Today, the concepts of the historical process (formational, civilizational, modernization theories) have found their limits of applicability. The degree of awareness of the limitations of these concepts varies: most of all, the shortcomings of the formation theory are realized, as for the civilizational doctrine and modernization theories, there are more illusions about their possibilities to explain the historical process. The insufficiency of these concepts for the study of social change does not mean that they are absolutely false, but only that the categorical apparatus of each of the concepts, the range of social phenomena described by it, is not sufficiently complete, at least in terms of describing what is contained in alternative theories. It is necessary to rethink the content of descriptions of social changes, as well as the concepts of general and unique, on the basis of which generalizations and differentiations are made, and schemes of the historical process are built. In this article, we will try to offer some conceptual guidelines for the synthetic concept of the historical process.

Theories of the historical process reflect a one-sided understanding of historical changes, and there is a reduction in the variety of their forms to any types. The formation concept sees in the historical process only progress, and total, considering that progressive development covers all spheres of social life, including the individual. Theories of modernization are also linear-progressive, differing from the formational approach in assessing Western civilization as the pinnacle of history, its completion. The civilizational concept draws attention to the variability of spiritual culture, asserts the immutability of cultural unique spiritual complexes, their crucial role. Although the cultural complexes themselves are considered stable, each of them is nevertheless represented as a special variant of culture. If Hegel believed that the spiritual, so to speak, by definition has the capacity for development, this approach asserts the opposite: the external world can change, but the unique systems of culture cannot.

Obviously, each of the concepts contains rational ideas and ignores the others. The real history of society includes both a complex of changes and certain constants that have not yet been brought together, which is hindered by limited estimates, when particular changes are considered as integral, and the lack of a categorical apparatus that can cover opposite approaches. History shows that social change is more diverse than social change.

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their theoretical models. From this fact, you can draw different conclusions: either abandon the models, or find out their real boundaries. The latter is more constructive.

There is no doubt about the progress of technology and science. This type of change is described in sufficient detail, and we will not dwell on it (1). However, it is not the only one. In addition to progressive changes, combinatorics, which we understand as combinations of stable elements (for example, a set of different forms of ownership), is also quite widely represented in society. Functional changes are also very important - changing the role of some elements in relation to others. For example, science for a considerable time performed ideological functions for a narrow circle of people. In modern conditions, it is the basis for creating new technologies and everyday actions of millions of people. G. E. Zborovsky and G. P. Orlov pay attention to the role dynamics of communication elements: "There is such an eternal and constantly living problem - the problem of the "leading factor". We are always dealing with a multiplicity of determinants. Singling out one thing as crucial for all times and states is a dead end " (2). It is hard to disagree with this. Related parties exist in the context of conditions, and they can be of varying degrees of maturity, which undoubtedly affects their mutual roles of "defined" and "determining".

There is also such a form of change as an increase or decrease in the significance of social phenomena, for example, the importance of morality as a way of regulating people's relations increases in comparison with the role of traditions. The moral norms themselves practically do not change, but the scope of this method of regulating relations between people is growing, and traditions are falling.

The success of the synthetic work is largely due to how fully and correctly the forms of historical changes are described in particular concepts that claim to be universal. Although there are rational propositions in the existing doctrines of social change, they nevertheless bear the imprint of claims to monopolism and contain distortions. Let us consider in more detail the weak points of the civilizational concept of the historical process, since its methodological capabilities are evaluated rather uncritically (3).

Despite the rational aspects, the civilizational approach is characterized by a fair amount of anti-historicism, which consists in the fact that the orders that took place in a certain period are interpreted as mandatory for the entire history. The disadvantage of the civilizational approach is that culture is considered only in language form, at the level of mental phenomena, but it does not take into account that the spiritual is objectified in the environment (infrastructure, technology), plant and animal species, organizations, and technologies. If we take into account the real forms of existence of culture, then when studying civilizations, it is necessary to consider the features of all spheres of society. Connecting the spheres of life described by sociologists with civilization: consciousness, economy, politics, everyday life and infrastructure, this phenomenon can be described more fully.

As a disadvantage of the civilizational approach, we should mention the cultural-centrist motives of treating a person not as a subject of spiritual culture, but as its slave. Culturocentrism, for all its originality, implies an attempt, just like sociocentrism, to explain a person as a manifestation of culture, and not as its creator. However, there are also natural elements in a person that cannot be explained from culture; culture itself is an instrument of life that is created by people.

One of the reasons for ignoring changes in culture is that its analysis is limited to such stable cultural phenomena as religious consciousness. Indeed, there is no doubt that there are stable forms of religious consciousness, but we should not lose sight of the fact that its role varies at different stages of history. Proponents of the civilizational approach, considering societies, also ignore the commonality in historical changes, see

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they contain only the unique. This is possible because the study of societies uses the concept of the general, which is understood as total-general.

The description of local societies cannot be limited to specific, unique features; they also have general characteristics, although the nature of the latter is specific. What is common is not the values shared in these societies, which proponents of the civilizational approach pay attention to, but their functions and meanings. This specific type of general may well serve as a basis for classifying local societies. For example, from the point of view of the role played by different forms of consciousness, we can distinguish three stages in the life of societies: mythological, theocratic, and secular. This is the main line of evolution. The sequence of these changes should not be interpreted in the spirit of O. Comte, that each subsequent stage excludes the previous one. It is a question of changing the dominant role of the form of consciousness. In a secular society, religion and mythology do not disappear, but they do not play a dominant role in relation to social practice.

To identify both the rational and weak sides of the civilizational approach, it is necessary to define the concept of "civilization". We consider the concepts of "local society" and "civilization" as coinciding in relation to a certain historical period (from the Neolithic revolution to the formation of the world market). In this era, local society is a manifestation of the phenomenon of civilization (a specific culture in all its forms: mental, practical, object) in its most complete form. This approach does not contradict the understanding of society as a system of relations, since relations are also a sphere of culture.

In modern conditions, the concept of "civilization" characterizes only the residual cultural differences between regions that are undergoing changes. In our time, we can talk about the civilizational originality of regions, and not about different civilizations. This conclusion is unavoidable if we accept that culture is not something unchangeable.

The emergence of civilizations was associated, on the one hand, with the autonomization of local societies, their autarky, on the other hand, with a specific combination of basic forms of activity within them. The combinatorial type of change means that there is no predestination in local societies, and also that these societies cannot be classified unambiguously, as, for example, feudal or capitalist. These are particular constructs that highlight a particular feature of the life of local societies. In reality, autonomous societies can only be described through a set of specific features, when the specifics of one do not predetermine the specifics of the other. What determines the fact that a particular set of characteristics is formed in a society? The answer to this question can hardly be unambiguous, but the determinants seem to be the choice of people themselves and, in part, the influence of circumstances. Thus, the specification of general forms of activity is characterized by randomness.

In local societies or civilizations, the dominant role of religious consciousness is revealed, and two types are distinguished: immanent (pagan, recognizing the existence of gods in the world) and transcendent (god exists outside the world). Each of these types of religious consciousness exists in specific forms.

The dominance of religious consciousness was manifested in the fact that it had a regulatory impact on the sphere of not only personal, but also industrial, social, and political life. Subsequently, the scientific consciousness begins to dominate, which does not exclude mythological and religious consciousness, which has an impact on personal life, on the practice of saving the soul, but not on industrial or political practices.

The leading role of religious consciousness is a general characteristic of local societies, which manifests itself despite different ideas about God or gods,

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ways of salvation, in all spheres of public life. The very idea of salvation also has something in common. For Christians and Buddhists, salvation lies in getting rid of a bad life, suffering, although the specific ideas about suffering are different.

In our opinion, another thesis of the proponents of the civilizational approach is also doubtful, which is that the civilizational community is culturally unified, and the values of spiritual culture are universal for this civilizational community. So, for Europeans, one mentality is characteristic, for Hindus - another. This conclusion is made on the basis of extrapolating to society the ideas about the general, which are developed in natural science. We have already noted that the general nature of social life is partial, which manifests itself in the same functions of different entities. But there is another form of partial generality: qualitatively general, characterized by quantitative differences. Thus, a large group of people may have a common belief in a particular god, which does not exclude differences in the degree of faith. In faith, as in every business, there are heroes and pariahs. Many believers are so purely outwardly, faith does not have a significant impact on their lives. In addition, in every civilizational community, there have always been and will always be people who do not believe, or who believe in what is condemned by members of the official denomination.

In part, the common is also manifested in the fact that the common in one respect can be accompanied by differences in another. For example, belief in a single god does not guarantee a single cult, a single lifestyle. This is well known. The civilizational approach professes the understanding of the general as a total-general, that is, the phenomena compared are the same in everything. The concept of the general as total-common is, whether its proponents realize it or not, the basis of messianism. Those who believe in the existence of a common one of this kind strive to make all of humanity happy. It should be noted that this understanding is also inherent in proponents of linear approaches to history.

This means that in any civilization there were elements of different cultures, although their status was not the same: there were officially recognized cultures and opinions, and there were unofficial ones. In the civilizational approach, official culture is interpreted as the only and unchangeable one.

Let's try to show the forms of partial-general that took place in local societies.

The differences in the economic sphere between local societies are not very significant in terms of tools and are quite significant in terms of working conditions and forms of ownership: manual tools dominate in all of them. More important are differences in the objects of labor (natural fertility of the soil, types of flora and fauna in a given territory) and geographical working conditions (dry climate or, on the contrary, wet). These natural differences determine the economic shape of society. The dependence of production on the geographical environment is high at this stage, but later its value decreases. If the tools of labor in societies are relatively of the same type, then economic relations are diverse: in some societies commodity-money relations have a significant weight, in others they are insignificant. Forms of ownership and their combinations are diverse: public, private, and community ownership are represented in these societies quite widely.

In all spheres of local societies, there is a special form of division of labor, which can be called hereditary. This type of division of labor was fixed either by a system of legal norms, or by traditions and customs and covered all spheres of public life.

One of the myths that are current in historical, political, and philosophical literature consists in constructing an artificial independent subject of history (society, nation, class, organization, state, clan, etc.) and two types of relations between it and the individual: either the community is recognized as dominant over the individual.

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an individual, or individuals are recognized as autonomous. The power of the community over individuals is interpreted as the essence of the Asian type of society.

What causes doubts about this design? First of all, the holistic interpretation of the concept of "society", according to which it acts as a special subject capable of entering into relations with real people. We believe that society cannot act as a special entity. Therefore, the differences between regions can hardly be described using fictional subjects. In our opinion, the specificity of Eastern societies is that they guarantee a lifelong human connection with the earth, economic and political status. In Western society, however, guaranteed economic status either does not exist, or it is very weakened. As a result, the concept of economic life as a competitive game is being implemented in practice, where wealth, land, and in some cases one's own freedom are the stakes. The market is a manifestation of the economic concept of life as a game.

The certainty and guarantee of economic status lies in the fact that a person who is an owner or user of land acts in these qualities regardless of market conditions. This situation is possible because the land is not an object of purchase and sale. In Western society, however, status depends on economic activity: a person can lose the status of an owner or user if their activity does not meet certain conditions. The same thing happens with social status. Status persistence has pros and cons. Thus, the disadvantage of permanent status can be considered that it does not perform a motivating role for risk-and game-oriented subjects, is not associated with personal abilities, and leads to equalization. The advantage is that the individual is protected from the vicissitudes of market fluctuations. However, in Eastern society, the motivating values of land ownership and wealth are weakened. But this does not mean that there are no other motives for working.

It should be noted that the guarantee of economic status does not exclude the possibility of human development as a person. On the contrary, with this status, a person has more opportunities to invest in themselves, rather than in things, that is, to develop their strength and abilities. The constancy of status (and occupation) is mainly regulated by tradition. And the force that guarantees it is the communities of people themselves. This means that the role of legal regulation in this society decreases, but does not disappear. The law as a regulator in these conditions is not entirely expedient, but only within certain limits, since there are no permanent losses or acquisitions of property at the expense of others, there is no need to force individuals to comply with economic norms. The main negative factor in this society is the lack of a mass education system, the dominance of traditional technologies, and not the lack of private ownership of land.

The difference in guaranteed statuses is understood in the literature as an inter-civilizational difference between the West and the East, but its real content indicates that orientation to different life styles (life-play, stable life, ascetic life) takes place in every civilization, that is, there are large groups of adherents of a particular way of life. Another thing is that in the existing civilizations, one of these styles received the dominant value. This circumstance requires understanding in relation to the present and the future of humanity. It can be assumed that all of them will be recognized as equal.

In local societies, there are specific relations between the political and economic spheres; in particular, we can talk about the fusion of political power and land ownership: the owner of land is, as a rule, an official. Subsequently, there is a separation of political power from land ownership.

Relations between people in local societies are spatially limited, are territorial in nature, with the transition from local societies to global

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relations acquire an extraterritorial character. The peculiarity of autonomous societies (civilizations) is also that in some of them (Egypt, Greece, Rome) slavery is widespread, although it occurs in the tribal society. The political sphere of local societies is characterized by the presence of the state, the church, which, as a rule, are fused together. The degree of this connection varies from absolute in the Muslim world to moderate in the Catholic world.

At the level of infrastructure in local societies, it can be divided into natural and artificial. Artificial infrastructure is represented by the following types: rural, urban, or mixed.

The importance of infrastructure in relation to local societies is poorly understood in the historical literature, it is not taken into account either in periodizations or in classifications of society. Such ignoring leads to the fact that the picture of local societies is obviously incomplete. In a preliminary order, we can note the following: exclusively rural societies are those that existed after the Neolithic revolution until the emergence of urban or mixed civilizations, and the first ones appeared on a pagan basis. What characterizes village society? In our opinion, its main feature is the relative professional homogeneity of people; the city is characterized by the presence of many heterogeneous professional groups and, thus, the market as a place of exchange of labor results.

European society seems to have been rural for several centuries after the fall of Rome. So-called feudalism is nothing more than a village society, but with a specific state structure, a church, and a Christian religion. However, within the framework of this society, cities, secular culture, and industry gradually emerged, which led to the need for a different type of state, one that serves not the patrimony, but the nation with revived elements of ancient life. Ancient society was more urban than rural in its infrastructure. In this sense, it was radically different from the early Middle Ages. The late Middle Ages are already a mixed society.

Asian local societies (China, India) were mixed in terms of infrastructure, they always had cities and villages. The same picture is seen in the Middle East in the early Middle Ages. In this respect, they were different from modern Europe: they had a different type of state-despotic or patriarchal-despotic (as in the period of absolutism in Europe, when cities appeared), a different religion and culture.

Thus, local civilizations emerged as a result of specific historical changes. The latter are represented, on the one hand, by the differentiation of a community of people into spatially isolated groups, on the other - by the combinatorics of various spheres of social life and their elements, the realization of a set of opportunities in each local society. Local societies are the sum of civilizations that, although they influence each other, nevertheless retain their autonomy. Society as a whole can only arise as a result of the reverse process of convergence, which is expressed in the formation of a single world market, a single economy, the internationalization of various aspects of local cultures, and the change of people. A person of a local society is limited by its culture, while a modern person is a carrier of both local and world cultures at the same time, which gives grounds for distinguishing the stages of civilization - first as a community of people, and later as a cultural phenomenon. These processes are a reality in our time. Although they cannot be considered complete or exclude the emergence of new local differences, they clearly indicate that civilizations are a historical phenomenon.

It should be noted that in the XVIII century the beginning of the process directly opposite to the separation of societies is observed - the formation of the world market. In the XX century, a single information space is being formed, cultures are interpenetrating, and there is a great deal of interaction.

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the process of integrating local civilizations into a single society. It is clear that there are still significant differences between the former local societies. However, these are not the old civilizations, but their remnants.

Considering the noted long-term trends that affect the fate of civilizational differences, we note that they have manifested themselves in one way or another, but these manifestations can hardly be considered exhausted at the moment. The basis of these tendencies is not the action of some impersonal laws, not fate, but the desire of people for self-realization, for the fullness of life. Real needs, as well as the real conditions for their satisfaction, are sufficient grounds for understanding the forms of life in which these needs can be met.

In the spiritual sphere, there is a tendency to transform former homogeneous civilizations into heterogeneous formations. The former regional cultures are becoming international and extraterritorial. This means that regions that were previously characterized as homogeneous in terms of religion, customs, traditions, and ethnic composition are becoming multicultural and multi-confessional. This fact inevitably requires the formation of supra-confessional, supranational cultural regulators. Among them, science and international law are becoming more and more prominent. If there are no regulators, it is inevitable that one religion or culture will win, and this entails the violence of some people over others, the imposition of some values and ideals. The theory of civilization in the traditional interpretation, regardless of the intentions of its supporters, hinders the integration process, focuses on preserving regions as mono-confessional, on countering the penetration of "foreign culture and faith", and, therefore, on imposing faith on people.

In the economic sphere, local societies, on the contrary, were multi-functional, each of them had the main types of production: agriculture, extractive industries, construction, crafts, trade. An increase in labor productivity inevitably led to the emergence of exchange. The latter contributed to the formation of an international division of labor, which inevitably leads to changes in the economic life of regions, the emergence of industries operating on the world market, and transnational corporations. At the same time, regional economic inequality is emerging. In some regions, advanced technologies are concentrated, in others-backward ones, in some there is scientific and industrial development, in others - agricultural development. The zone of agricultural development includes a number of civilizations that many supporters of the civilizational approach refer to the eastern type of development. Thus, the international division of labor seems to preserve and support certain elements of the culture of traditional civilizations in these countries: attachment to land, communal nature of land use, the role of the community. However, the preservation of these orders is not the result of lagging behind the world, but of participating in the international division of labor.

In these circumstances, to raise the question of the economic equality of regions and states located in them means to focus on past orders. Economic equality of territories can no longer exist, and regions cannot be monotonous in terms of the composition of productive forces and branches of production. To return to this, you need to isolate the country or region. At the same time, this ideal flourishes on the pages of philosophical and sociological literature. Countries and regions are divided into advanced ones that are capable of continuous independent modernization, and those that are being modernized to a small extent under the pressure of external necessity. The authors of such concepts assume that social changes should be the same in all regions. This desire for sameness stems from past experience, it is rooted in the belief that there can be no other. In our opinion, the question of equality in modern conditions can only be raised in the sense of social equality, that is, the equality of regions, their interest in the international division of labor, and the absence of discrimination.

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The trends that take place in the economic and cultural fields are also manifested in a specific way in the political sphere. The internationalization of the economy inevitably requires internationalization in the political sphere, since the organization of political power on a regional basis largely hinders the implementation of fair economic relations. Extraterritorial subjects of power are needed, and, as can be seen from modern history, they are emerging. Example of the UN. Their absence or imperfection, with strong regional and national authorities, leads to conflicts, distrust, unfair distribution of benefits, and attempts by some peoples to rule others.

However, this does not mean that regional or national authorities should disappear. They will remain, but their functions will change. One of the main changes, apparently, will be the transfer of the right to international bodies for violence on international issues, a ban on national armies (of course, in the long term).

It is also important to note the trends that are possible in the field of economic and, above all, commodity-money relations. In local societies, markets were inevitably regional in nature. In fact, despite international trade, each region was economically self-sufficient. At least the bulk of the goods were traded in regional markets. This is not to say that the historical memory of these orders has been erased. They are reanimated in a peculiar way as the ideal of formation theory and in technological determinism. Here, the development of society at the stage of the emergence of the world economy is conceived in terms of national economies; it is assumed that the world economy will consist of the sum of national and regional economies, each being a copy of the other. In particular, each of them should have industry, agriculture, science, culture, healthcare, etc. Thus, whether explicitly or implicitly, the equality of regions in their social structure was assumed.

The evolution of societies in this direction would mean that the international division of labor would have a symbolic meaning, and the struggle between states and regions would become more acute, especially for resources, for which country's order should be a model for others. The new European history clearly demonstrates the struggle between states for leadership, resources, and influence. It inevitably involves reliance on force, the presence of powerful armies, weapons, and the use of violence as the main argument in defending the right.

However, the international division of labor requires the rejection of regional equality, which is understood as similar to the economic, social and cultural life of countries and regions. On the contrary, its consistent implementation means a certain inequality of regions in terms of the composition of productive forces, production of dominant types of goods and services, cultural identity and way of life. This inequality can be defined as occupational, not social. Regions and states are interesting to each other for their diversity and dissimilarity. In this case, the criteria for evaluating peoples and cultures also change, and there is no need to measure the modernity of peoples and regions by the degree of their compliance with the chosen model. Messianic thinking becomes redundant.

When the inter-regional division of labor is consistently carried out, the characteristics of the international market also change in many ways. First of all, regions are becoming increasingly dependent on each other, and competition is increasing within industries and regions.

With the international division of labor, innovations in market relations are inevitable. Commodity-money relations are characterized by the fact that the allocation of resources is carried out in accordance with economic efficiency. Organizations that work more efficiently also allocate more resources. With the same set of activities in each country, this leads to the fact that some regions lose, others win, some lag behind, others are ahead. Gosu-

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partnerships and their unions that are ahead of others often seek to take advantage of their own advantages, limit the ability of competitors, and maintain leadership, which leads to ugly relationships.

However, it is necessary to realize that these results of the market economy are not a consequence of commodity-money relations in general, but of the model of a complete regional market, which arose in the past from the denial of the regional division of labor. Indeed, even if each state or region strives for comprehensiveness at the expense of autarky, there is a dependence on raw materials located outside the country or region, since it is possible to create a branch of the economy, but not raw materials. There is a dependence on labor and intellectual resources that move from one region to another. A uniform model of development of the world's countries is not effective, it requires a colossal militarization of society, expensive military organizations that do not create national wealth, but spend it.

Another negative aspect of this model of the world community is that superprofits are concentrated in certain regions, and therefore assistance and assistance (as inevitable functions that complement market regulation) are provided by them from the standpoint of political bias, priority of national interests, and not economic expediency, which creates dissonance in the economic life of the world community. Sovereignty and uniformity of regions become obstacles to the development of economic, spiritual and political life of peoples. Their role is similar to that of feudal isolation in European history, which prevented the formation of national states and national markets. In the twentieth century, the monopoly of a number of national States on weapons of mass destruction largely contributed to the preservation of national States. Currently, this monopoly has been lost, and therefore the chances of individual states or regions to play the role of world government are being lost. No nation-State can effectively fulfill the role of a world government, no matter how rich and stubborn these States may be.

The practice of creating blocks that oppose each other is dangerous and can lead to the self-destruction of humanity. In modern conditions, there is no reasonable alternative to creating an international power center that would perform specific functions. The denial of such a center leads to the fact that national states or their unions begin to claim the role of the center.

Thus, consideration of social changes allows us to conclude that along with progressive ones, there are also combinatorial ones, as well as changes in the roles of certain ideas and values. The concept of change does not exhaust social reality, since there are also stable phenomena, such as moral norms.

The latter is very important, since both the formational and civilizational approaches deny the existence of generic unchangeable values inherent in generations of people living in different historical epochs. However, the same values exist, and they are primarily related to relations within small groups: families, labor collectives. They can disappear only with the disappearance of society. For example, love for one's neighbor, solidarity, and mutual aid are sanctified by both pagan and world religions.

There is no doubt that the theories of progress have a rational meaning, since proponents of the civilizational approach interpret progress as a myth. The concept of "progress" gained a certain content in the philosophical and sociological systems of the XIX century (O. Comte, G. Spencer, K. Marx, etc.). In the XX century, a number of their aspects were revealed to be untenable, which led many thinkers to reject the recognition of progressive changes in society, to put forward alternative theories, such as the doctrine of the permanence of the crisis state of society, the theory of cyclical development (P. Sorokin), and the civilizational approach (N. Danilevsky, A. Toynbee, etc.). Actually, in recent years," Sociological Research " has repeatedly published materials on this issue [4].

The ideas of self-action of progress, its totality and teleology are doubtful.

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Self-action refers to the independence of progress from people. Its driving forces are carried beyond the limits of human capabilities. It is believed that progress is realized regardless of people's intentions. The totality of progress means that it has an all-encompassing character, that all components of the social world are progressing: a person, technology, relationships, consciousness. The teleological nature of progress was understood as its focus on a certain goal, for example, communism, universal happiness, the establishment of the monopoly of positive thinking, etc. The goals for which progress was made were also considered as criteria for progress.

From our point of view, progress in the social world is an increase in human capabilities, due to the complexity of both the conditions of human activity and the activity itself. Such an understanding of progress is not connected with teleology, nor with a total understanding of progress, nor with a belief in its self-realization, and is in relation to continuity with the traditional only in determining such a sign as its complication. Progress takes place where new, more complex formations appear.

The understanding of progress as the growth of human capabilities through the improvement of the factors of activity and the activity itself does not apply to the motives of human activity, to the attitude of a person to the world, to people. This means that progress is not total. If we define areas of progress in the social world, they are limited to knowledge, technology, the activity itself, and its complexity. The growth of human capabilities does not mean the progress of morals and feelings. The results of progress can be used both for the good of people and against them.

Such an interpretation of progress is compatible with the existence of the world market, the freedom of individuals, both generic and transitory values, the uniqueness of people themselves, the diversity of their powers and abilities, which are largely genetically determined and therefore ineradicable. The subjects of history are specific people who have not only common, but also unique features. Freedom of self-determination is a condition for the realization of a person, the expression of his individuality. The future society will be pluralistic, connected with different lifestyles and value systems.

The difference between people of the future and past generations in terms of values will consist not in the absence of pluralism of values, but in the possibility of their free choice, in the fact that groups of people who share the same values will not necessarily be concentrated in one territory. They may live in different regions, and their organizations will have an extraterritorial nature.

Thus, both civilizational and linear-progressive approaches to the periodization of history have both certain disadvantages and positive aspects. Neither one nor the other can be recognized as the basis for a holistic understanding of the process of social change due to one-sidedness. Such a basis is the awareness of both complexes of social changes and sustainable components of social life. This makes us think about the need to build a theory that would take into account the types of social changes and their role dynamics.

NOTES 1. See Shtompka P. Sotsiologiya sotsial'nykh izmenenii [Sociology of Social Changes], Moscow: Aspect Press, 1996, pp. 45-60.

2. Zborovsky G. E., Orlov G. P. Sotsiologiya: Uchebn [Sociology: Textbook]. for humanitarian universities, Moscow, 1995, p. 48.

3. Semennikova L. I. Civilizations in the history of mankind: Training manual. Bryansk: Italics. 1998. p. 8.

4. Sorokin P. A. Obzor tsiklicheskikh kontseptsii sotsial'no-istoricheskogo protsessa [Review of cyclic concepts of the socio-historical process]. research. 1998. N 12; Zapf, W., Theory of modernization and the diverse paths of social development // Toshchenko Zh. T. Sotsiologiya: puti nauchnoi reformatsii [Sociology: ways of scientific reformation] // 1999. N 7; Zborovsky G. E. Once again about the real problems of modern sociology // Ibid., 1999, No. 6; et al.

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