object of the crusades, a vast pagan country whose peoples should rather be converted to the Christian faith. It is also important that it was in the year of the discovery of America that the reconquista (reconquest of previously occupied Arab lands), which lasted for more than seven centuries, was completed with the conquest of the last Muslim state on the Iberian Peninsula - the Emirate of Granada. This last stage of the reconquista was carried out by the "Catholic kings" of Spain as another crusade, amid the rise of mass religious fanaticism. And the discovery of the New World promised new, boundless opportunities for the small Spanish nobles who had become too numerous and were "out of business"-hidalgo, who considered the only possible field for themselves to be military. They were still completely possessed by the inertia of conquest, and the predatory goals of war were wrapped in religious veils.

The Conquest left a deep imprint on the development of feudalism in Spain, giving it very peculiar forms. It is important for us that a number of its institutions were formed in the context of the almost continuous state of war between the Christian states of the Iberian Peninsula and the Muslim ones for more than seven centuries. By the time of the discovery of America and the beginning of its conquest, Spain itself had developed a system of military - feudal institutions, adapted primarily for a long war and proved its effectiveness by the very fact of the victorious completion of the reconquista. This was sufficient reason for the Spanish crown to apply the specified military-feudal system, with some changes that were dictated by local conditions, and in the process of conquering America.

Already in the first stages of the conquest, the Spanish crown faced the problem of military measures to retain the lands captured in America and maintain the colonization order there. The crown awarded the title of adelantado (from the Spanish "adelante" - "forward", "ahead") to the leaders of the advanced detachments of the conquistadors (Spanish conquerors) who carried out the actual conquest. This position originated during the reign of Alfonso X the Wise, King of Castile and Leon (1252-1284), it was assigned to the rulers of the border areas with the Arabs, who during the Reconquista had to solve a wide range of military, judicial, and political tasks. Similar powers were given to the Adelantados in America, where, in addition to directing the conquest, they organized an extensive program of military activities, as well as the political and economic structure of the lands they conquered.

When the conquest of America was largely completed and the features of the huge colonial empire belonging to the Spanish crown began to become clear, political and administrative units were established there and colonial administration was established. Already in the first half of the 16th century, two viceroyalties were formed-New Spain (approximately within the borders of present-day Mexico, Central America, and the Antilles), Peru (about half of the mainland of South America, except Brazil and Venezuela), and in the 18th century, two more were separated from the viceroyalty of Peru-New Granada (approximately within the borders of present-day Colombia and Ecuador) and Rio de La-

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Plata (Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay). The supreme power of the King of Spain was represented here by the viceroys. The idea of vicerooms was not new. As early as the beginning of the 15th century, the viceroyships under the rule of the Spanish kings were Sicily and Sardinia. In 1503, the Spanish-conquered Kingdom of Naples also became a viceroyalty.

The range of powers and responsibilities of viceroys and captains-general (heads of smaller administrative units in America) in the military field was very extensive. Their military functions were primarily as follows: 1) further expansion of colonization by sending new armed detachments ("entrada") to the"deep" areas; 2) suppression of Indian uprisings; 3) protection of the Spanish colonies from attacks from outside. To perform these functions, the Viceroy (or captain-General) was invested with the supreme military authority on land and in the seas surrounding his subordinate lands, and had at his disposal detachments of regular Spanish troops, which, however, were very small, owing to the extreme cost of maintaining these troops, which were hired at that time, and the difficulties of transportation They're from Spain.

The mainstay of the military power of the Spanish viceroyalty and captaincy General in America was in the XVI-XVII centuries. militias composed of encomenderos, i.e. encomienda holders. We are talking about one of the most important methods of enslaving peasants in Spain during the conquest period, which was used by the conquistadors in America to enslave the Indian population. Encomienda is the transfer of certain possessions, settlements, and individuals to the protection of a feudal lord with sufficient power and influence. In Spain, he was called a comendero, received a fixed fee from his wards, and they performed certain duties in his favor. The Encomienda appeared in Spain in the ninth century, and reached its greatest development in the fourteenth century, when the Comenderos began to turn the lands under their protection into their own fiefdoms. The feudal institution of the encomienda was also applied by the Spanish conquerors in America. Here," under the care and protection " of a particular conquistador, or in other words, in his encomienda, several crowded Indian villages were transferred at once. By the laws established by the Spanish Crown in America, the holder of the encomienda was supposed not only to protect his wards, but also to carry out the work of introducing them to "truly Christian customs and virtues", that is, to convert them to Catholicism. In fact, over time, this became the actual enslavement of the Indians, led to their merciless exploitation by the encomendero, who turned into a feudal lord, the owner of a hereditary feudal estate.

As for the military significance of the encomienda institution, already in 1524, the conqueror and first ruler of New Spain, where the Spanish methods of colonization were first applied and tested, Hernan Cortes, issued a whole set of laws, in particular, regulating the military foundations of the administration of the new vast colony. They determined that the holder of an encomienda with a number of Indians "from five hundred or less must have a spear, and a sword, and a dagger, and a helmet with a visor, and a crossbow or musket, and a cuirass or other protective equipment such as is used in Spain," as well as all the accessories necessary for handling the listed weapons. The encomendero, whose "care" was from 500 to 1 thousand Indians, had to have, in addition to these weapons, another " horse with a saddle and all the necessary harness." The holder of an encomienda with 2 thousand Indians had to have in addition to the above three spears and four crossbows or muskets, i.e. weapons for a group of his people. The execution of these requirements was strictly controlled in certain districts of the colony by local officials - the mayor-

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and the Rejidors (their name and administrative functions were also transferred from Spain). For this purpose, special reviews were held every four months - alarde, where detailed lists of people capable of military operations and available weapons were compiled. Non-compliance with these laws or failure to appear at the review was severely punished: for the first violation, a very large monetary fine was levied, for the second - a double fine, and after the third violation, the encomendero was deprived of his encomienda .3
Thus, Cortez in New Spain applied the previously repeatedly tested experience of creating a typical military-feudal militia. The use of this military force seems to have satisfied the Spanish crown, since the rules introduced by Cortes were legally extended to other Spanish possessions in America. On November 20, 1536, a royal decree was issued, obliging the encomenderos "in all the Indies" (as is known, from the moment of opening until the end of the first quarter of the XIX century. all lands in the Americas were listed as "Indies"in official Spanish documentation) have at all times "a horse, a spear, a sword, and such other offensive and defensive weapons as the local administrator deems necessary in accordance with the size of the repartimiento 4 and the nature of military operations, so that they are suitable for any occasion, on pain of taking away the Indians given to the encomienda" 5 .

Along the route of the entrades to the interior of the conquered country, the conquistadors founded new cities and villages, which became the mainstays of colonization. They primarily built a Catholic mission, i.e. a church with a group of buildings around it for the clergy, and a military fortification called the "presidio" (presidio), most often an earthen fort fortified with wooden palisades with embrasures for cannon and rifle shooting. As a rule, the Indians were forced to build all this, and immediately became the object of"Christianization". All Spaniards who participated in the founding of cities and settlements received land from the crown in the form of so-called soldiers ' allotments (peonia) or larger plots called "caballeria" .6 Every Spaniard who received such an allotment became a "vesino" - a resident of the city, which was associated with a certain range of rights and obligations in the urban community. In some cases, it maintained at its own expense a small staff of professional gunners, as well as hired soldiers for the permanent protection of city fortifications and other military needs that might arise. Issues related to the constant maintenance of the defense of a Spanish city in America were handled by the city council - the cabildo, and at critical moments (revolts of the surrounding Indians, the threat of pirate attacks, etc.) - the cabildo abierto, i.e., an expanded city council.

The main and indispensable military force of each city was the militia, consisting of citizens. Already in the laws of Cortes (1524) it was recorded: "I command that every inhabitant of the cities and settlements that now exist or will be, should have in his house a spear and a sword, and a dagger, and a shield, and a helmet or helmet, and protective equipment... and that with these weapons he would come to the review when he is called there. " 7 The Spanish Crown extended this provision to all of its territories.

3 Gutierrez Santos D. Op. cit., pp. 226 - 228.

4 Repartimiento (Spanish: repartimiento - "distribution") - securing the Indians for the conquistadors, giving them to the encomienda.

5 Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de la Indias. T. II- o. Madrid. 1943, p. 265 (далее - Recopilacion de Leyes).

6 Alperovich M. S. The War for the Independence of Mexico (1810-1824). Moscow, 1964, p. 52.

7 Gutierrez Santos D. Op. cit., p. 227.

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colonial possessions by a special decree of Philip II, signed in Seville in 1570, which stated: "We command the viceroys, presidents and governors to carefully monitor the availability of weapons and horses among the citizens,.. so that in the event of an enemy appearing, they would be ready to defend themselves. " 8
One of the most important factors that led to the unusually rapid conquest of America by the Spaniards was the huge military and technical superiority of the conquistadors over the existing Indian military force: the stone-tipped spears that were armed with warriors of the Aztec and other states were opposed by steel swords and armor, cannons, arquebuses and muskets, never seen before in these lands war horses. The Spaniards intended to maintain this immeasurable military and technical superiority even after the conquest in order to keep the conquered peoples in subjection. A number of royal decrees strictly prescribed that the Indians should not be allowed to use weapons that the Spaniards possessed. Already the" Catholic kings " Ferdinand and Isabella signed a decree in Grenada in 1501 prohibiting the sale or otherwise transfer of weapons to the Indians on pain of confiscation of half of all property. The same decree provided for severe punishment for Indians who were found to have a sword or dagger. This position was subsequently confirmed several times by Emperor Charles V (aka King Charles I of Spain) and King Philip II, who in 1568 and 1570. issued edicts prohibiting Indians from riding horses .9 The conquerors were all the more afraid that the Indians would be able to master the secrets of the production of European weapons.

Charles V, by decree of 1534, orders that "the masters of arms should not teach their art to the Indians, nor allow them to live in their homes, but that the gunsmiths who violate this decree are subject to a fine of one hundred pesos and banishment at the will of the viceroy or governor." 10
The Spanish Crown was particularly concerned that weapons might fall into the hands of Negro slaves, whose importation to the American colonies from Africa was already taking on a significant scale in the middle of the XVI century. A decree issued by Charles V in 1551 ordered the immediate removal of any weapons found in the possession of a Negro; if this happened again, the Negro would be punished with ten days ' imprisonment, and a third time with a hundred strokes of the stick. In 1628, King Philip II warns colonial officials not to allow Negroes to carry weapons .11
The first stages of Spanish colonization of America, which were generally military and feudal, coincided with the period of so - called initial accumulation, when England, Holland, and France came to the fore in international relations-countries where the commercial bourgeoisie was rapidly developing in the sixteenth century and manufacturing was growing. These processes were directly related to the intensification of the struggle between the leading powers of Western Europe for the mastery of American wealth. This struggle was so openly predatory and predatory that it is difficult to distinguish the actions of merchants from those of pirates, who often had the permission and approval of their monarchs. In connection with the development of Western European commercial capital of that period, Karl Marx wrote:

"Wherever commercial capital has the predominant ascendancy, it is a system of plunder, and it is not without reason that its development among the merchant peoples is not without reason.-

8 Recopilacion de Leyes. T. l-o, pp. 567 - 568.

9 Ibid. T. II-o, pp. 196 - 197.

10 Ibid. T. I-o, p. 573.

11 Ibid. T. II-o, p. 364 - 365.

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Both ancient and modern times are directly connected with violent robbery, sea robbery, theft of slaves, enslavement of colonies" 12 .

The treasures that Spain appropriated in America immediately became the object of lust for other European powers and individual groups of adventurers. Already in 1523, two Spanish ships, on which Cortez sent the Aztec treasures to Spain, were captured by the French pirate J. P. Blavatsky. Dango. Especially numerous raids of pirates-especially in the waters of the Caribbean Sea-began in the second half of the XVI century. and the death of the Spanish "Grand Armada" off the coast of Ireland, which undermined the naval power of Spain, finally untied the hands of sea robbers. The Dutch alone captured about 550 Spanish ships in 13 years, from 1623 to 1636 .13

Pirate robbery was not limited to looting Spanish ships at sea. Increasingly, groups of pirates made daring attacks on the coastal cities of Spanish America. In 1555, the French pirates under the leadership of J. The Sora captured Havana, sacked it, and burned the city. In 1671, the English pirate G. Morgan landed with a detachment of his men on the coast near the Isthmus of Panama, stormed, sacked and burned the city of Panama. In 1688, he also sacked Portobelo, captured several ships in its harbor, and forced the Spaniards to pay a ransom of 100 thousand pesos.

The constant and growing threat of pirate attacks forced the Spanish Crown to take special protection measures. Already in the second half of the 16th century, a system of naval convoys was adopted. In Spanish America, two main ports were identified for the periodic departure of large caravans of ships loaded with precious goods to the metropolis-Veracruz in New Spain and Cartagena de las Indias in New Granada. From here, Spanish fleets sailed to Havana, which served as the largest naval base of the American possessions of the Spanish crown. Here, ships arriving from Veracruz and Cartagena gathered together, undergoing necessary repairs and making other preparations for crossing the ocean. Then a huge caravan, sometimes consisting of hundreds of large merchant ships, followed a certain order, surrounded by a strong squadron of warships, sailed to Spain, ending its journey either at Cadiz or at Sanlucar de Barrameda, the port of Seville, where a number of administrative and commercial institutions were located that were responsible for the affairs of the American colonies.

Another measure to protect against the threat of attacks on Spanish possessions in America was the creation of an extensive system of defensive structures here, including the construction of powerful fortresses in the most important ports. They were supposed to be built on the approaches to Veracruz (New Spain), in Havana, in Cartagena de las Indias, in San Juan de Puerto Rico, in the ocean port of the Peruvian capital of Lima-Callao. Less powerful fortresses, watchtowers and other defensive structures were planned to be built in dozens of other port cities or on the approaches to them. Since 1583, the Spanish Crown has issued a series of laws regulating the construction of fortresses in detail, including instructions on the daily routine for free workers, the attraction of slaves, the amount and procedure for issuing salaries for engineers and workers. In addition, there are royal decrees on the internal order in already built fortresses, the range of duties of commandants and other officials of fortress garrisons, the storage of weapons and ammunition, etc. Special attention

12 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 25, part 1, p. 364.

13 Foster W. Z. Essay on the political history of America. Ed. 2-E. M. 1955, p. 147.

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The decrees on fortresses in America of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries focused on such key points of strategic control in the Caribbean Sea area as Havana, Cartagena de las Indias, Portobelo, La Guaira, and the fortress of San Juan de Ulua, which blocks the entrance to the port of Veracruz .14
At the time when the Spanish crown decided to build fortresses in the American colonies, in Europe, Italian engineers - fortifiers were especially famous for their art. The Madrid Court announced among them a competition for the best designs of port fortresses in America. The winner of the competition was an outstanding Italian military engineer of that era, B. Antonelli. Already in 1589, he and his nephew J. Bautista Jr. arrived in the American possessions of Spain and with a group of Spanish engineers began designing and building large fortifications in several ports of the Caribbean Sea at once; this work continued for several generations of builders.

The most grandiose fortifications, designed and started by Antonelli and his assistants, were located in Havana and Cartagena de las Indias. In Havana, by the time Antonelli's work began, there was already a significant fortress-La Real Fuerza and the watchtower of San Lazaro, built 30 years earlier. However, the Italian engineer considered these fortifications insufficient to reliably protect the port of Havana - a key point of sea communication in the Caribbean - and began building two more fortresses here-La Punta and El Morro, which were supposed to block enemy ships from entering the bay with crossfire of artillery. An additional barrier was a huge chain stretched between these two fortresses, located opposite each other on both sides of the entrance to the bay. Both of the new fortresses of Havana were designed so that their bastions could repel the enemy not only from the sea, but also from the land side in the event of his landing on the shore. At the end of the 16th century, the fortress system of Havana was supplemented by the construction of a defensive wall, and in 1646 - a second watchtower - La Chorrera 15 .

The implementation of Antonelli's fortification plans took on a particularly wide scale in Cartagena de las Indias, which was considered the sea gateway to South America. The main works here were carried out already in the XVII century: in 1632, powerful fortress walls were built, and in 1657, the construction of the fortress of San Felipe de Barajas began, which was gradually completed and improved over the course of a century and a half. Since the bay here has two entrances from the sea, two separate fortresses were built to defend each of them. Nevertheless, even after the construction of these fortifications, Cartagena, where many valuable goods were stored for shipment to the mother country, was repeatedly attacked, besieged, and its warehouses looted. Only in 1741, after the introduction of a series of improvements to the defensive system, was Cartagena successfully able to withstand a long and intense siege, which was subjected to it by the English Admiral E. Vernon with the largest military fleet that had ever appeared in Caribbean waters before him16 .

So, during the first century of Spanish rule in America, there was a military-colonial system of exploitation of conquered peoples, plundering the natural resources of American lands.

14 Recopilacion de Leyes. T. I-o, pp. 574, 595.

15 Roigde Leuchsenring E. Los monumentos nacionales de la Republics de Cuba. Vol. III. Fprtalezas coloniales de la Habana. La Habana. 1960, pp. 9 - 11.

16 Arciniegas G. El continente de siete colores. Buenos Aires. 1965, pp. 207 - 208.

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The basis of this system was the encomenderos who became feudal lords, who held the masses of the Indians in subjection by force of arms, and the fortified cities with their forts, military garrisons and militias from the inhabitants of the cities, which served as the strongholds of the power of the Spanish crown. The export of riches plundered by the colonialists to the mother country was ensured by a regularly established system of armed convoys and powerful fortresses in the most important seaports.

Predatory plundering of the colonies, especially the export of a huge amount of precious metals from them, did not, as is well known, make Spain a rich and prosperous power. By the end of the seventeenth century, the decline of all branches of its economy was astounding. The manufactories that flourished at the time of the beginning of the conquest of America completely ceased to exist. As early as the beginning of the 16th century. Spain was a manufacturer of the best weapons in Europe, to which the Spaniards were largely indebted for the success of their conquests in America; it was in Spain that the musket first appeared, which had such a noticeable influence on the development of military affairs in Europe. Now the weapon manufactories and workshops were abandoned, and the production of the famous edged weapons and armor in Toledo was completely stopped. The very raw material base of weapons production - the iron mines in Biscay-was also abandoned.

By occupying a dominant position in society, the Spanish feudal lords used it to capture the lion's share in the distribution of plundered riches in America. The enrichment of the feudal elite greatly strengthened its position in society, the Spanish nobility used American gold to preserve feudal relations, to preserve and strengthen their medieval privileges. In the words of Karl Marx, "in Spain, the aristocracy declined, retaining its worst privileges" 17 and destroyed the beginnings of capitalist industry. Thus, even "after the reign of Charles I (i.e., after 1556 - V. S.), the political and social decline of Spain showed all the symptoms of shameful and prolonged decay, reminiscent of the worst times of the Turkish Empire" 18 .

This general decline of the Spanish Monarchy was fully reflected in the state of military affairs, in the armament and size of the army and navy. In the mother country, the entire Spanish army was reduced by the end of the 17th century to 4,781 cavalry soldiers and 1,475 infantry under the command of 600 officers .19 The pirates who ruled the Caribbean and ravaged the American possessions of the Spanish crown even attacked Spain itself.

This situation in the kingdom itself directly affected the ability of the Spanish authorities in the American colonies to repel the attacks of expeditionary detachments of other European powers, who had already begun to seize significant islands in the Caribbean; it became difficult for the Spaniards to keep the masses of the oppressed population in subjection - by the end of the XVII century. in all the American possessions of Spain, whose population was estimated at 10-12 million. However, there were hardly more than 5 thousand soldiers of the regular Spanish troops. Thus, the royal administration in the vast viceroyalty of Peru at that time had only a hundred nobles from the most prominent Creole families who formed the personal guard of the viceroy, and a permanent garrison of 500 European mercenary soldiers in the most important fortress on the Pacific coast of Callao, which protected the capital of the viceroyalty of Lima

17 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 10, p. 432.

18 Ibid., p. 431.

19 Ballesteros y Beretta A. Historia de Espana y su influencia en la historia Universal. T. IV, pt. 2-a. Barcelona. 1927, p. 97.

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from attacks from the sea 20 . However, the colonial authorities could not place high hopes on this garrison either. The French military engineer M. Frazier, who visited the Spanish fortresses of the Pacific coast at the beginning of the XVIII century, testifies that their garrisons consisted of people " convicted of any crimes; for them, staying in the forts replaces punishment on galleys. These people are in the fortresses, they serve as a garrison, which consists here only of this kind of people - both soldiers and officers here serve their sentences equally." And on the other side of the continent, in Caracas, in all the fortresses and forts that defended the capital of the Captaincy General of Venezuela from the sea, there were three companies of Spanish soldiers, in which, instead of more than 300 people on the list, there were barely 90 soldiers .

The condition of the numerous fortresses was also deplorable, for the construction of which huge sums were spent and the hard labor of tens of thousands of people was spent, and thanks to the existence of which the Spanish crown hoped to maintain its undivided power in the New World. The commandant of the La Real Fuerza fortress in Havana reported that there were only 50 soldiers and 8 artillery pieces, while it was necessary to have at least three times as many 22 . And those guns that were available in Spanish fortresses, such an authoritative expert as Frezier, considered little suitable because they are completely worn out and of poor quality, having been smelted in local arsenals 100 years ago, and in general are not ready for firing, since there are no gun platforms on the bastions. The weakness of Spanish fortresses in America, Frezier wrote, could not be compensated for either by good garrisons or experienced commandants .23
The deplorable state of Spain's military forces in its American possessions perfectly reflected the general decline of affairs in the mother country itself, which led to a crisis of the entire vast Spanish colonial Empire, which lasted for many decades. The accession of the Bourbon dynasty to the Spanish throne at the beginning of the eighteenth century brought Spain closer to the then most powerful power in Western Europe, France, where a number of reforms in the spirit of "Colbertism" were already carried out, which contributed to the development of the capitalist system, trade and industry, and a more rational colonial policy. In the eighteenth century, under this influence, Spain began a slow but steady economic recovery. In the country, with the support of the government, old manufactories are being restored and new ones are being created, some of which - the so-called royal manufactories-belonged to the crown. Little by little, agricultural production is increasing, and trade is reviving. The country is entering the manufacturing stage of capitalist development. Under the changed conditions, the colonial possessions in America cease to be for the Spanish crown only a source of gold, silver, and even a small amount of expensive exotic, "colonial goods". Now the mother country is beginning to see in the colonies a wide market for the goods of the developing Spanish industry. Among other reforms in Spain, measures of a military nature were carried out (military reforms of 1704-1711), as a result of which the size of the army significantly increased (from 20 thousand people in 1710 to 100 thousand in the middle of the XVIII century), its organization, armament and management system were improved.

20 CampbeII L. G. Op. cit., p. 4.

21 Frezier M. Relation du voyage de la Mer du Sud aux cotes du Chile, du Perou et du Bresil. T. I. Amsterdam, 1717, p. 78.

22 Las Instituciones militares Venezolanas del per'iodo hispanico en los archives. Caracas. 1969, p. .XXXII (далее - Las Instituciones militares).

23 Frezier M. Op. cit., p. 91.

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and supply 24 . In particular, at the most advanced technical level for that era, the production of weapons and ammunition was launched at the royal manufactories, of which the largest were located in Barcelona and Malaga .25
These changes in the military sphere, however, affected the Spanish colonies in America to a very small extent. Naval officers who visited New Granada, Peru and Chile in the 1740s. Juan and A. de Ulloa reported to the King in a secret report about the deplorable state of the Spanish troops and fortresses in these colonies, about the lack of weapons and ammunition .26 Meanwhile, the growth of popular liberation movements in the colonies and the increased colonial expansion of other European powers in the Western hemisphere urgently required the Madrid court to make extensive changes in the outdated military-colonial system. A tangible impetus for this was the serious failures of Spain in the Seven Years ' War. In 1762, the British squadron, which was commanded by Admiral J. R. R. Tolkien. Pocock, consisting of 40 warships and 150 ell transport ships with thousands of soldiers on board, approached Havana. After 29 days of siege, the fortress surrendered. The great booty of the English, 650,000 pounds, was divided, according to the custom of the time, among the sailors, soldiers, and officers, according to their rank. Pocock himself received 123 thousand pounds sterling 27 . Much more serious than the financial damage was the strategic and political damage caused by the loss of this key naval base in the Caribbean. Under the Treaty of Paris (February 10, 1763), Spain was forced to cede Florida to England in exchange for the return of the Antilles.

To develop the necessary military measures in the American possessions of the Spanish crown, a special secret committee of high officials was created in Madrid, which made a number of decisions in 1764. First, it provided for the renewal of fortifications in the most important strategic points of the colonies. Secondly, taking into account the experience of the Seven Years ' War, which showed the short-sightedness of relying only on the fortress system, a new colonial army was organized. In addition to the periodically changing regiments from the mother country, permanent units (so-called fiho) were established, i.e. infantry regiments and battalions, as well as artillery companies for garrison service in fortresses and major cities. Parts of the Fijo were maintained by the colonial administration, and each of them had a permanent recruitment point for hired soldiers in the mother country. So, the Buenos Aires regiment had such a point in La Coruna, the Caracas battalion-in Seville and the Canary Islands 28 .

The most important measure, which had numerous and profound consequences for the later history of Latin American countries, was the creation of militia battalions and companies of local natives in all the colonies .29 These militia troops were allowed not only Creoles, but also colored Castas (mulattoes, mestizos, etc.), with the exception of Negroes and Indians, who were still prohibited from handling weapons

24 Zabalay Lara P. Espana bajo los Borbones. Barcelona - Buenos Aires. 1930, pp. 132 - 133.

25 Ballesteros у Beretta A. Op. cit. T. VI, p. 64.

26 Juan J. Ulloa A. de. Noticias secretas de America. Buenos Aires. 1953, pp. 111 - 116.

27 Papeles sobre la toma de la Habana por los ingleses en 1762. La Habana. 1948, pp. VII-X.

28 Archive de Simancas. Secretaria de guerra (siglo XVIII. Hojas de Servicios de America. Valladolid. 1958, pp. 347, 351.

29 The main difference between militia troops and regular troops was that they were recruited not on the basis of conscription, for hire, or through recruitment, but on a voluntary basis.

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and horses. The royal decree on the formation of militia troops stated that they "in uniform and with weapons, both in peacetime and in wartime, should be used on an equal basis with other (regular) troops. - VS ) troops, and for better training and discipline, they must conduct exercises four times a month, and the powder required for this is provided by local arsenals. " 30
First of all, it was decided to organize a new military force in Cuba. Given the exceptional importance attached to this reform by the Madrid court, the formation of militia troops here was entrusted to the Comte de Rikla, a man close to the king, who also possessed recognized military and administrative abilities. The implementation of military reform was the main task in his appointment to the post of Captain General of Cuba. The need to have a large military force in the colonies forced the Spanish government to make a number of concessions, especially to the local Creole landowning elite, which by then had a huge influence on the actual state of affairs in the American viceroyalty and captaincy general. Representatives of the wealthiest Creole families were allowed to draw up the basic regulations on the militia forces in Cuba, as long as the cost of maintaining the new militia troops would be paid by the Cubans themselves. To cover these costs, the crown raised the most hated tax, alcabala 31, from 2% to 6%, and also imposed a new tax of 2 pesos per barrel on the sale of vodka. In return, and above all to the considerable benefit of the large Cuban plantation owners, who at that time were mainly engaged in the cultivation and processing of sugar cane, nine Spanish ports were opened for the import of goods produced by their farms, duties on the export and sale of sugar were reduced, and the tax on the import of black slaves was abolished.

Officers and sergeants of militia troops were granted a special legal privilege - fuero militar, which until then was used in America only by Spaniards who served as officers and sergeants in regular troops. The granting of the fuero militar meant, firstly, the protection of special military courts, i.e. non-jurisdiction of civil judicial authorities, special military jurisdiction in all matters of civil or criminal order, except for particularly serious crimes against the interests of the crown, such as smuggling and abuse of the treasury, and secondly, exemption from a number of tax charges (Thus, joining the militia forces greatly increased the prestige of Creoles in colonial society, brought them as close as possible to Spanish officers (peninsulares).

In the draft royal law on militia troops, developed with the participation of the Cuban landowning aristocracy, the highest command positions in these troops were given to the "best" surnames. In particular, the patent for the highest rank of colonel in these troops was provided for "the most worthy persons who possess outstanding qualities, people of high spirit and honor... and with sufficient funds to maintain the dignity of their rank." In three militia regiments formed in Cuba - the Havana White Infantry Volunteer Regiment, the Havana Cavalry Volunteer Regiment, and the Matanzas Dragoon Volunteer Regiment-

30 Las Instituciones militares, p. XXXVI.

31 Alqabalah - the duty charged on each trade transaction.

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The colonels were the most distinguished and wealthy Creoles: the Count de Casa Bayona, the Count de Gibacoa and Juan O'farril .

The regulations on the militia forces in Cuba, the procedure for their formation, organization, provision of fuero militar, etc., were approved by Charles III in Seville in 1765 and extended to all other colonies in America as a mandatory guide for conducting military reform there. These changes were welcomed by the rich landowning Creole families, among whom there was competition for military ranks, although patents for them, sold by the crown, were expensive. So, the patent for the rank of captain cost 6 million 500 thousand pesos, lieutenant - 3 million, ensign-2 million 33 . French agent F. Depon, who spent several years in the Captaincy General of Venezuela, wrote: "This reorganization... It has proved so tempting to the ambition of the noble Creoles that there is not one of them who does not seek the honor of joining the militia as an officer. Even the noblest are envious of someone who wears epaulettes... In the opinion of the public, almost no distinction is made between officers of militia and regular troops. The Marquis del Toro, one of the richest lords of Caracas, has the honor of being colonel of the Aragua militia battalion, and the Comte de San Xavier, who is as rich and distinguished as he is, no less appreciates the honor conferred on him by the King, who entrusted him with the command of the Caracas militia battalion." 34
In carrying out military reforms in the colonies, the Spanish crown primarily sought to secure support from the upper strata of the Creoles, taking advantage, in particular, of their predilection for titles and honors, in which they could now compare with the Spaniards. Senior officer patents were open to members of Creole noble families, and junior officer patents were offered to the wealthiest members of the urban communities where these companies were formed. So the ruling strata of colonial society were attracted to the militia troops as if " recognizing their position and dignity." The Crown hoped to create a loyal and dedicated officer corps whose members would have a personal stake in the success of the militia program. At the same time, militia formations were often created by large Creole landowners from among their peons, which further tightened the peonage system, increased the real power of landowners, who now, in fact, acquired feudal squads.

The militia military system in the American colonies largely justified the calculations of the Spanish crown. First, soon after their creation, militia troops were used to suppress such major anti - colonial mass protests as the Tupac Amaru uprising in Peru (1780-1783) and the Comuneros uprising in New Granada (1781-1782). Secondly, it was the local formations of regular and militia units that were used to suppress the most important anti - colonial mass protests in Peru (1780-1783) and the "comuneros" uprising in New Granada (1781-1782). defeated British troops during their invasion of La Plata in 1807.

The total number of militia troops in the American colonies of Spain was quite impressive. Thus, in the Viceroyalty of New Spain in 1804, there were 22,277 militia troops per 9919 regulars .35 In the Captaincy-General of Venezuela, where the militia system was one of the most developed, in the same year 1804 (according to f. Depona) per 2 thousand regular employees accounted for 11,375

32 Kuethe A. J. Op. cit., pp. 699 - 700.

33 Gutierrez. Santоs D. Op. cit., p. 421.

34 Depons F. Viaje a la parte oriental de Tierra Firme en la America Meridional. T. I. Caracas. 1960, p. 219.

35 Gutierrez Santos D. Op. cit., pp. 434 - 435.

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36 people of militia troops . In total, according to approximate calculations, at the end of the XVIII-beginning of the XIX century. in the American colonies of Spain (their population is about 17 million people) there were about 17 thousand people of regular troops (Spanish from the mother country and local Fijo) and about 60 thousand people of local militia troops. The number of these latter could be significantly increased in extreme circumstances.

In addition to the military aspects of the case, the presence in the American colonies of Spain of a standing army consisting of numerous militia corps had far-reaching social, political and economic consequences. The impact of the new military institution was more or less felt by all segments of colonial society. The ruling strata of the Creoles, supplying cadres for the officer corps, acquired a number of new privileges, took a more confident position in relation to Spanish officers, resulting from the consciousness that the protection of the existing order in their countries and defense against external danger were in their hands. As for the masses of the people, the obligation to serve in the militia forces, on the one hand, placed them in double subordination to the ruling class of landowners, and, on the other, this new position gave them weapons and skills in handling them, which under certain circumstances could be directed both against this ruling class and against the ruling class. and the colonizers.

Of great importance was the extension of the fuero militar, which had previously been used only by the Spanish military, with its associated privileges and privileges, to a large and influential group of colonial society. And as the number and importance of the armed forces of the American colonies of Spain increased, the mere fact of enjoying these privileges and privileges created a new social group of the military, which was in an exceptional position, exempt from liability to civil laws.

The potential danger to the mother country from the new situation in the colonial possessions, for the existence of the colonial regime itself, the most far-sighted Spanish officials saw immediately after the implementation of these military transformations. A typical representative of Spanish enlightened absolutism, the first minister of Charles IV, Count X. M. Floridanblanca, wrote in 1787 :" In these countries (in the American possessions. - V. S. ) militia troops and fiho corps, although useful and necessary to protect against enemy invasions, are not so necessary: to maintain a good internal order, because trained local natives who hate Europeans can connect with the villagers and with the castas (ethnically mixed groups of the population. - V. S. ), disturbing the peace, which should be especially borne in mind" 37 . And in November 1796, the Caracas Chamber of Commerce sent a statement to the Captain General of Venezuela, Diego de Gardoca, saying that the militia detachments were "mulattoes and colored people"... very harmful to the state in the present circumstances, because of the fatal consequences that their training in the use of weapons, even if only with cold weapons, portends. " 38
In fact, it was thanks to the existence of militia troops that at the beginning of the War of independence, Latin American patriots had a certain basis for forming a large, organized, armed and trained military force led by a professional officer corps (S. Bolivar himself, A. Itur-

36 Depons F. Op. cit., pp. 222 - 224.

37 Las Institucicnes militares, p. LXI.

38 Ibid., p. 148.

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for example, A. L. Santa Anna and many other figures of the liberation wars were previously officers of the militia forces).

The most important significance of the liberation wars of 1810-1826 for the further development of Latin American countries is beyond doubt. Colonial dependence on the mother country was eliminated, numerous restrictions that hindered the development of colonies were removed, and more favorable conditions were created for the development of capitalist relations and the involvement of the continent's countries in the world economy. In the newly independent States, a republican system was established and bourgeois-type constitutions were adopted. Objectively anti-feudal in their aims, the liberation wars of 1810-1826 did not, however, lead to any radical restructuring of socio-economic relations. Although the local commercial and emerging industrial bourgeoisie was given new opportunities for their activities, the main gain went to the local (Creole) land-owning and pastoral aristocracy.

In addition to economic and political power, this aristocracy also became militarily powerful. During the wars of independence, revolutionary governments, often very limited in resources, could not fully maintain large enough armies in rural areas, and relied on large landowners and pastoralists to create militia units out of their peons. In such detachments, the usual hierarchy for peacetime was preserved: the master became the commander, his employees became officers, and the peons became soldiers. So there were troops organized on the principle of the "master - peon" relationship, very similar to the feudal militias of the Middle Ages. Militia units of this type were often subordinated primarily to their owners, who pursued selfish goals, seeking to free themselves from any state control. Rebel detachments were transformed into a kind of freemen led by feudal leaders-caudillos, who used the weakening of the central government for unbridled plunder outside the area that this freemen considered their own. Thus, already during the years of the liberation wars, local separatism was born, the evolution of which over the next decades brought endless civil wars to Latin America.

Thus, one of the consequences of the wars of independence was that the land-owning and pastoral aristocracy, acting as commanders of the rebel forces, increased their political influence and economic power. In some cases, this was fixed by legislative acts. In Venezuela, by a series of decrees signed by Bolivar, property confiscated from the Spanish and American royalists, primarily land, was distributed among the participants in the campaigns of 1814-1821, and according to a strictly hierarchical principle: the general received the right to property worth 25 thousand pesos, the colonel - 10 thousand, the captain-6 thousand, the sergeant-1 thousand, and so on. soldier - 500 pesos. However, very soon, using a series of simple frauds, generals and officers took possession of the property intended for sergeants and soldiers, and even more "rounded" their possessions 39 . Huge fortunes were created, similar to those of Paes, Bermudez, the Monatas brothers, Marigno, and the Laplat provinces of Urquiza, Ramirez, and Erenho, among others. These vast estates were inhabited by numerous peons, who were entirely dependent on their caudillo masters, and who, at the request of their leader, could quickly form strong military detachments. So, caudillo

39 J. Lynch Revolutions in Spanish America. 1807-1826. Moscow, 1979, p. 233.

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Urquiza in Entre Rios could have 10 thousand horsemen with a total population of 46 thousand inhabitants in its possessions .40
Another consequence of the wars of independence was the formation of bloated and influential military institutions. After the end of hostilities against the Spaniards, the armies continued to exist, absorbing the lion's share of government spending in the young states. The Swedish naval officer K. Gosselman, who visited Ecuador in the 1830s, reported that the expenses of this republic in 1836 amounted to 869925 piastres, of which 510329 piastres were spent on the army and navy, where there were not even 1 thousand people (with 600 thousand of the country's population) .41 In the province of Buenos Aires, during the Rosas dictatorship, military expenditures reached 49.1% in 1840, and 54.72% in 1845 of all government expenditures .42 The main task of the Latin American armies now was to ensure the well-being of their own personnel. In addition, a large military class retained the fuero militar, which was reflected in the constitutions of a number of young states, and stubbornly clung to the privileges and privileges associated with it .43 Being in its origin and meaning a colonial institution that consolidated the exclusive position of a repressive military force in society: fuero militar was one of the remnants of colonial Spanish-American society (along with church institutions, feudal remnants in the countryside, etc.) and became for many decades a brake on the social development of Latin American countries.

The large military force that remained in the young states of Spanish America, with its semi-feudal militias, was not a single national army. Already in the first years after the end of hostilities against the Spaniards, fierce rivalry flared up between military leaders, each of whom was backed by a local military group. The dispersion of economic centers, the weak development of relations between individual regions in the new states, and the existence of separatist tendencies in them led in some cases to the split of some of these states into virtually independent territories that were completely controlled by one or another military leader - a caudillo, or a clan that had armed forces. Even in the first years after the end of the wars of independence, large landowners, pastoralists, or ambitious military men ruled virtually independent districts.

The possibility of such a situation was rooted in the fact that the independence won by Latin American countries, in fact, did not imply any fundamental socio - economic changes in the situation of the predominant rural population of the former colonies; within the framework of the changed political picture, the most archaic social structures continued to exist. Bourgeois institutions, which many of the leaders of the wars of independence sincerely fought to implement, were only formally included in the constitutions of the young states, which, however, confirmed the fuero militar. In practice, for the majority of the population, feudal relations based on large-scale ownership of land and unlimited power over those who worked it were virtually preserved everywhere. Outside of cities, such real power-economic, social, and political-consisted solely of personal power over the inhabitants

40 Best F. Historia de las Guerras Argentinas. T. 1. Buenos Aires. 1960, p. 118.

41 GosseIman C. A. Informe sobre los Estados Sudamericanos en los anos de 1837 y 1838. Estocolmo. 1962, pp. 95, 101.

42 Historia integral argentina. Т. 2. Buenos Aires. 1972, p. 148.

43 Johnson J. J. Op. cit., pp. 32 - 35.

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estates and communities that were also soldiers of the local "army".

For the large group of professional soldiers that emerged during the years of the liberation wars, a general or colonel - caudillo was often the only person whose authority was taken seriously. In these troubled times (for most countries from about the end of the 1820s to the 1870s), the highest virtue was loyalty to a military and political leader at the same time. The existence of numerous armed detachments operating solely at the whim of their Hefe leaders in vast areas inhabited by poor, defenseless, ignorant peasants, pastoralists, and farm labourers, where these detachments were the only real force that was organized in any way, gave rise to the fetishization of the leaders of these armed detachments, the Caudidyo, who represented economic, political, and military power.

Caudillism is a socio-political and socio - psychological phenomenon characteristic of Latin America during the formation of bourgeois states. The essence of this phenomenon is reduced to the personification of political power and military leadership. The Caudillo, as the head of the nation and state, is opposed to representative institutions and political parties, excluding the one that he himself leads and represents. Caudillism most often played a very definite class role, being a political and ideological tool of the oligarchy. In most cases, the Caudillos were either large landowners or pastoralists. However, it is impossible to treat all the caudillos unequivocally and unequivocally condemn their role in the national development of all Latin American countries. Sometimes the caudillos expressed the spontaneous aspirations of the urban "demos" and even the oppressed peasant masses; in some cases, they played a prominent role in organizing bourgeois centralized states, strengthening their sovereignty, and carrying out various progressive reforms (like Justo Rufino Barrios in Guatemala, Eloy Alfaro in Ecuador, and some others).

As V. I. Lenin noted, militarism is always "the result of capitalism", its "vital manifestation" .44 The local and foreign bourgeoisie supports military cliques closely linked to large-scale land ownership, seeing in them protection from the popular masses. At the same time, the main class trait of Caudillism is perceived and inherited as a specific feature of Latin American militarism, the sharp edge of which was directed primarily against the working masses. Around the 80s of the XIX century, the process of merging the military elite (which retains the class characteristics of its origin) with the big bourgeoisie was completed. This connection was most often made through the establishment of family ties, as well as on the basis of corruption. With the strengthening of the economic position of capitalism, the bourgeoisie becomes more and more interested in improving the military machine for the suppression of the working masses within their countries. Foreign capital is also interested in this. Given the historically important role of the military in Latin American countries, governments of imperialist Powers are beginning to develop ties with the local military elite. Thus, they actively contribute to the strengthening of militarism, hindering the democratic development of Latin American countries.

44 Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 17, p. 187.

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