This paper gives an overview of the current debate in the cognitive theories of religion over the relative role of social and cultural versus biological and cognitive factors in the development and formation of religious beliefs. One of the key elements of this debate is the so-called Born Believers thesis. Here we identify and analyze in detail its underlying assumptions, major components, and argumentation. We also show limitations and weak empirical validity of the alternative to Born Believers thesis hypothesis - treating religion as the result solely of religious socialization and enculturation. Furthermore, we identify the place of the Born Believers thesis in the context of the wider "innateness" debate in cognitive sciences. This thesis satisfies the minimum condition of "innateness" and may serve as a useful heuristic tool in cross-cultural research and in studies of children's

The research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation grant 14-18-03771 "Modern Western Psychology of Religion: Adaptation in the Russian context", the recipient organization of funding-St. Tikhon Orthodox University for the Humanities.

Malevich T., Kozhevnikov D. Discussions about "innate" religiosity in cognitive religious studies / / State, Religion, Church in Russia and abroad. 2016. N2. pp. 373-398.

Malevich, Tatiana, Kozhevnikov, Denis (2016) "Innate Religiousness Debate in the Cognitive Science of Religion", Gosudarstvo. religiia, tserkou' v Rossii i za rubezhom 34(2): 373-398.

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religiosity. At the same time, we demonstrate how the Born Believers thesis reveals the limitations of the cognitive approach to the study of religion in solving the problem of "innateness" of religious beliefs.

Keywords: cognitive science of religion, cognitive sciences, nativism, innateness, modularity, religion, religiousness, anthropomorphism.

DISCUSSIONS about the problem of "nature and education" in the development of human thinking have a rather long history-starting with ancient philosophy - and occupy a significant place in the modern intellectual space, resulting in the confrontation of two main approaches: empiricism and nativism. The first one denies the existence of any innate ideas: from this point of view, our mind is a tabula rasa, which means that even if we have innate abilities to acquire knowledge, its only source is sensory experience. Nativism, on the other hand, asserts that the human mind is equipped from birth not only with mechanisms and rules for acquiring knowledge, but also with a certain set of conceptuals1. The problem of biological / sociocultural determinism of religious beliefs has also been and remains an important aspect of this discussion field, leading to questions of both a theoretical nature (for example, about the evolutionary role of religion and its place in culture) and an applied one (in particular, about the necessity or permissibility of religious education).

One of the first attempts to describe the religious beliefs of a person who was not subjected to religious inculturation was made in 1892 by W. James, based on the memoirs of the deaf-mute artist Theophilus d'Estrella, whose views were close to animism and naive creationism2. Subsequently, with the development of behaviorism and its reliance on the concept of tabula rasa, and then social constructivism, which assumed socio - cultural determinism in epistemology, interest in this kind of research began to fade rapidly and was revived only in the second half of the twentieth century.

1. См. Sampson, G. (2005) The 'Language Instinct'Debate, pp. 1-25. London: A&C Black.

2. См. James, W. (1892) "Thought before Language: a Deaf-Mute's Recollections", The Philosophical Review 1: 613-624.

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At present, both in Russian and foreign science, the idea of" innate " religiosity is rarely expressed explicitly, but it often takes on implicit forms of expression. With the expansion of the methodological tools of psychology in general and psychology of religion in particular, after a number of discoveries in the field of neuroscience and cognitive and evolutionary psychology, as well as with the emergence of new interdisciplinary projects - neurotheology3 and cognitive religious studies (hereinafter - KR) - these questions began to arise again. Interest in this topic is reflected in many scientific publications, and in some popular scientific publications, the names of which speak for themselves: "Born Believers" 4, "Instinct of Faith" 5, "Born to Believe" 6, "God Gene" 7, etc.

Here we will focus on the discussion field of the Kyrgyz Republic - a research program for the study of religion, based on the theoretical basis and methodology of cognitive sciences. It should be noted that the Kyrgyz Republic does not set itself the task of justifying or refuting the idea of innate religiosity. On the contrary, it rather - following the general trend in the cognitive sciences8 - deliberately puts this question out of brackets. Nevertheless, the idea of innate religiosity is implicitly expressed in a different terminology-through the thesis of "born believers" (hereinafter - tOPV), put forward by the American scientists J. R. R. Tolkien. Barrett 9 and J. R. R. Tolkien Bering 10. According to tOPV, religions-

3. Neurotheology is a field of research that differs from the study of religion mainly in its focus on the search for the biological "substrate" of religion and the use of neuroimaging methods. Malevich T. V. Neyroteologiya: teorii religii i nauka o mozge [Neurotheology: Theories of Religion and the science of the brain]. 2012. N1-2. pp. 62-83.

4. Barrett, J.L. (2012) Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster.

5. Bering, J.M. (2011) The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and the Meaning of Life. N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company.

6. Newberg, A. and Waldman, M.R. (2007) Born to Believe: God, Science, and the Origin of Ordinary and Extraordinary Beliefs. N.Y.: Free Press.

7. Hamer, D. (2005) The God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired into Our Genes. N.Y.: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

8. For more information, see Griffiths, P. E. (2002)" What Is Innateness?", The Monist 85(1): 70-85.

9. См. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief. It is worth noting that the term "born believers" was popularized by J. Barrett in the same work.

10. См. Bering, J.M. The Belief Instinct: The Psychology of Souls, Destiny, and the Meaning of Life.

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Religious beliefs and behaviors are cognitively "natural" phenomena that result from "normal" cognitive development and do not require special training for their occurrence. In other words, "born believers", like "born" singers, artists, gamblers, etc., are not born as such, but are born with abilities that, under minimally favorable conditions, allow them to succeed in a particular type of activity; however, unlike "born" singers and artists, "born believers"are not born as such. almost all people turn out to be 11.

In this article, we will try to analyze the content of tOPV, identify its weaknesses and strengths, and determine what potential it has for further research on religiosity. To do this, we will first identify the key principles of the Kyrgyz Republic that determine the approach of its representatives to the interpretation of religious phenomena; then we will reveal the content of tOPV, its elements and argumentative-theoretical and empirical-basis, and also consider the alternative tOPV hypothesis, which assumes that the main source of religious beliefs is the process of religious inculturation; finally, we will determine the place of tOPV in the context of discussions about innateness in the cognitive sciences.

The development of this issue can, in our opinion, clarify the question of pre-cultural predestination of religious ideas and their elements, which, in turn, is an integral part of public polemics between believers and atheists, allows us to clarify the place of religion in culture and almost inevitably arises in the course of analyzing the psychological dimension of religiosity. In addition, when considering this problem, we seem to approach the question of the boundaries of the Kyrgyz Republic as a research project, since its solution requires reference to its meta-theoretical principles. It should also be noted that, despite the active interest of Russian researchers in the Kyrgyz Republic, which has been observed recently, 12 in the ote-

11. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief.

12. For an example, see Sergienko R. A. Kognitivnyj podkhod k explaineniyu prirody religii i religicheskikh predstavlenij [A cognitive approach to explaining the nature of religion and religious representations]. 2011. Vol. 3 (! 7). pp. 36-43; Malevich T. V., Folieva T. A. "Naturalness" of religion and "natural religion" in cognitive religious studies. 2014. Vol. 11 (83). pp. 1605-1617; Shakhnovich M. Kognitivnaya nauka i issledovaniya religii [Cognitive science and research of religion]. Gosudarstvo, religiya i tserkva v Rossii i za rubezhom [State, Religion and Church in Russia and abroad]. 2013. Vol. 3 (31), pp. 32-62.

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In fact, there are no works devoted to the analysis of these problems in the Russian scientific literature.

Cognitive religious studies and its key principles

Thus, QD is an area of research aimed primarily at addressing the question of how our natural cognitive tendencies determine religious beliefs and behavior, and what is the significance of "external" - socio - cultural and natural-factors in this process13. One of the central places in the cognitive science of religion is occupied by the problem of "nature and upbringing", that is, the comparative role of innate / biological characteristics and the environment in the formation of religious ideas and practices.

Among the key principles on which the CD relies and which influence the solution of this problem, it is important to pay attention to the following. First, it is a modular approach to the organization of the psyche - currently one of the key areas in the cognitive sciences (along with the symbolic approach and connectionism), which we will discuss in more detail. Let us clarify that in this case we are talking about the so - called massive modularity of the psyche-a point of view that significantly expands the modularity of consciousness in its classical version, proposed by Jerry Fodor. If in the interpretation of the latter, the modular character is attributed mainly to peripheral systems, that is, cognitive systems of the "lower level" 14, then proponents of universal modularity speak of the modular organization of the central nervous system.-

13. См. Barrett, J.L. (2011) "Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back, Looking Forward", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50(2): 229-239.

14. Recall that, according to Fodor, cognitive modules should have the following properties:: (1) they are highly specialized, i.e. they are tied to the processing of information related to specific subject areas; (2) their work is compulsory; (3) the mental representations they produce are generally inaccessible to consciousness; (4) the information processing processes produced by cognitive modules are very fast; (5) cognitive modules are "information encapsulated", i.e. "impenetrable" to our conceptual knowledge; (6) the mental representations produced by them are "raw" or "superficial"; (7) cognitive modules have a fixed neuroanatomic localization; (8) violations in the module are specific in nature and do not affect the operation of other modules; (9) The development of modules is determined by ontogenesis, which means that in some sense they are innate. See: Fodor, J. (1983) The Modularity of Mind, p. 47-101. Cambridge.

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In other words, "thinking in the proper sense of the word" (thought proper) - both at the micro level (in this case, we can talk about the modularity of specific concepts), and at the macro level of entire ontological areas ("naive physics", "naive biology", etc.) 15. points out the French anthropologist D. Sperber, one of the authors of the concept of universal modularity, as well as the creator of the "epidemiology of representations", which directly influenced the development of CD16, people, being "naturally powerful producers, transmitters and consumers of information", expand the areas of specialization of their cognitive modules - in such a way that we need to distinguish between "proper" ones, "actual" and "cultural" areas of specialization 17. The latter type, as Sperber emphasizes, has a specific property: it is largely organized by the person himself, which means that it can contain information that differs to some extent from the basic and relatively universal representations found in the "appropriate" areas of cognitive modules; it is this information that can attract our attention, has a great chance of "cultural" development. success" and varies from one cultural tradition to another 18. Moreover, this culturally specific and often counterintuitive information, in Sperber's view, is formed by second - order representations, or meta-representations - "representations of representations" and "concepts of concepts", which, unlike our intuitive beliefs, are the product of a particular type of information. a special meta-presentation module that is not tied to any specific conceptual area and I play-

15. Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, pp. 119, 139-141. Oxford: Blackwell.

16. "Epidemiology of representations" is a model of cultural evolution that uses an epidemiological metaphor to describe the spread of cultural representations in a population. From Sperber's point of view, cultural representation is successful, that is, it is actively distributed and more or less retains its original form, only if it is, firstly, easy to remember and, secondly, attractive. In addition, in the case of religious representations, Sperber suggests another condition: people must believe these representations (for example, at the expense of social and - ultimately - "divine" authority), otherwise, in the process of cultural selection, they turn into memorable and attractive fairy tales. See: Sperber, D. Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, pp. 95-96.

17. Ibid., pp. 138-139.

18. Ibid., pp. 139-140.

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which plays an important role in the process of adaptation to the natural and social environment 19.

Despite the fact that representatives of the Kyrgyz Republic rarely explicitly refer to the concept of modularity 20, they at least adhere to the epidemiological approach based on modularity, and the concept of narrow specialization of cognitive areas in the processing of certain types of information - one of the most important characteristics of the cognitive module 21. Although the very question of the relationship between innateness and narrow specialization remains open, this concept still contains a kind of nativism, suggesting that our consciousness is not a tabula rasa or a "passive sponge"22; on the contrary, we have a number of innate cognitive structures that do not need a special learning mechanism to develop 23. Among such structures (modules, highly specialized areas, cognitive limitations, "mental organs", "mental tools", in the terminology of J. R. R. Tolkien). Barrett's 24, or "innate cognitive schemas", in S. Atran's terminology 25) traditionally include, for example, language competencies, as well as implicit "naive" or" intuitive " theories about the physical world, biological and psychological properties of living organisms, etc.26 Representations of "supernatural agents" (gods, spirits, ghosts, etc.) - a cross-cultural trait of religious systems, from the point of view of cognitivists - are also considered to be part of the social order.

19. Sperber, D. (1996) Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, pp. 132-138, 146-150.

20. Ср. Powell, R., Clarke, S. (2012) "Religion as an Evolutionary Byproduct: A Critique of the Standard", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63(3): 461.

21. As L. Hirschfeld and S. Gelman point out, the key difference between modularity and narrow specialization is that "the former focuses on specificity in functional cognitive architecture, while the latter focuses on specialization in specific types of knowledge" (Hirschfeld, L. A. and Gelman, S. A. (1994) "Towards a Topography of Mind: An Introduction to Domain Specificity", in LA. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (eds) Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, p. 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

22. Barrett, J.L. "Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back, Looking Forward", p. 231.

23. См. Prinz, J.J. (2006) "Is the Mind Really Modular?" in R.J. Stainton (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, pp. 27-29. Maiden: Blackwell.

24. Barrett, J.L. "Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back, Looking Forward", p. 231.

25. Atran, S. (2002) In God We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion, p. 57. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

26. См. Samuels, R. (2002) "Nativism in Cognitive Science", Mind & Language 17(3): 234; Prinz, J.J. "Is the Mind Really Modular?", pp. 27-29.

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one of the results of the activity of such a cognitive structure, namely the mental model, which processes information about its own mental states and attributes mental states to other subjects. 27 Of course, the described type of nativism is closer to the" primitivism " of R. Samuels-the position in the cognitive sciences, according to which innate is such a cognitive structure, which does not require "any psychological process or mechanism" to arise; however, as Samuels emphasizes, from the very fact that a certain cognitive structure is innate, it does not follow that no factors are involved in it. environmental factors do not affect its occurrence 28.

The second principle, which also requires detailed disclosure, is related to the processes of natural categorization and the presence of what P. Boyer calls an "intuitive ontology" - a set of specialized conceptual areas and principles that structure these areas. 29 Boyer lists, with some variations, such ontological domains as PHYSICAL OBJECTS, ARTEFACTS, ANIMALS (excluding "people"), PLANTS, and PERSONALITIES.30 Following the American psychologist F. He suggests that each of these domains is structured by intuitive expectations with respect to the possible states and causal properties of its constituent objects; such structuring principles form implicit "intuitive" theories specific to each particular ontological domain.32 An example of such theories, without which other assumptions about the re --

27. См. Barrett, J.L. (2000) "Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion", Trends in Cognitive Science 4(1): 29-34.

28. Samuels, R. "Nativism in Cognitive Science", pp. 234-236.

29. Boyer, P., Barrett, H.C. (2005) "Domain Specificity and Intuitive Ontology," in D.M. Buss (ed.) The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, p. 96. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons.

30. См., например, Boyer, P. (1996) "What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Representations", The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 2(1): 84.

31. См., например, Keil, F.C. (1979) Semantic and Conceptual Development: An Ontological Perspective. Cambridge.

32. Boyer, P. (2002) "Religious Ontologies and the Bounds of Sense: A Cognitive Catalogue of the Supernatural," in Philosophy in Wartime: A Collection of Readings Prepared in Conjunction with the Seminar: Religion, Revolution, Terrorism and War (University at Buffalo Spring Semester 2002) [http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/coursesoi/rrtw/Boyer.htm, accessed on 01.02.2016].

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The three areas already mentioned above, namely, naive physics, naive biology, and naive psychology, are considered to be meaningless.33 Thus, the concepts of "cat" and "giraffe", which are included in the ontological domain of ANIMALS, automatically trigger the naive biology characteristic of this domain: we intuitively believe that cats need food because animals die of hunger, or that giraffes are born from other giraffes34.

From this point of view, religious concepts are a kind of so - called "supernatural" concepts, which have their own specifics in comparison with the sphere of everyday experience. First, they are "counterintuitive", that is, they contain explicit violations of certain intuitive expectations in relation to a certain ontological category, which ensures their attention-grabbing "strangeness": for example, the concept of "breathing statue" includes an explicit violation of the naive biology inherent in the ontological domain ARTIFACTS, and the concept of "ghost" has counterintuitive features. for the category of PERSONALITY, physical properties - the ability to pass through walls or invisibility. Secondly, these concepts still implicitly activate the background of undisturbed expectations, which are considered true in relation to the categories corresponding to these concepts and ensure their memorability: for example, the concept of "breathing statue" can retain intuitive assumptions in the field of naive physics, and the concept of "ghost" - in the field of naive psychology.35
A third noteworthy principle states that religious thinking is not a deviation from "natural" cognitive functioning. In contrast, religious beliefs and behaviors are "normal" or " natural-

33. Boyer, P. "What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Representations", p. 85; Boyer, P. (1994) The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion, pp. 68-88, 91-124. Berkeley: University of California Press.

34. Idem, pp. 67-69.

35. См. Boyer, P. "What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Representations", pp. 84-87; Boyer, P. "Religious Ontologies and the Bounds of Sense: A Cognitive Catalogue of the Supernatural".

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the product of thinking, which in turn is defined and limited by our cognitive activity.36
Finally, the fourth principle to focus on is the "particularist approach" to religion: the Kyrgyz Republic does not attempt to define "religion" as such and does not claim to provide an exhaustive explanation of "religion in general" - this task is left to other sub-disciplines of religious studies. 37 The term "religion" itself is used by cognitive scientists rather as a useful heuristic construct, and their attention is drawn to those cross-culturally recurrent patterns of representation and behavior that receive a religious interpretation in one context or another.38
Thus, from the point of view of the KR, religion arises as a result of the functioning of a number of cognitive systems, and not in the course of some unique processes. Or, to use the metaphorical expression of R. McCauley, religion is a Rube Goldberg machine, that is, a device that performs some rather simple function through an extremely long sequence of operations. In other words, religion is a cognitively "expensive" mechanism that uses representations and patterns of behavior that are adapted to solve other, mainly practical, mental and social tasks; however, just like Rube Goldberg's machines, it can "fascinate" the human mind.39
Elements of the "born believers"thesis

So, as the research program of the Kyrgyz Republic suggests, religion is "a natural product of the totality of ordinary cognitive processes" 40. Moreover, the proponents of tOPV claim-

36. Например, см. Boyer, P. (2003) "Religious Thought and Behaviour as Byproducts of Brain Function", Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7(3): 119; Barrett, J.L. "Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion", p. 29.

37. См. Barrett, J.L. "Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back, Looking Forward", p. 231.

38. См. Pyysiainen, I. (2003) How Religion Works: Towards a New Cognitive Science of Religion, pp. 1-3. Leiden: Brill.

39. См. McCauley, R.N. (2011) Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not, pp. 154-162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

40. Barrett, J.L. "Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion", p. 29.

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It is assumed that this "product" is a consequence of our biological predisposition and does not require a special cultural environment for its origin 41. Next, we will take a closer look at the elements of the tOPV and the evidence in its favor.

1. "Agency detection mechanism" and "Readiness hypothesis"

One of the most important foundations of the idea of innate religiosity is the hypothesis that people have a special mechanism that works to detect the so - called "agents" - a class of beings endowed with intentionality and the ability to actively interact with the environment. From a biological point of view, such a mechanism is a necessary "mental tool"for our survival.42 This tool, however, has a curious property: it is hyper-sensitive, which means that in conditions of uncertain perceptual information, it is highly likely to be false-triggered - according to the principle "it is better to be safe than sorry" 43. As a consequence, we "discover" agency where there are no agents, that is, we animate and anthropomorphize the world around us.44
Perhaps the most famous modern formulation of the view of anthropomorphism and animism as a natural property of human thinking belongs to the Swiss psychologist J. Piaget45. An even more radical position is taken by our contemporary anthropologist S. Guthrie, who considers anthropomorphism and animism to be the results of an adaptive and general perceptual strategy for all animals to give the most significant interpretation to uncertain situations.46 The largest one is the same

41. For example, see Barrett, J. L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief, p. 19.

42. Barrett, J.L. "Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion", p. 31.

43. Guthrie, S.E. (1993) Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion, p. 5. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.

44. См. Barrett, J.L. "Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion", p. 31; Guthrie, S.E. (2002) "Animal Animism: Evolutionary Roots of Religious Cognition", in I. Pyysiainen and V. Anttonen (eds) Current Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion, pp. 38-39. London: Continuum.

45. For example, see Piaget, J. (2001) Child's Concept of the World, pp. 169-252. London: Routledge.

46. См. Guthrie, S.E. Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion, pp. v-viii, 50, 82.

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according to Guthrie, living organisms, mainly humans, have meaning for us, and this is why the world seems to us "not only alive, but also human-like"47. He sees in this perceptual strategy the source of ideas about gods and the "common denominator of religions" and, moreover, argues that ultimately "religion is anthropomorphism" 48.

It should be borne in mind that while Guthrie considers anthropomorphism and animism to be "natural" and "intuitive" cognitive attitudes, 49 from the point of view of most cognitive religious scholars, they are "natural" but "counterintuitive."50 Similar conclusions follow from a number of cross-cultural experiments showing that children and adults do not need to anthropomorphize to make sense of "superhuman" agents - they can use more abstract concepts to do so. The extent to which these concepts are actually anthropomorphic depends on the cognitive requirements of the context 51.

Considering "anthropomorphism" and "agency" as two independent theoretical constructs that explain religion, J. Barrett introduces the "preparedness hypothesis", stating that already at the early stages of ontogenesis, people have all the necessary mechanisms to work with the category of "agents", independent of their concepts of people, in particular, the concept of "agents". first of all, the so - called "hypersensitive Agency Detection Device" (hereinafter referred to as GMO). However, this cognitive structure has two distinctive properties. First, it is intended to represent any intentional agents - not just a person. Second, GMOs provide us with intuitions about a category of agents, many of which are "superhuman" in nature.52
47. Guthrie, S.E. Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion, p. 62.

48. Guthrie, S.E. "Animal Animism: Evolutionary Roots of Religious Cognition," pp. 38-39. Также см. Guthrie, S.E. Faces in the Clouds: A New Theory of Religion, p. 178.

49. Guthrie, S.E. "Animal Animism: Evolutionary Roots of Religious Cognition", p. 40.

50. Например, см. Boyer, P. "What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Representations", pp. 83-84.

51. Barrett, J.L., Richert, R.A. (2003) "Anthropomorphism or Preparedness? Exploring Children's God Concepts", Review of Religious Research 44: 300-312.

52. См. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief, pp. 25-26, 78-79.

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However," superhuman " characteristics are attributed not only to religious characters, but also to fairy-tale characters or so-called "imaginary friends" 53. This fact has given rise to two interrelated problems in the Kyrgyz Republic: The "Mickey Mouse problem" and the "Zeus problem" are questions about what distinguishes representations of religious agents from representations of fantastic creatures (for example, cartoon characters, superheroes, Santa Claus) and what makes us believe in some but not others - "alien" gods, respectively 54. Both are agents with "superpowers", but they differ significantly in the role they play in our system of representations. To define this role, cognitive scientists are forced to go beyond the discussion of supracultural cognitive tendencies and turn to the culturally specific features of certain representations that allow them to easily integrate into the religious picture of the world, and environmental factors that make us "immune" to believing in "other people's" religious ideas. For example, we can talk about the ability of an agent to act as an " ally "or"enemy"55 or about "context-based" learning 56.

Below, we will briefly review the remaining three elements of tOPV, which are actually extensions of the first element - the natural cognitive attitude to recognize agency.

2. Intuitive Creationism and "Promiscuous teleology"

Zh. Piaget was the author of another important hypothesis - the hypothesis of "child artistry", according to which children at the age of

53. Wigger, J.B., Paxson, K., Ryan, L. (2013) "What Do Invisible Friends Know? Imaginary Companions, Theory of Mind, and God", The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 23(1): 2-14.

54. См. Barrett, J.L. (2008) "Why Santa Claus Is not a God", Journal of Cognition and Culture 8(1-2): 149-161; Gervais, W.M., and Henrich, J. (2010) "The Zeus Problem: Why Representational Content Biases Cannot Explain Faith in Gods", Journal of Cognition and Culture 10(3): 383-389.

55. См. Barrett, J.L. "Why Santa Claus Is not a God".

56. См. Gervais, W.M., Henrich, J. "The Zeus Problem: Why Representational Content Biases Cannot Explain Faith in Gods".

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from two to seven to eight years old, the natural world is viewed as the result of the activity of anthropomorphic agents, mainly humans.57 Modern experimental works only partially confirm this hypothesis: they show that preschool children attribute the origin of artifacts to humans, but they are more likely to consider the already mentioned "superhuman" agents responsible for the appearance of natural objects and living beings.58
In particular, studies led by American psychologists D. Kelemen and M. Evans show that children tend to think about natural phenomena in terms of "goals" and prefer "creationist" terminology to "evolutionist"terminology when explaining their origin. 59 Moreover, their experiments have shown that these trends are characteristic not only for children,but also for adults. but also for adults under conditions of additional cognitive load, which indicates that we have two basic automatic intuitions: so-called "promiscuous teleology", that is, the tendency to "default" to explanations in terms of "purpose" even when such explanations are inappropriate, and intuitive creationism, that is, attributing the causes of the origin of natural phenomena to"superhuman"/" supernatural " agents. 60
3. Intuitive Essentialism / Dualism and belief in immortality

The next point that received experimental justification was intuitive essentialism - a natural tendency to endow objects of any category with a set of features that make up their "inner essence". In the case of the category "person", such an" internal entity " often becomes-

57. Piaget, J. Child's Conception of the World, pp. 253-388.

58. Например, см. Petrovich, О. (1997) "Understanding of Non-Natural Causality in Children and Adults: A Case against Artificialism", Psyche en Geloof 8: 151-165.

59. См. Evans, E.M. (2001) "Cognitive and Contextual Factors in the Emergence of Diverse Belief Systems: Creation versus Evolution", Cognitive Psychology 42: 217-266; Kelemen, D., DiYanni, С (2005) "Intuitions about Origins: Purpose and Intelligent Design in Children's Reasoning about Nature", Journal of Cognition and Development 6(1): 3-31.

60. См. Casler, K., Kelemen, D. (2008) "Developmental Continuity in Teleo-Functional Explanation: Reasoning about Nature among Romanian Romani Adults", Journal of Cognition and Development 9(3): 340-363; Evans, E.M. "Cognitive and Contextual Factors in the Emergence of Diverse Belief Systems: Creation versus Evolution".

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there is a certain characteristic from the field of the mental model - for example, intentionality 61. Moreover, intuitive essentialism is associated with another phenomenon - intuitive dualism, by which the American psychologist P. Bloom understands the innate tendency to interpret the world either in terms of material/physical objects (including our own corporeality), or in terms of intentional agents and mental states (for example, an immaterial mind or soul). From his point of view, this is the prevailing trend.

Research in the field of intuitive essentialism / dualism, conducted by J. R. R. Tolkien. They have shown that people are characterized by the so-called "naive psychology of souls" (folk psychology of souls) - an intuitive idea that some element of a person ("inner essence" - soul, spirit, mind, consciousness, etc.) can continue to exist even after the death of the physical body 63. according to him, people usually attribute to "dead" agents mental states without which they cannot imagine their own existence: emotions, desires, and epistemic states, as opposed to psychobiological and perceptual states.64 On this basis, Behring concludes that our implicit beliefs in the afterlife are "more or less innate." 65
4. Moral realism

Finally, the last element of tOPV is moral realism - the intuitive idea that moral norms are unchangeable, and some actions, in fact, do not change.,

61. См. Cohen, E., Barrett, J.L. (2008) "Conceptualizing Spirit Possession: Ethnographic and Experimental Evidence", Ethos 26(2): 246-267.

62. См. Bloom, P. (2004) Descartes'Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes Us Human. N.Y.: Basic Books.

63. Например, см. Bering, J.M. (2006) "The Folk Psychology of Souls", Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29: 453-498; Bering, J.M. (2002) "Intuitive Conceptions of Dead Agents' Minds: the Natural Foundations of Afterlife Beliefs as Phenomenological Boundary", Journal of Cognition and Culture 2(4): 263-308.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., pp. 292-293.

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are correct or incorrect 66. From the point of view of J. R. R. Tolkien According to J. Barrett, this view makes a significant contribution to the formation of beliefs in "supernatural" and "benevolent" agents-the gods.67 Let us emphasize that we are talking here about intuitive theories, and not about moral realism as a philosophical program that presupposes the objective existence of moral facts.68 However, it is worth paying attention to the fact that what is meant is not "moral realism", in the terminology of Zh. Piaget: in his concept, this concept refers to the second stage of the child's moral development in chronological terms, at which he considers moral rules absolute and unchangeable and evaluates the morality of actions solely by their external consequences.69
Nevertheless, moral realism as a naive theory, unlike the three elements of tOPV mentioned above, has not yet received sufficient empirical justification. Cross-cultural and cross-species studies in the field of evolutionary psychology indicate rather that humans and higher primates have recurrent prosocial patterns of thinking and behavior, 70 which are not moral in themselves and, in any case, do not allow us to speak about the existence of innate moral intuitions.71
* * *

So, we have considered four elements of tOPV, namely: 1) GMOs and the "readiness hypothesis"; 2) intuitive creationism and" promiscuous teleology"; 3) intuitive essentialism and intuitive dualism; 4) moral realism. On the one hand,

66. См. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief, p. 121.

67. Ibid., pp. 121-122.

68. См. Schloss, J.P. (2014) "Darwinian Explanations of Morality: Accounting for the Normal but not the Normative", in H. Putnam, S. Neiman, J.P. Schloss (eds.) Understanding Moral Sentiments: Darwinian Perspectives? pp. 81-121. Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

69. See Piaget J. Moral judgment in the child, Moscow: Academic Project, 2006.

70. См., например, Flack, J., de Waal, F. (2002) "'Any Animal Whatever': Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes", in L.D. Katz (ed.) Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross Disciplinary Perspectives, pp. 1-30. Thorverton: Imprint Academic.

71. См., например, Schloss, J.P. "Darwinian Explanations of Morality: Accounting for the Normal but not the Normative", p. 105.

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It can be concluded that if the latter is a debatable element of tOPV, then there is a kind of consensus in the cognitive sciences regarding the remaining three elements, supported by the results of cross-cultural studies. On the other hand, we have shown that the first and most "inclusive" element of tOPV allows us to talk about certain supracultural cognitive structures that contribute to the emergence and spread of beliefs in "superhuman"/"supernatural" agents, but in itself does not explain why only some of the representations of such agents can be embedded in a religious context.

The "born believers" thesis vs. the "indoctrination hypothesis"

В качестве конкурирующего теоретического конструкта, противостоящего ТоПВ, используется "гипотеза индоктринации"72, отличающая главным образом концепции "новых атеистов". Общий ее смысл (в различных формулировках: например, меметика, "духовное насилие" и "доверчивость детского ума" у Р. Докинза73; "религиозный брейнуошинг" или "интеллектуальное младенчество" у Э. Грейлинга74 и т.п.) гласит, что религиозность является результатом систематической религиозной социализации, а не естественным следствием стандартного когнитивного развития75.

Существуют и определенные эмпирические свидетельства в пользу подобной точки зрения. В частности, группа ученых из Бостонского университета под руководством К. Корриво предполагает, что детская религиозность - следствие соответствующей социализации и индоктринации. В своем эксперименталь-

72. Данный термин предложен ее оппонентами, в первую очередь Дж. Барреттом. См. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief, p. 4.

73. Докинз Р. Бог как иллюзия. М.: КоЛибри, 2010.

74. Grayling, A.C. (2007) Against All Gods: Six Polemics on Religion and an Essay on Kindness. London: Oberon Books.

75. We will not dwell in more detail on the argumentation of the "new atheists", partly because it is sufficiently disclosed in the Russian-language literature (see, for example, Mikhelson O. Approaches to the study of religion in modern evolutionary psychology / / State, religion and the Church in Russia and abroad. 2013. Vol. 3 (31), pp. 63-76), partly because it initially contains some metaphysical assumptions about the ontological nature of religion, which, from our point of view, are incompatible with an objective scientific approach.

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In the first study, they presented them to preschoolers (5-6 years old) three different stories ("religious," "historical," and "fantastic") were asked to rate their plausibility. As expected, almost all children considered "historical" narratives plausible, whereas in the case of "religious" narratives, this was true mainly for children who received a religious upbringing. However, the results related to the "fantastic" story were much more interesting: 87% of "secular" respondents considered it a fiction, and only 40% of "religious" children refused to believe in its truthfulness.76 From this, the authors of the experiment believe, it follows that the religious environment affects the perception of agency: children who grew up in a religious environment tend to attribute to agents "superhuman" / "supernatural" abilities that violate intuitive causal ideas about the structure of the world. In other words, it is more likely that religious education eliminates the skeptical attitude towards events that are impossible in the ordinary world than that secular education suppresses the natural predisposition to believe in their possibility, or, as the authors say, "even if children do not have a natural tendency to believe in divine or superhuman agency, religious training can easily lead them to this belief.""77.

Nevertheless, it should be recognized that K. Corriveau and her colleagues are still far from refuting tOPV. First, the operational and environmental validity of their experiment raises questions. Its weakest point is the stimulus material used. 78 In fact, all three types of narratives are based on biblical stories and retain their structure, which makes them easily recognizable to children from religious families. Secondly, the age structure of the sample is no less problematic: the proponents of tOPV themselves do not deny that the tendency to believe in "supernatural" agents is still formed and modulated by individual differences and the environment, which means that by 5-6 years of age, "secular" inculturation can already instill in a child " imma-

76. См. Corriveau, K.H., Chen, E.E., Harris, P.L. (2015) "Judgments about Fact and Fiction by Children from Religious and Nonreligious Backgrounds", Cognitive Science 39(2): 357-371.

77. Ibid., p. 375.

78. See Ibid., pp. 379-382.

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immunity" to certain beliefs in religious and fantastic creatures 79.

Finally , and this remark applies not so much to experiment K. Corriveau's approach to the "indoctrination hypothesis" as a whole - the point of view that religiosity is a consequence exclusively of socialization and inculturation-contains a significant heuristic flaw: it does not answer questions about the reasons for the stability and "success" of certain religious beliefs, nor about the reasons for their cross-cultural recurrence, and therefore, it is not possible to find a solution to the problem. it cannot serve as a full-fledged causal explanation 80.

The thesis of "born believers" and the concept of "innateness"

The problem is undoubtedly complicated by the fact that there is basically no consensus in the cognitive sciences about the concept of "innateness". Some authors believe that the innate / acquired dichotomy has no scientific value; in any case, the concept of "innateness" is not consistent and theoretically useful 81. Others believe that it encompasses a cluster of ideas that can still serve certain heuristic purposes.82 Still others insist that the very idea of innate traits is a consequence of our naive ideas about biological species. 83
Of course, of all the meanings put into this concept 84, in the context of KR, the one that R. Samuels calls the "minimum condition" of innateness turns out to be relevant (let's leave it at that).

79. См. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief, p. 3.

80. См. Sperber, D. Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach, pp. 47-48, 58.

81. См. Griffiths, P.E. "What Is Innateness?"; Mameli, M. and Bateson, P. (2011) "An Evaluation of the Concept of Innateness", Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 366: 436-443.

82. Например, см. Boyd, R. (1991) "Realism, Antifoundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds", Philosophical Studies 61(1): 127-148.

83. Например, см. Linquist, S., Machery, E., Griffiths, P.E., Stotz, K. (2011) "Exploring the Folkbiological Conception of Human Nature", Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 366: 444-453.

84. As M. Mameli and P. Bateson point out, there are many ways to determine the criteria for innateness of a trait - according to the principles: whether a trait has a high phenotypic constancy, whether it has a history of natural selection, whether it develops without special training, etc., but all these principles are important.-

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already dubious attempts to find a certain "God gene" (no comment): if a trait is innate, it means that it is not acquired in the process of learning; if this condition is not met, it means that the trait is not innate 86. In a certain aspect, tOPV is quite consistent with such a broad understanding of innateness: it is, as J. R. R. Tolkien asserts, the most important element of innateness. Barrett indicates that a person has a sensitive period of religious development (mainly in the first five years of life). In this sense, religion is a "natural" and "biological" ability and - along with other cognitive abilities-is a "predictable expression" of our development in a normal environment.87 However, as Barrett himself notes, the existence of a biological ability does not yet say anything about the biological determinism of a particular trait: its appearance also depends on a combination of other factors-personal (for example, the individual's development of the theory of mental and related social thinking) and social, that is, environmental factors (among them: social factors). communications; security; technological progress and belief in human capabilities; mythologization of "pseudo-agents" - fate, chance, government, and even natural selection; early (anti -) religious inculturation, etc.) 88.

This position does not seem unfounded - unlike, for example, the attempts of neurotheologists to find the "neurological substrate" of religious faith and prove its innateness by appealing to a person's genetic predisposition to mystical and religious experiences.89 Nevertheless, the problematic nature of tOPV becomes more obvious when we turn to the consideration of its applied significance. First, despite the desire to

they are problematic to one degree or another. См. Mameli, M. and Bateson, P. "An Evaluation of the Concept of Innateness".

85. See Hamer, D. The God Gene: How Faith Is Hardwired into Our Genes.

86. См. Samuels, R. "Nativism in Cognitive Science." Note that this condition is minimal, but still insufficient. See Mameli, M. and Bateson, P. "An Evaluation of the Concept of Innateness", p. 437.

87. См. Barrett, J.L. Born Believers: The Science of Children's Religious Belief, pp. 8-20, 126-128.

88. Ibid., pp. 19-20, 202-217.

89. Newberg, A. and Waldman, M.R. Born to Believe: God, Science, and the Origin of Ordinary and Extraordinary Beliefs, pp. xvii-xviii.

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proponents of this thesis see religion as a kind of natural cognitive ability, but it only points to the innateness of certain cognitive structures, the natural, but nevertheless by-product of which religion acts. As the Finnish religious scholar I. Pyusiainen notes, criticizing the position of tOPV adherents (here it is worth recalling the approach to the interpretation of the concept of "religion" in the Kyrgyz Republic), "some concepts and ways of thinking may be innate, but religion may be no more innate than football or politics"91. In addition, doubts are expressed about the non-religious approach to the concept of "religion" in the Kyrgyz Republic. not only the innateness and universality of the structures that, in the view of tOPV proponents, underlie religious beliefs - for example, the models of psychic, intuitive essentialism and dualism 92 - but also the concepts of narrow specialization of the psyche and universal modularity 93.

Secondly, it should be borne in mind that tOPV postulates the existence of a cognitive tendency to believe in "superhuman" agents, but such a belief is not yet a religion and cannot even be considered its "minimum": as we have already noted, in order to determine when the representations of these agents become religious, we have to address sociocultural factors. In other words, tOPV helps explain what makes religion possible, but not why it actually occurs.

Conclusions

So, in the course of our analysis, we found that tOPV, on the one hand, is based on a number of discoveries of cognitive psi-

90. For more information, see: Malevich T. V., Folieva T. A. "Naturalness" of religion and "natural religion" in cognitive religious studies.

91. Pyysiainen, I. (2003) "On the 'innateness' of religion: a comment on Bering", Journal of Cognition and Culture 3(3): 218-225.

92. См., например, Hodge, K.M. (2012) "Context Sensitivity and the Folk Psychology of Souls: Why Bering et. al. Got the Findings They Did", in D. Evers, M. Fuller, A. Jackelen, and T. Smedes (eds) Is religion natural? pp. 49-63. NewYork: T & T Clark International; Waxman, S., Medin, D., Ross, N. (2007) "Folkbiological Reasoning from a Cross-Cultural Developmental Perspective: Early Essentialist Notions Are Shaped by Cultural Beliefs", Developmental Psychology 43(2): 294-308.

93. См. Prinz, J.J. "Is the Mind Really Modular?"; Powell, R., Clarke, S. "Religion as an Evolutionary Byproduct: A Critique of the Standard"; Chiao, J.Y., Immordino-Yang, M.H. (2013) "Modularity and the Cultural Mind: Contributions of Cultural Neuroscience to Cognitive Theory", Perspectives on Psychological Science 8(1): 56-61.

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The results of these studies indicate the existence of certain supracultural cognitive predispositions. In this way, he raises the question of the innateness of religious beliefs in a new way-not as ideas embedded in the "mind" or "soul", but as natural cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the emergence of certain ideas - and transfers it from the field of philosophical analysis and discussions of apologists and critics of religion to the soil of empirical research. On the other hand, the Kyrgyz Republic does not claim to create an exhaustive theory of religion as such: it uses a particularist approach and believes that religious beliefs and behavior are based on mechanisms designed to solve other problems. Thus, according to cognitive scientists, religion is a natural product of our thinking, and its analysis does not require the invention of special causal explanations, whether it is a special gene that causes belief in God, or specific areas of the brain responsible for producing religious experiences.

The tOPV itself consists of four elements, which, in turn, determine its evidentiary value. What is problematic here is the statement about the existence of innate moral intuitions, which has not yet received a strong justification. The rest of its elements are generally confirmed by the results of cross-cultural studies and can be reduced to the first component-the hypothesis that we have a special innate cognitive mechanism that allows our thinking to work with a wide category of agents that are not limited to anthropomorphic creatures. In addition, tOPV has a certain advantage over the "indoctrination hypothesis": this hypothesis has not yet received sufficient empirical confirmation and has a lower heuristic potential.

However, one should also pay attention to the limitations that tOPV imposes on the discourse on innate religiosity. First, it does allow us to talk about some supracultural cognitive tendencies that contribute to the emergence of universal ideas about "supernatural" agents, but it does not explain the mechanism of distribution of "religious" and" non-religious " roles between them in different cultural systems. In order to define these roles, the Kyrgyz Republic is forced to refer to the culturally specific features of certain representations and the process of religious socialization and enter into mutual relations.-

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interaction with other religious research programs.

Secondly, here the Kyrgyz Republic faces two meta-theoretical problems related to the interpretation of the concept of "innateness" in the cognitive sciences and the definition of the "minimum" of the religious. Ultimately, the solution of these problems lies outside the competence of the Kyrgyz Republic, which means that tOPV as such is not a final argument in favor of the idea of innate religiosity.

Nevertheless, tOPV, which treats religion as a cognitively "natural" phenomenon, fully satisfies the" minimum condition " of innateness and does not imply absolute biological determinism. Thus, this thesis can serve as a useful heuristic tool in analyzing children's religiosity and in comparative studies, explaining cross-culturally repetitive patterns of religious thinking and behavior.

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