Balogh, Margit (2014) Kardinal Jósef Mindzenty. Ein Leben zwischen kommunistischen Diktatur und Kaltem Krieg. Berlin: Osteuropa Zentrum Berlin-Verlag, 2014. - 672 S.9

In recent decades, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty has become one of the most famous representatives of Eastern European Catholicism in the 20th century, surpassing even Pope John Paul II in the number of studies and documentary publications devoted to him. If during the period of confrontation between the two political systems, he was an icon of anti-communism, a model of resistance and categorical rejection of the Soviet-type socialist system, then in a later period he became the personification of the national hero of non-communist/Catholic Hungary.

9. The publication was prepared within the framework of the Russian Science Foundation project No. 15-18-00135 " Individual, ethnic group, religion in the process of intercultural interaction: russian and miro-

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For the Russian-speaking reader, the socio-political context of Mindszenty's activities in Hungary may become more clear thanks to the publications of the historian A. S. Stykalin10. And thanks to the translation of I. Lupandin, 11 the fascinating memoirs of the cardinal, who began his activity as a parish priest of Jozsef Pema in 1915, became available. who later adopted the symbolic surname Mindsenti (which denoted the area from which he was born, and had the church sound - "Vsekhsvyatsky"). His memoirs are extremely important for historians, as they provide a clear picture of the important role that parish priests played in the social and political life of Hungary in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as the unprecedented work in the social and cultural sphere that the Catholic Church conducted in the Hungarian state formed as a result of the First World War: at that time in accordance with the" hortist " national Christian doctrine, it was considered important to strengthen the social influence of historical churches in order to resist socialism. To be present as a pastor in the public space and be responsible for all aspects of the life of his flock, while firmly opposing socialism - this is Mindsenti's lifelong attitude, which provides a key to understanding the motivation of his actions. Although he went down in history as the primate of Hungary, in fact, Mindszenty's activity as head of the Catholic Church of Hungary was short-lived (since September 1945). until his arrest on December 26, 1948), as his appointment to this post coincided with radical political transformations in the country.

This monograph by historian Margit Balogh, a researcher at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, is one of her books about Cardinal Mindszenty. The first monograph was published in Hungary in 2002, and the second expanded edition was published in German in 2014. Balog studies the history of Hungarian Catholicism in the context of social history, in particular the Catholic agrarian movement, and prepared for publication the protocols of the Hungarian Bishops ' Conference for 1949-

experience of forming a common civil identity".

10. Stykalin A. S. Hungarian crisis of 1956 in historical retrospect, Moscow, 2016, pp. 125-166.

11. Lupandin I. Memoirs of Cardinal Mindsenti. Parts 1-4 / / Prose. <url>. 2012. Publication certificate No. 212122301396 [http://www.proza.ru/2012/12/23/1396, accessed from 22.03.2017].

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1965 With a strong source base, Balog's research on Mindsenti is very personal: she sets herself the task of "touching" the cardinal, giving a heartfelt empathic description of his activities and fate. Starting with the claim that saints also have flaws, Balog aims to tell the story of the cardinal in a fascinating, vivid and at the same time documented way, in its entirety. Indeed, the monograph contains materials from 38 archives, primarily ecclesiastical (dioceses, orders, Catholic organizations), as well as 9 state and public (both Hungarian and foreign). The researcher also used archival collections in the United States: the Eisenhower Library in Kansas, the Johnson Library in Texas, the Kennedy Library in Boston, the Nixon Library in California, the Truman Library in Missouri, the Hoover Institution in California, and the National Archives in Maryland.

The monograph is based on the biographical principle and consists of ten chapters. The first two are dedicated to Mindszenty's childhood and 25 years of pastoral ministry, during which he took care of the vast region of Zala (Zalaegersege). From these sections, it becomes clear that Mindsenti is becoming a legitimist and monarchist with a focus on broad social activity of the Catholic Church. During the period of his priestly activity (described in the section "At the center of public life: a priest in everyday politics", pp. 51-66), Mindsenti launched social and educational work among the population, opened many parishes and schools. Of interest is his work on strengthening lay activity, creating the so-called "apostolate of laity", which provided a powerful social base for the church. Already in 1919, during the short-term regime of Bela Kun, Mindszenty had an experience with communists, which ended with the arrest of a priest. Criticism of Marxist-Leninist ideology became an important part of his work. In his memoirs, he wrote that he spent a lot of time studying this phenomenon and had no illusions about the nature of the communist state.

The third chapter, "In the City of the Queen," deals with Mindszenty's relatively short period as bishop of Veszprem. He was appointed to this see by Pope Pius XII (despite the objections of Archbishop Justinian Sheredi and the Hungarian government) at the beginning of the Wehrmacht occupation of Hungary in March

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1944 After his appointment, Mindszenty vigorously defended persecuted Jews and right-wing politicians, and opposed the requisition of church property. After appealing to the Hungarian authorities to end hostilities, he was arrested on November 27, 1944 and sent to a camp, and then from February 1945 he was kept under house arrest in a convent in Sopron. Mindszenty was released as a result of the entry of Soviet troops into Hungary, after which he secretly returned to his department, collected information about the situation in 88 parishes and compiled detailed reports on military destruction, losses and deaths, which he summarized to Rome and the country's top leadership.

The fourth chapter, Man of Steel, has four sections. The first one is dedicated to the appointment of Mindszenty in September 1945 as Archbishop of Esztergom and Primate of Hungary, which was not without the influence of the authoritative Jesuit Tehetem Nagy, who highly appreciated Mindszenty. The second section deals with Mindszenty's first actions as primate (who, according to the law, was among the highest dignitaries of the country) and his relationship with the new government. The following sections describe the statement of Mindszenty and other bishops in connection with the proclamation of the republic, his activities to protect the rights of prisoners, prisoners of war, victims of war and violence, war criminals, displaced persons. Mindszenty's particular attention was drawn to the deportation of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the displacement of Germans (Swabians) from Hungary during the redrawing of borders and the ethnic map of Eastern Europe after World War II. It also describes Mindszenty's trip to Rome, where he became a cardinal. The last section of the chapter is devoted to the beginning of the ongoing struggle against the Church in Hungary, the actions initiated by the authorities against the primate (ranging from accusations in the press to mass demonstrations), as well as the activity of pro-socialist representatives of the parish clergy.

The fifth chapter consists of six sections. The first and fourth sections deal with the struggle around teaching religion in schools and for the preservation of church schools; Mindszenty's trip to America; mass Catholic events in connection with the declared Year of the Holy Virgin; and serious events of the Communist Party under the leadership of

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Rakosi, directed personally against the primate, which took on the character of an ideological struggle against "mindsentism" as a phenomenon. This chapter also describes the position of other bishops, in particular Archbishop Gul Chapik (p. 222), who opposed the primate, believing that the latter should be more flexible in dealing with the authorities. It becomes clear that by the time the highest political level decided to arrest Mindszenty, the Catholic Church in Hungary remained the only legal opposition force in the country, and attempts by the authorities to gain loyalty from its head were not crowned with success.

The sixth chapter of the book is called the gospel saying " I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep of the flock will be scattered." It describes Mindszenty's arrest on December 26, 1948, the first interrogations, the conditions on which the Hungarian authorities were willing to negotiate with the primate, the development of the scenario of the demonstration trial and its conduct. Separately, the primate's behavior is analyzed through the dilemma "lack of will or survival tactics", as well as the reaction of the world community to the trial of the Hungarian Primate. Mindszenty was charged with participating in a coup plot with the help of the United States, currency fraud and connections with the House of Habsburg. In this chapter, the author focuses on a very painful question: did drugs and torture really apply to the primate (which he repeatedly writes about in his memoirs)? The author has no doubts about the fact of physical violence, and she also admits the possibility of using drugs.

The fact is that as a result of the trial, materials were published that allegedly confirmed the primate's guilt, including his written confession, which began with the words:" I am a representative of the Hungarian nobility " (p.269). Mindszenty in his memoirs claims that this text was forged and even names the "experts" - an elderly intelligent couple. However, in the course of scrupulous work with sources, Margit Balogh came to the conclusion that it is unlikely that an educated and intelligent couple, forging a text on behalf of the cardinal, would have made 15 elementary spelling mistakes. She believes that the primate worked with the proposed text template in a deranged state (pp. 273-274). This hypothesis is confirmed by another Hungarian researcher - Adriani, who recalled that

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at a meeting in 1974, the cardinal told him that he did not remember what happened during the investigation.12 The cardinal's lack of initiative, subdued, even conformist behavior during the open trial, including his guilty plea, made a huge impression on the world, and Mindsenty was later burdened with showing his "weakness". The attempt to justify himself, to give a convincing explanation for his actions, is reflected in his memoirs, where he describes in great detail the ill-treatment of him during the investigation and deception (in particular, drawing up a letter to the American representatives with the help of officers who participated in the investigation, but allegedly sympathized with the cardinal, asking them to organize the escape of Mindsenti).

Another fundamental question that the researcher addresses in this chapter is: what was the role of Soviet representatives and the Soviet leadership in initiating and conducting the demonstration trial of Mindsenti? Later, many Hungarian communists justified their participation in the repression against the primate by direct pressure from Moscow. However, the author does not find this confirmed in the documents (p. 313) and believes that this was a personal initiative of Matyas Rakosi. Although the Soviet representatives certainly considered Mindsenti one of the main enemies and had been watching him since October 1945, they considered it absolutely wrong, both in 1948 and in 1956, to make Mindsenti a martyr (see p.228 et seq.). The seventh chapter describes the cardinal's 8-year incarceration, including in a prison hospital and under house arrest.

The next stage in Mindszenty's life comes in 1956, when during an attempt to change the political regime in the country, he was given the opportunity to return to public space for a short time (from October 30 to November 4). In the eighth chapter, the author analyzes in detail his actions during this period of time. Unlike his Polish counterpart, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski, the primate of Poland, who expressed his willingness to negotiate with the Gomulka government, Mindszenty showed a different pattern of behavior. His speech on the radio on November 3, 1956, which was then interpreted by the Hungarian Communists as reactionary-

12. Adriányi, Gabriel (2014-2015) "Review of: Margit Balogh, Kardinal József Mindszenty. Ein Leben zwischen kommunistischer Diktatur und Kaltem Krieg, Berlin: Osteuropa Zentrum, 2014", Ungarn-Jahrbuch 32: 429.

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The call for the restoration of the monarchy in the country and for the return of the church's previously confiscated real estate received a strong response both within the country and in the European press. The latter generally reacted negatively to his message, perceiving it as a political and revanchist appeal, and not as an emotional and pastoral impulse of the hierarch, who had previously spent eight years in prison and unexpectedly had the opportunity to address the flock throughout the country. It also did not contribute to the consolidation of Hungarian society; rather, it only increased the concern of representatives of the entire political spectrum about the radicalism of the church hierarch.

The cardinal's accusations of dependence on the United States, which were made by the Hungarian communist authorities in the second half of the 1940s, received, so to speak, additional justification when, in the conditions of the Soviet invasion of Budapest, Mindszenty, not having received guarantees of immunity from the Hungarian parliament, hurried to find refuge in the building of the American mission.

The ninth chapter of the monograph "In a golden cage - two decades in the American mission" (the title of which somewhat exaggerates the term of the cardinal's stay in the mission) is devoted to an unprecedented episode in world history when the head of the Catholic Church of the country was granted political asylum by the US government in the American diplomatic mission in Budapest. This decision, far from being perfect from a legal point of view, put the US government in an unpleasant and vulnerable position from the point of view of international politics. Nor was the situation difficult for the cardinal, who was faced with a choice between seeking political asylum and being sent back to prison. As M. Balog shows, the Americans were extremely concerned about the appearance of a Hungarian hierarch on their territory, who asked the United States to intervene in the political situation in Hungary and prevent its occupation by Soviet troops.

The regime of Janos Kadar established in Hungary declared Cardinal Mindszenty the main counter-revolutionary, an opponent of social and political transformations, land reform, etc. (pp. 376-377). The uncooperative primate's stay at the American mission proved beneficial to the Hungarian government and lasted for many decades. Different political players - ven-

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the Russian government, the Soviet Union, and to a large extent the Vatican found this situation convenient: Mindszenty was isolated, and responsibility for his actions fell on the American side.

In his research, M. Balog shows the complexity of international relations during the Cold War period, which Cardinal Mindsenti, who did not have the skills and talents to play out subtle political combinations, plunged into like a whirlpool. The author points out many details (described in the documents) of the complex system of communication between the US diplomatic mission, the US government, the Hungarian government, the press, the Vatican, and even the Italian Communist Party that existed in the second half of the 1950s and 1960s.

In the second half of the 1960s, the cardinal, who tried to prevent the normalization of US - Hungarian relations to the best of his ability, really became a bone in the throat of American politicians. During his stay at the American diplomatic mission, Mindsenty wrote several dozen letters to four American presidents, in which he expressed his ideas about the US place in the world and how the US government should treat the countries of the socialist camp13. The publication of the Hungarian cardinal's letters in English sheds light on the image of the United States and American foreign policy during the Cold War period among the faithful of Eastern Europe.

The author of the study notes the ambition of Mindszenty, who spoke both on behalf of the Catholic Church and on behalf of the Hungarian people, which led to a complication of his relations with the Vatican. Characteristically, he insisted on his title of "Prince-primate", considering that this title, in the absence of the king, is reserved for him according to Hungarian law, which means that the Vatican's decision to abandon the use of secular titles by church hierarchs does not apply to him. The danger of being stripped of the title of official head of the Hungarian Church seemed to hang over the cardinal precisely in connection with his claim to po-

13. This carefully prepared selection is presented in the collection of documents: "Do not forget This Small Honest Nation" Cardinal Mindszenty to 4 US Presidents and State Secretaries 1956-1971 as conserved in American Archives and commented by American diplomats. Ed.by Adam Somorjai, OSB and Tibor Zinner. Xlibris Corporation. 2013. - 417 P.

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the lytic role. After a visit to Hungary in 1963 by Cardinal Koenig, during which he conveyed the pope's opinion that Mindszenty should leave the country and move to Rome, the latter formulated and then developed his own conditions. At first, they were limited to the fact that he must leave Hungary as its primate, but later they were supplemented with the following requirements:: (1) investigation of the cases of suspended bishops; (2) release of imprisoned clerics and believers; (3) return of prisoners of war and deportees to their families; (4) the return of priests to their parishes; (5) the promise of building a new church on the site of the destroyed Regnum Marianum (p.421).

In 1964, the Vatican's authorized representative, Agostino Casaroli, held lengthy negotiations with the Hungarian government, because in order to normalize Vatican-Hungarian relations, it was necessary to reach a consensus on the "Mindszenty case". During the negotiations, the parties agreed that this "case" should not be used in the information war, which was an important component of the confrontation between the two political systems (p. 423). M. Balog describes the complexity of many years of negotiations between the Hungarian government, the Vatican, the United States, and the UN, during which the cardinal himself turned out to be the most intractable party. His attitude (his emphasis on defending the interests of the church in the face of godless communism and his demand to be recognized as the head of the church in Hungary), his stubbornness, advanced age and poor health - all this irritated everyone involved. However, in the end, on September 28, 1971, the elderly cardinal, forgetting to thank the US Ambassador for many years of refuge, left the American mission building in Budapest and went to Rome.

The tenth chapter of M. Balogh's research is devoted to Mindsenti's life in exile. It tells how he was received in Rome, where, despite the honor shown to him, he felt uncomfortable, and therefore tried to move to Vienna as quickly as possible, which caused serious concerns among the Austrian government (at that time the Social Democrats were in power, trying to avoid conflicts with the Hungarian authorities). In Vienna, Mindszenty launches 14 active social activities; at the same time, worldwide activism is being implemented.-

14. A separate collection of articles dedicated to Mindszenty's stay in Vienna was published: Csaba Szabó (Hg.) (2012) " Jozsef Kardinal Mindszenty in Wien (1971-1975)", Publikationen der

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Many of his fans are Hungarian immigrants, so Pope Paul VI has to personally ask Mindszenty to coordinate his public actions and speeches in advance (as evidenced by their lengthy correspondence). The Cardinal focused his attention on caring for the emigrant flock around the world. Meanwhile, the Pope was informed from Hungary that the church had entered a period of crisis there: of the eleven dioceses, only three were headed by diocesan bishops, while the rest, including the Archdiocese of Esztergom, were governed by apostolic administrators. In this situation, the refusal of the Hungarian cardinal-emigrant to give up the title of Archbishop of Esztergom again attracted public attention at the international level to the "Mindszenty case". Pope Paul VI corresponded with Mindszenty for a long time and finally came to the unilateral decision to declare the see of Archbishop Esztergom vacant (p. 493).

Mindszenty considered himself primarily the head of the Catholic Church in Hungary, but the Cold War situation was such that the position of Catholic churches in socialist countries largely depended on the relationship of their governments with the Vatican. Today, there is a generally accepted view in historiography, according to which the public rejection and condemnation of communism by Pope Pius XII and the ban on Catholics from membership in communist parties contributed to the fact that Catholicism was declared a hostile religion in the Eastern Bloc countries, and, as a result, repression unfolded against the Catholic Church.

How did the Vatican perceive Cardinal Mindsenti - his political activities and the whole situation, including the church, that has developed around his "case"?

During the pontificates of John XXIII and Paul VI, the Vatican sought to normalize relations with the governments of socialist countries in order to preserve the Catholic Church there. The restoration of diocesan structures and the approval of candidates for episcopal positions were the subject of long and difficult negotiations. M. Balogh cites Mindsenti's arguments (pp. 494-500) during his confrontation with the pope over the removal from office and is inclined to believe that the decision to remove him was dictated mainly by political considerations and was only covered by pastoral motives. Day-

ungarischen Geschichtsforschung in Wien. Bd. IV. Wien.

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Consequently, there have been repeated reports in right-wing Catholic circles that Mindszenty was a victim of the Vatican Ostpolitik. Balog reports on a number of protest demonstrations against the Roman See among Hungarian emigrants 15.

Mindszenty's pastoral trip to the emigrant parishes of Latin America in the spring of 1975 was his last: on May 6, 1975, he died in a Vienna clinic.

In the last chapter of Balog's monograph, another player appears - the emigrant circles, which were involved in the vicissitudes of the Cold War, drawing attention to the facts of discrimination against believers in socialist countries and thereby causing a public outcry that hinders the Vatican's eastern policy. However, these circles, whose prominent representative was the inconvenient Cardinal Mindsenti, remained marginal until the end of the 1970s, so that their position was not taken into account by the Vatican, where they were confident in the stability and inviolability of socialism.

Margit Balogh's monograph largely sums up the results of Hungarian "mindsentivology" over the past three decades. The breadth of the source base takes the book beyond the boundaries of traditional biographical studies and publications about national heroes. We can see how during the Cold War, the authorities of Hungary, which was part of the Eastern Bloc, were forced to abandon the policy of sharp confrontation with religious institutions and came to understand the need to build a communication system with them both inside the country (in exchange for political loyalty) and in the international arena. For its part, the Vatican, as part of the new deal Ostpolitik, is taking active steps to establish cooperation with the governments of socialist states, bypassing or ignoring (as in the case of Mindsenti) the position of the official primate of the local church. The policy of defusing international tensions, the need to resolve controversial issues of Hungary's international status, and the unwillingness to support the image of Mindsenti as a sufferer for the faith with a claim to the status of a public political figure - all this created a space for dialogue between Hungary and the Vatican. On the other hand, Ho-

15. See critical analysis of the Vatican Ostpolitik in the context of the Mindszenty case: Adriány, Gabriel (2003) Die Ostpolitik des Vaticans 1958-1978 gegenüber Ungarn. Der Fall Kardinal Mindszenty. Herne: Schafer.

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The cold war actualized the political elites ' understanding of the importance of the religious factor, and the appearance on the political scene of social forces that draw attention to Christians suffering behind the Iron Curtain (and Cardinal Mindsenti was a living symbol of such suffering) created new opportunities for shaping the image of the other through information conflict. At the same time, another factor was also present in the" Mindszenty case " - the United States, which, in the context of the bloc confrontation, was forced to patronize the Catholic prince-primate, nostalgic for the imperial past of Hungary, but convinced that only the United States can guarantee religious freedom.

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