Question 4

Section 1. Does the apostle really define faith appropriately?

The reasoning in the first section is as follows. It seems that the definition of faith given by the apostle ("faith is the substance of things hoped for, the argument about the invisible"1) is not appropriate.

1. In fact, no quality is a substance. But faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above (Part 1-II, V. 62, p. 3). Therefore, it is not a substance.

2. Besides, different virtues have different objects. But the thing that is hoped for is the object of hope. Therefore, it should not be included in the definition of faith as its object.

3. Moreover, faith is perfected rather by love-caritas 2 than by hope, since love-caritas is a form of faith, as will be discussed later (Ch. II-II, V. 4, p. 3.). Therefore, much more likely to be included in the definition of faith is the thing that should be considered as a form of faith. to love more than one should hope for.

4. In addition, the same thing should not be assumed in different genera. But substance and argument are different genera, and neither of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore, it is not appropriate to call faith a substance and an argument.

5. In addition, the argument reveals the truth of what the argument leads to. But that which is revealed in truth is called obvious. Therefore, there seems to be a contradiction in the words "argument about the invisible". Therefore, the description of faith is incorrect.

But against it: the authority of the apostle suffices.

1. In the Synodal translation: "Faith is the fulfillment of what is expected and the assurance of what is not seen "(Heb 11: 1).

2. Thomas distinguishes " caritas "(love of God as a theological virtue) from" amor " (love as passion). At the same time, love-caritas resides in the will as its subject, while love-amor refers to the sensual part of the soul.

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I answer that, it must be said that although some say that these words of the apostle are not a definition of faith, nevertheless, if we consider the question properly, it will become clear that in this description everything is touched upon on the basis of which faith can be defined, although these words themselves do not have the form of a definition (but so it is). after all, even among philosophers, the beginnings of syllogisms are affected even in the absence of the form of the syllogism itself). In order to be clear on this point, it must be taken into account that since habitus 3 is known through an act, and an act through its object, faith, since it is a kind of habitus, must be defined through its own act in relation to its own object. But an act of faith is a belief, which, as already stated (Parts II-II, B. 1, P. 2, 3), is the action of reason, determined to one thing in accordance with the command of the will. And so, therefore, the act of faith has order both in relation to the object of the will, which is the good and the end, and to the object of reason, which is the true. And inasmuch as faith (for it is a theological virtue, as stated above (Parts I-II, V. 62, p. 2)) has the same end and object, it is necessary that the object and end of faith should be proportionally related to each other. But it has already been said above (Parts II-II, B. 1, p. 1) that the first truth is an object of faith, because it is invisible (as well as what we hold for its sake is invisible). And accordingly it is necessary that the first truth itself should be related to the act of faith according to the method of the goal, according to the semantic content of the invisible thing. And this refers to the meaning of the thing that is hoped for, according to these words of the apostle (Rom 8: 25): We hope for what we do not see. For to see the truth is to possess it; but no one hopes for what they already possess, and faith for what they do not possess, as stated above (Parts I-II, V. 67, p. 4). And so, therefore, the relation of the act of faith to the end, which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words faith is the substance of things hoped for. In fact, substance is usually called the first beginning of a thing, and, first of all, in the case when all subsequent things are virtually contained in the original (for example, we say-

3. Habitus - a hard-to-remove quality. According to Thomas, all virtues, including theological ones, are the habitations of the soul.

4. The term "virtual" (from "virtus" - power) in this case is identical to the term "potentially". A thing is contained in something virtually, if it can be derived from it, or it can be produced by it (in the latter sense).-

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It is obvious that the first unprovable principles are the substance of science: precisely because the first thing that science has in us is such principles, and virtually all science is contained in them). So, in this sense, it is said that faith is the substance of things that are hoped for: in connection with the fact that in us the first beginning of things that are to be hoped for takes place through the consent of faith, which virtually contains in itself all things that are to be hoped for. Indeed, we hope to find bliss in seeing with clear eyes what we hold by faith, as is evident from what was said earlier about bliss (Ch. I-II, V. 3, P. 8).

And the relation of the act of faith to the object of reason, according to the fact that it is the object of faith, is described by the words " argument about the invisible." And by argument here is meant the consequence of argument, for reason comes to hold on to some truth by argument; and therefore the very firm adherence of reason to the invisible truth of faith is here called argument. This is why another translation speaks of "conviction," since divine authority persuades the believer to accept what he does not see. If, therefore, one wishes to give the above words the form of a definition, one can say that "faith is the habitus of the mind, through which the beginning of eternal life is present in us and which leads the mind to accept the invisible."

But this makes faith different from anything else that relates to reason. Indeed, because it is called an "argument," it is distinguished from opinion, supposition, and doubt: for it does not give rise to the beginning of a firm commitment of the mind to anything. Because faith is called the "argument about the invisible," it differs from science and the simple comprehension of the principles that make something manifest. And because faith is called "the substance of things to be hoped for," the virtue of faith

St. Thomas says, for example, that "everything that can have the semantic content of what is and what is true is virtually contained in God": Summa th., I, q. 19, a. 6, ad 2).

5. Unprovable principles - for example, axioms of geometry. From the point of view of medieval tradition, all sciences are based on such unprovable principles.

6. According to Aristotle (Ethic, VI, 3; 1139b16), there are three intellectual habits by which a person comprehends truth: the simple comprehension of principles (intellectus), by which the unprovable axioms of a particular science are comprehended; scientific knowledge (scientia), which is the knowledge of conclusions drawn from these principles; and wisdom (sapientia), i.e. knowledge of higher causes.

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it differs from faith in the broad sense of the word, since the latter is not ordered in relation to the bliss we hope for.

And all the other definitions that have ever been given to faith are explanations of what the apostle said. Indeed, the definitions of Augustine ("faith is a virtue by which one believes in the invisible"), Damascene ("faith is agreement with the unknown"), and others ("faith is a certain confidence of the spirit in the absent, higher than opinion, but lower than knowledge"7) are identical with the apostle's words about the "argument about the invisible". And Dionysius 'definition that faith is" the firm support of believers, placing them in the truth, and the truth in them, " is identical with [the apostle's] words about "the substance of things to be hoped for."

To the first, then, it must be answered that by "substance" is not meant here the highest genus, which is distinct from all the others; but [the word is used] according to the fact that in any genus there is a certain semblance of substance: insofar as the first in any genus, which virtually contains everything else, is called the substance of such.

To the second, it must be answered that, since faith belongs to reason according to what the will commands it, it must be ordered as to the end, as to the objects of those virtues by which the will is perfected. But among them is hope, as will be clear from what follows (Parts II-II, B. 18, P. 1). Therefore, the definition of faith includes the object of hope.

To the third, it must be answered that love can relate to the visible as well as to the invisible, to the present as well as to the absent. Therefore," a thing to love "is not so characteristic of faith as" a thing to hope for", because hope always refers to the absent and invisible.

To the fourth, it must be answered that substance and argument, according as they are included in the definition of faith, do not imply either a difference in the kinds of faith or a difference in its acts; they only imply different relations of one act to different objects, as is evident from what has been said.

7. We are talking, among other things, about Hugh of Saint-Victor, who wrote:: "If anyone wants to give a complete and general definition of faith, he can say:' Faith is a certain confidence of the spirit in things that are absent, which is above opinion and below knowledge '" (De sacr., I, p. 10, p. 2; PL 176, 330C).

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The answer to the fifth question is that what makes a thing explicit is the argument that is taken from the proper principles of that thing. But an argument that is taken from divine authority does not make the thing explicit. And it is this argument that is included in the definition of faith.

Question 81

Section 1. Is it really a religion

It orders man only in relation to God

The reasoning in the first section is as follows. It seems that religion orders a person not only in relation to God.

1. For it is written (James 1: 27): A pure and undefiled religion before God and the Father is to visit the fatherless and widows in their sorrows, and to keep oneself unspotted from the world. But the care of widows and orphans refers to the order in relation to one's neighbor, and the preservation of oneself unspotted from this world refers to the order in which a person is ordered in relation to himself. Therefore, religion does not order a person only in relation to God.

2. In addition, Augustine says in the Tenth Book of the City of God: 8 " But since the use of this word among the Latins requires not only the unlearned, but also the most learned to observe religion in relation to kinship, property, and other relations, this word does not eliminate the ambiguity when it comes to veneration, in such a way that it can be said with all certainty that religion is to be understood precisely as the worship that should be given to God alone." Consequently, religion should be spoken of not only in order to God, but also in order to our neighbors.

3. In addition, religion seems to include [what the Greeks call the word] latreia. But this word, according to what Augustine says in the tenth book "On the City of God"9, is translated as "service". However, we must serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to these words (Galatians 5: 13): Serve one another with love. Therefore, religion implies order in relation to one's neighbor.

4. Religion also includes worship. But it is said that a person worships not only God, but also his neighbor, with the help of-

8. De civ. Dei, X, p. 1.

9. Ibid.

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according to these words of Cato: "Bow down to your parents." Therefore, religion orders us not only in relation to God, but also in relation to our neighbor.

5. Moreover, all who are in a state of salvation are subject to God. But" religious " is not meant for all those who are in this state, but only for those who have taken certain vows and are subject to certain people.10 Religion, therefore, does not seem to involve the submission of man to God alone.

But against it: Tullius says in the second book of the Rhetorica, 11 that " religion is that by which that higher nature, which is called divine, is worshipped and ritualized."

I answer that, it must be said that, as Isidore says in the Etymologies, 12 " a 'religious' person (from 'religion') is one who constantly ponders and, as it were, re-reads (relegit) what belongs to the divine cult." And so "religion" seems to be so called from "re-reading" what belongs to the divine cult, since such things must be constantly considered in one's heart, according to these words (Prov 3:5): Trust in the Lord with all your heart. Although, according to Augustine 13, [the origin of the word] "religion "may also be due to the fact that"we must choose God again and again, which, if we neglect Him, we lose." Alternatively, "religion" may derive from "binding" (religando), as Augustine says in On True Religion 14: "Religion binds (religet) us to the one almighty God." But whether a religion is called a religion because of its incessant re-reading, or because of its constant selection of what has been lost through neglect, or because of its binding, it as such implies order in relation to God. In fact, He is the One with whom we must first be connected as an undying principle; and in the same way we must continually choose Him as the ultimate goal; and besides, we must rediscover Him by believing and expressing our faith, if we lose Him in sinful neglect.

10. In medieval Latin, one of the meanings of the word "religio "is" monastic order"; accordingly," religiosi "means"monastics".

11. Rhet, II, 53.

12. Ethymol., X.

13. De civ. Dei, X, 3.

14. De vera relig., 55.

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To the first question, then, it must be answered that religion has two types of actions. Some actions are those which it chooses and which are its own and immediate; and by these actions (such as sacrifice, worship, etc.) man is ordered only in relation to God. But religion also has other functions, which it performs by means of those virtues which it commands, ordering them to the worship of God: for the virtue to which the end belongs commands those virtues to which the means of achieving the end belong. And accordingly it is said that the act of religion "according to the manner of command" is to provide for widows and orphans in their sorrows (for this is an act chosen out of charity); and in the same sense the act of religion is to protect oneself from this world, but it is chosen out of moderation or according to some other virtue.

To the second, the answer must be that "religion" applies to what is related to one's neighbors when it is used in a broad sense, but not in the proper sense. Therefore Augustine shortly before these words writes: "In the proper sense of the word, 'religion' does not seem to mean any worship, but only the worship of God."

To the third, it must be answered that since the servant is spoken of only in relation to the master, it is necessary that the proper and special semantic content of "service" should be present where there is a proper and special semantic content of "dominion". However, it is obvious that dominion is due to God in accordance with some special and unique semantic content, since He created everything and since He has the highest sovereignty over all things. And therefore, in relation to Him, there must be a special semantic content of the service. And a similar service among the Greeks is called latreia. And so it properly refers to religion.

To the fourth, the answer is that when we pay homage to certain people, either in their immediate presence or by remembering them, we are said to be worshiping (colere) them. And sometimes it is said that we worship what is subordinate to us: for example, the farmers (agricolae) have the care (colunt) of the fields, and the settlers (incolae) take care (colunt) of the area in which they live. But since special honors are due to God (for He is the first beginning of all things), then worship of Him is necessary.-

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but it has a special character, and therefore in Greek it is called eusebia or theosebia, as Augustine says.

The answer to the fifth question is that although "religious" is generally defined as all those who worship God, nevertheless, first of all, "religious" refers to people who have devoted their entire lives to God, having withdrawn from worldly affairs. In fact, "contemplatives" are also called not those who [sometimes] indulge in contemplation, but those who have devoted their entire lives to contemplation. But in this way man submits to man, not for his own sake, but for God's sake, according to these words of the apostle (Galatians 4: 14): You have received me as an angel of God, as Christ Jesus.

Section 2. Is religion a Virtue

The reasoning in the second section is as follows. It seems that religion is not a virtue.

1. Indeed, reverence for God belongs to religion. But reverence is the effect of that fear which is a gift of God, as is evident from what was said earlier (Parts I-II, V. 19, p. 9). Therefore, religion is not a virtue, but a gift.

2. Furthermore, any virtue implies the use of free will, and is therefore called an elective or volitional habitus. But, as mentioned above, religion includes latreia, which implies some kind of service. Therefore, religion is not a virtue.

3. Moreover, as stated in the second book of Ethics, 15 the tendency to virtue is inherent in us by nature, and therefore what belongs to virtue belongs to the prescription of natural reason. But religion also includes performing ritual service to the divine nature. But ritual, as already mentioned above (Parts I-II, V. 101), does not belong to the prescriptions of natural reason. Therefore, religion is not a virtue.

But against: religion is included in the list of virtues, as is clear from the above (Parts II-II, V. 80).

I answer that, it must be said that, as already noted above (Parts II-II, V. 58, p.3), virtue is that which makes its possessor good and turns his works to good. Therefore, it is necessary that all good deeds should relate to virtue. But it is obvious that giving what is due to someone has a semantic meaning-

15. Ethic. II, 1.

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holding the good, since such an action presupposes that the requester is properly related to the one to whom he is being rewarded, that is, as it were, properly ordered in relation to him. But order (as well as mode and form 16) refers to the semantic content of the good - as is clear from the words of Augustine in the book On the Nature of the Good17. So, since it is a matter of religion to pay due homage to God, it is obvious that religion is a virtue.

To the first question, then, we must answer that reverence for God is the effect of the gift of fear. But religion refers to actions performed out of reverence for God. It follows, therefore, not that religion is identical with the gift of fear, but that it is ordered in relation to it as something central. In fact, gifts are more important than moral virtues, as already stated above (Parts I-II, V. 68, p. 8).

To the second, it must be answered that even a servant can do what he ought to do in relation to his master, of his own free will; and so he necessarily performs a virtuous act, doing what is due of his own free will. Similarly, the exercise of proper service to God can be an act of virtue, according to the fact that it is voluntary.

To the third, it must be answered that man does something connected with the expression of reverence for God, according to the commandment of natural reason; but that man does this or that particular act is not according to the commandment of natural reason, but according to the institution of divine or human right.

16. The idea that the concept of "good" includes "mode, kind, and order" goes back to Augustine, who wrote (De nat. boni, 3), that: "These three, i.e. mode, kind, and order, are present in the things created by God as certain common goods." Thomas explained it this way (Summa th., I, q. 5, a. 5): "For something to be perfect and good, it must necessarily have: 1) a form; 2) what that form requires; 3) what follows from the form. The form, on the other hand, requires definiteness, or proportionality, of the principles... And this is denoted by the term "mode", in connection with which it is said that "measure gives mode". The form itself is designated by the term "kind", because through form everything is defined in its own kind... The form is followed by a tendency to a definite goal, action, and so on, for any thing, insofar as it is actual, acts and strives for what is appropriate to it according to its form. And this applies to weight and order."

17. De nat. boni, 3.

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