Introduction

With the return to the field of socio-political sciences of religion as a burning research topic of the last two decades, the theoretical paradigm of multiple modernities has also become widespread. This conceptual approach allows us to offer a historical and sociological analysis of cultural differences that avoids the harsh consequences of the "clash of civilizations" approach, emphasizing the presence of religious, cultural and traditional patterns in modernizing societies. The idea that differences in the types of secularization and socio-political development can be explained by examining the religious and cultural aspects of the respective processes has been recognized especially in Europe. From this point of view, European integration-understood as a cultural and political process that, in the most general sense, involves overcoming ideological differences after the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and specifically manifests itself in the creation of common institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union1 - involves the discovery or determination of new forms of integration in Eastern Europe.-

This article is based on the results of the scientific seminar "Multiple Moderns and a global post-secular society", which was held on May 4_6, 2011 at the University of Tor Vergata (Rome). The English version of this article will appear in the collection: Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Societies / Eds. Massimo Rosati and

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the division of the common that unites the European multiple moderns.

However, two recent experiences of applying the multiple modernity paradigm to the religious situation in Europe - Wilfrid Spohn's article "Europeanization, Religion, and Collective Identities in an Expanding Europe from the Perspective of the Multiple Modernity Concept"2 and the collection edited by Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein "Religion in an Expanding Europe"3-show that this paradigm can be used in two different ways, leading to different consequences and giving different results. According to the comparative-civilizational approach, European integration is a meeting of a fully secularized Western Christian civilization with an eastern and southeastern Orthodox Christian civilization and a Muslim civilization. From the point of view of Spon, the difference between these civilizational spheres and their characteristic religious and secular trajectories is the main obstacle to European integration. If we look at this issue by focusing on actors and institutions, then, on the contrary, religious actors and transnational religious unions are barriers to further integration.4 In this article, I would like to clarify the difference between the starting points and the corresponding consequences in relation to these two variants of the multiple modernity paradigm, which I call "comparative-civilizational" and "post-secular". By focusing in more detail on the current religious-secular discussions and using Russian Orthodoxy as an example, I will try to show that the problem of the relationship between religious and secular is connected both with civilizational differences and with ideological conflict

Kristina Stoeckl. Farnham: Ashgate, 2012 (Forthcoming). The rights to publish the article are provided by Ashgate Publishing house.

1. See also the definition in: Katzenstein Peter J. Multiple Modernities as Limits to Secular Europeanization? // Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. P. 1 - 33.

2. Spohn W. Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe: A Multiple Modernities Perspective // European Journal of Social Theory. 2009. Vol. 12 (3). P. 358 - 74.

3. Byrnes T.A., Katzenstein P. (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

4. Ibid.

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between secularism and religion. The multiple modernity paradigm can help explain both of these phenomena, but it needs to be further developed and refined.

Russian Orthodoxy against Secularism and religious pluralism

Orthodox Christianity in today's Europe can be seen as a religion on the rise, recovering from decades of suppression by communist regimes and internally linked to the nationalist revival in many Eastern European countries. In all the Orthodox countries of former communist Europe, churches have found themselves in an advantageous position due to the growing religious commitment of the population. Olaf Mueller, who compared survey data on religiosity in former communist Europe in the 1990s, found only a very small increase in church attendance in Orthodox countries, but at the same time an increase in overall commitment to and trust in the Orthodox Church. He even talks about a "large-scale religious revival" in Russia5. Moreover, in all Orthodox countries, churches were able to re-establish themselves as religious actors in the public sphere and achieve a certain degree of political influence. This is particularly true in Russia, where the status of the Orthodox Church as a "traditional church" on Russian territory is emphasized in the preamble to the 1997 Law on Religions, which restricts religious pluralism in Russia6.

However, despite all this, today Eastern Orthodoxy is not only a resurgent religion, but also a defensive one. This was pointed out by Sabrina Ramet, who pointed out that in the face of social modernization and Europeanization, the Orthodox Churches in many cases face the need for social modernization and Europeanization.

5. Muller О. Religion in Central and Eastern Europe: Was There a Re-Awakening after the Breakdown of Communism? // Detlef Pollack and Daniel V. A. Olson (eds.). The Role of Religion in Modern Socities. New York, London: Routledge, 2008. P.70. См. также: Inglehart. R., Norris P. Sacred and Secular. Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. P. 111 - 132; Greeley A. A Religious Revival in Russia? // Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. 1994. Vol. 33 (3). P. 253 - 272.

6. Davis D. Editorial: Russia's New Law on Religion: Progress or Regress? // Journal of Church and State. 1997. Vol. 39. P. 645 - 656.

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take a cautious, defensive position 7. The Orthodox religion in Europe today is in a defensive position in relation to the Western world with its secular and pluralistic values and in relation to other religions, but also in relation to the internal processes of modernization and secularization taking place in the societies in which it is rooted. The confrontation of the Orthodox religion with secularism and religious pluralism is a double confrontation: It affects both the external relations of Orthodox Churches and their internal structure and the place they occupy in society.

This double confrontation of Orthodoxy with secularism and religious pluralism has been particularly evident recently in the example of the Russian Orthodox Church. Over the past decade, the Russian Orthodox Church has actively resisted the consequences of modernization and globalization. An unprecedented step in the history of Orthodoxy was the publication in 2000 by the Moscow Patriarchate of a document entitled "Fundamentals of the social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church" (see below: Social Doctrine), which was followed in 2008 by another document on human rights: "Fundamentals of the teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights "(hereinafter: The Teaching on Human Rights).8 These documents outlined the position of the Russian Orthodox Church in relation to a whole range of socio-cultural phenomena of our time: from issues of church-state relations and law to secularism, from culture to bioethics and the concept of human rights. The work on the creation of these documents was led by the current Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill (elected in 2009), at that time the former head of the Department for External Church Relations. It is not surprising that he made the theme of the clash between the Orthodox religion and modernity the main theme of his patriarchate.

When the Social Doctrine was published in 2000, many commentators viewed its very appearance as an important step for Russian Orthodoxy to meet the modern age-

7. Ramet S. P. The Way We Were - and Should Be Again? European Orthodox Churches and the "Idyllic Past" // Timothy A. Byrnes and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe. P. 148 - 175.

8. Both documents are available on the official website of the Moscow Patriarchate: http://www.patriarchia.ru/

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to the local political order. Rudolf Erz, for example, wrote that " the document contains important impulses for a constructive perception of the modern order,"9 while Konstantin Kostyuk believed that the Social Doctrine represented an important step taken by the Russian Orthodox Church towards becoming more modern. He wrote that the creation of a document is a leap towards a modern mode of communication and self-positioning, although he also noted the fact that this modern impulse is in contradiction with the content of the text - mostly conservative.10 In turn, Alexander Aghajanyan stressed the ambiguity of the document, which combines a pragmatic social approach with a politically conservative one.11
The social doctrine was addressed to members of the Russian Orthodox Church and Russian society as a whole. Although it resonated outside of Russia, especially in the Catholic world12, it was apparently addressed to a domestic audience. Through this document, the Church responded quite clearly to the social transformation of Russian society after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which brought with it many freedoms, but also many social and economic problems, and, from the point of view of the Church, led to moral degradation. In the document, the Church offered Orthodox believers answers to questions related to abortion, contraception, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and even environmental protection. A special innovation was the political position outlined in the Social Doctrine: the Russian Orthodox Church declared its independence from the Russian state and government.-

9. Uertz R.S., Lars P. (Hrsg.) Beginn einer neuen Ara? Die Sozialdoktrin der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche vom August 2000 im interkulturellen Dialog. Moskau: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e. V., 2004. S. 95.

10. Kostjuk K. Die Sozialdoktrin - Herausforderung fur die Tradition und die Theologie der Orthodoxie // Rudolf Uertz and Lars Peter Schmidt (Hrsg.)- Beginn einer neuen Ara? S. 67 - 74; Kostjuk K. Die Sozialdoktrin der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche: Schritt zur Zivilgesellschaft oder Manifest des orthodoxen Konservatismus? // Rudolf Uertz and Josef Thesing (Hrsg.). Die Grundlagen der Sozialdoktrin der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche. Deutsche Ubersetzung mit Einfuhrung und Kommentar. Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung e. V., 2001. S. 174 - 196.

11. Agadjanian A. Breakthrough to Modernity, Apologia for Traditionalism: the Russian Orthodox View of Society and Culture in Comparative Perspective // Religion, State and Society. 2003. Vol. 31 (4). P. 327 - 346.

12. Uertz R.S., Lars P. (Hrsg.) Beginn einer neuen Ara?

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government agencies. Drawing lessons from the history of its subordinate position in tsarist Russia and the persecutions of the Soviet era, the Church positioned itself as a potential collaborator of the government and as an independent force within civil society.13 This commitment to the separation of church and State does not necessarily have to be perceived in a liberal way, 14 but it does represent a break with the long tradition of the symphonic model of church-state relations characteristic of Orthodox Christianity.

Rather than interpreting this document as evidence of the rise of the Orthodox religion, I tend to see it as a gesture of self-defense. Orthodoxy in today's Russia competes with both other religions and secularist worldviews; it uses Social Doctrine to mark its place in the heterogeneous and pluralistic Russian society. The document both captures the confrontation with modernity and represents an attempt at partial reconciliation with it. Despite the conservative content of the document, the very fact that the Orthodox Church provides answers to questions about life in modern societies indicates that it defines and defends its position in accordance with the conditions of a secular and religiously pluralistic modernity.

The teaching on human rights was published in 2008. It was the last word in the discussions on human rights that took place within the Russian Orthodox Church and found its expression in the speeches and statements of representatives of the highest church leadership in previous years.15 Human rights protect freedom of conscience and equality of worldviews. From the ecclesiastical point of view, they are, therefore, an instrument that simultaneously protects religion.

13. Metropolitan Hilarion AIfeyev. The Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church in the year 2000: an overview over the main issues // Jonathan Sutton and Wil van den Bercken (eds.). Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe. Leuven, Paris, Dudley: Peeters, 2003. P. 249 - 270.

14. As I have shown elsewhere: Stoeckl K. Political Hesychasm? Vladimir Petrunin's Neo-Byzantine Interpretation of the Social Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church // Studies in East European Thought. 2010. Vol. 62 (1). P. 125 - 133.

15. Agadjanian A. Russian Orthodox Vision of Human Rights // Vasilios Makrides (Hrsg.). Erfurter Vortrage zur Kulturgeschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums. Erfurt: Universitat (Erfurt Religionswissenschaft Orthodoxes Christentum: 26), 2008. S. 14.

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to remember that the Orthodox churches behind the Iron Curtain were subjected to persecutions and vilifications that are still not forgotten-and challenges religion, since it implies equality of faiths. It is precisely this double impact of human rights on religion that is revealed in the analysis of this Orthodox document.

Russian sociologist of religion A. Aghajanyan speaks about the" internal "and" external " orientation of this document. "Internal orientation" refers to its clear guidance to Church members on how to deal with human rights issues and how to use this legal instrument to protect the rights of the Church and its members.16 Orthodoxy in this case finds itself in the position of a minority, "an institutional, social and moral enclave that uses the rhetoric of human rights to create and protect its own niche, its own modest space in a global multicultural world" 17. From the point of view of" external orientation", the document, on the contrary, addresses the issue of human rights in a more general perspective and is a proper Orthodox contribution to the national and international discussion of human rights. In this case, Russian Orthodoxy acts as the voice of the majority, which seeks to "remind Russian society, the Russian state (and also the international community) that the Russian Orthodox Church was the 'formative factor' of the Russian cultural ethos, and therefore Christian anthropology, a Christian understanding of dignity and freedom, and a Christian version of rights should determine - at the very least to some extent, it is a public discourse concerning values and morals. " 18
Both of these documents are examples of how the Russian Orthodox Church copes with the double confrontation between secularism and religious pluralism. This confrontation concerns the church itself, its relations with believers, politics and society in general, as well as external church relations and the church's place in the world. And now I will try to interpret these documents within the framework of two different theoretical approaches: comparative-civilizational and post-secular (in accordance with the paradigm of multiple modernities).

16. Ibid. P. 15.

17. Ibid. P. 18.

18. Ibid.

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European Integration and Russian Orthodoxy: a Comparative Civilizational Approach (in accordance with the paradigm of multiple modernities)

In his speech at the X World Russian People's Council in 2006, the theme of which was "Faith. Human. Earth. Mission of Russia in the XXI Century", the current Patriarch, and then Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, outlined the motive that encourages the Church to join the discussion on human rights:

There is an opinion that human rights are a universal norm. There can't be an Orthodox, Islamic, Buddhist, Russian, or American concept of human rights. This brings relativity to the understanding of human rights and, consequently, significantly restricts its functioning in international life. This is how many politicians and public leaders think. Indeed, one can understand the desire to preserve the universal nature of the concept of rights and freedoms, which would not depend on any variables. In fact, even Orthodox people do not object to the existence of some universal rules of behavior in the modern world. But these rules should be truly universal. The question arises: are the human rights that claim to play this role such in the current presentation?19

In my opinion, this statement of Kirill should be interpreted from the point of view of the multiple modernity paradigm. It suggests that the Russian Orthodox Church's Teaching on Human Rights is one of the competing codifications of human rights norms, comparable, for example, to the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981) or the Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights (1993). The basic idea is that the concept of human rights originated and developed in Western countries and cannot be applied in the same way in other regions. Cyril adds to this: "After-

19. Kirill, Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad. Human rights and moral responsibility. Speech at the X World Russian People's Council (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/10226l.html).

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It should be recognized that in these countries it has had its successes, but it has also shown its shortcomings." And he asks: "Does this mean that Western standards of human happiness are suitable for all countries and all cultures? "- after all, "other civilizations also have their own positive experience of public life" 20. Cyril does not reject the idea of human rights; he does not deny the value of this concept as such. His statement is not dictated by anti-modern, pre-modern or" fundamentalist " motives. He simply argues that there may be different understandings of human rights and human happiness, and that the largely individualistic interpretation of human rights that is typical of the West may not be appropriate outside of it.

From a historical and sociological point of view, Kirill's quote confirms what the theory of multiple modernities has always stated in the formulation of its main representative, Shmuel Eisenstadt: the Western trajectory of modernization should not be considered as the only possible path to modernity; on the contrary, we find many constantly evolving modernities in the world, each of which is a special institutional and ideological interpretation of the modernization cultural-specific programs 21. Religion is one of the elements - and perhaps the most important-among other cultural bases that determine the form of modernization in various societies. According to Eisenstadt, religion is indeed the most important factor in the existence of multiple moderns, since, in his view, multiple moderns are rooted in earlier patterns of axial civilizations, which in turn crystallize around religions.22
When analyzing religion in Europe from such a theoretical perspective, special attention is paid to how religions have shaped the world.

20. Ibid.

21. Eisenstadt S.N. The Reconstruction of Religious Arenas in the Framework of "Multiple Modernities" // Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 2000. Vol. 29 (3). P. 591 - 611; Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities // Daedalus. 2000. Vol. 129 (1). P. 1 - 29; Eisenstadt S.N. Comparative civilizations and multiple modernities. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2003; Eisenstadt S.N., Schluchter W. Introduction: Paths to Early Modernities. A Comparative View // Daedalus. 1998. Vol. 127 (3). P. 1 - 18.

22. Eisenstadt S.N. Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs - Their Characteristics and Origins // S. N. Eisenstadt (ed.). The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986. P. 1.

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societies in various parts of Europe. While secularized Latin Christianity became the basis of the Western pattern of modernity, 23 Orthodox Christianity and Islam in Eastern and Southeastern Europe contributed to a different socio-political development. This deeper level of civilizational analysis of Europe was revealed by Wilfrid Spohn in his answer to T. Byrnes and P. Katzenstein, who, when analyzing religion in Europe, also proceeded from the idea of multiple modernities, but did not extend it to comparative-civilizational analysis 24: "If we adhere more strictly to the comparative-civilizational approach of Shmuel Eisenstadt, Spohn writes, " then European multiple modernity should not be reduced, as the authors of the collection edited by Bairns and Katzenstein do, to the continued presence of the religious sphere in the form of various religious organizations and actors, but it should also be considered in terms of its constitutive and cultural role in shaping the secular sphere that encompasses politics, states, nations and collective identities " 25.

Orthodox criticism of the Western model of human rights can be interpreted as a form of resistance and, consequently, as an obstacle to the deeper cultural and political integration of the Orthodox East and Western Europe. The claim that the Western discourse on human rights is inadequate outside the Western cultural sphere, which we hear from the Russian Orthodox Church, is by no means the only example in the global discussion about the relationship between religious and secular: as Eisenstadt points out, "most modern religious movements take a clearly confrontational position towards the West and, in fact, towards everything else." what is perceived as Western, trying to get used to modernity and the global system in its own, often anti-Western, way " 26. And Spon draws attention to the fact that modern Europe is characterized by tension between the Western European,

23. Casanova J. Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration // Peter J. Katzenstein and Timothy A. Byrnes (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe. P. 65 - 92.

24. Byrnes T.A., Katzenstein P. (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe.

25. Spohn W. Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe: A Multiple Modernities Perspective. P. 360.

26. Eisenstadt S.N. Multiple Modernities. P. 22.

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culturally secular, a way of integration, and an Eastern European revival of religion:

The post-war division of Europe in 1945 paved the way for the unification of Western Europe on the basis of Latin Christianity and strongly secularized societies in opposition to communist-atheist Eastern Europe - in the context of a global conflict between West and East. This European situation has helped to reduce the conflict potential of religion on both sides of the Iron Curtain. However, after 1989, the restoration of the structural and cultural pluralism of European civilization was accompanied by the spread of the Western European secular integration project to the East of Europe. This expanding process of Europeanization has faced increasing resistance and, as a result, tension between the Western European, culturally secular, mode of integration and the Eastern European revival of nationalism and religion. In addition, the current wave of globalization, accompanied by an increase in immigration and the development of inter-civilizational interaction, has contributed to increasing tensions between a secularized Europe of the Latin Christian tradition, a resurgent Eastern Christian Europe, and an Islamic civilization.27
In his interpretation of Orthodoxy in Europe, Spon highlights the external aspects of the Orthodox confrontation with secularism and religious pluralism; he sees the rise of the Orthodox religion-in contrast to the trends typical of Western Europe. The above statement of Kirill at first glance confirms this contrast between the Orthodox religion and Western secularism.

However, in reality, as I tried to show above, the contrast between Orthodoxy and secularism is a double confrontation. It takes place not only at the level of external relations of the Russian Orthodox Church, when it seeks to determine its place in the global context, but also at the "home" level. Orthodox Churches in Eastern Europe today operate in a social context that compels them to occupy their own territories.

27. Spohn W. Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging Europe: A Multiple Modernities Perspective. P. 362.

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take a defensive position in their own countries as well. Familiarity with the church documents discussed above allows us to conclude that the Orthodox Christian tradition really generates a special kind of modernity, but we must not forget that in these documents such modernity is rather constructed than recorded. In other words, one should be careful to deduce from the programmatic statements of the Orthodox church leadership the very existence of an Orthodox-Christian civilizational sphere, the boundaries of which should be taken into account when it comes to the cultural and political integration of Europe. With a comparative-civilizational approach in accordance with the paradigm of multiple modernities, there is a risk of not noticing this difference.

And here, in my opinion, we should pay close attention to some critical assessments of civilizational theory, which at the same time shed new light on the very paradigm of multiple modernities. Wolfgang Knobl believes that the emphasis of civilizational theory on cultural and religious aspects of development is problematic. He writes: "It is not convincing to say that individual and collective actors in different regions of a certain civilization and at very different periods of time reproduce the same civilizational configurations over and over again, simply drawing from the same intellectual and cultural sources."28.From his point of view, explaining the long-term existence of civilizational patterns requires an analysis of the mechanisms of power, authority and control that ensure the transmission of these very patterns. In this regard, the work of Johann Arnason on "imperial formations"29 opens up new ways of interpretation, since it emphasizes that for civilizational patterns to play a stabilizing role, they must be supported by political power, and that those in power, in turn, are interested in preserving and expanding institutional constructs30.

28. Knobl W. Path Dependency and Civilizational Analysis: Methodological Challenges and Theoretical Tasks // European Journal of Social Theory. 2010. Vol. 13 (1). P. 93.

29. Arnason J. P. Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions. Leiden: Brill, 2003.

30. Knobl W. Path Dependency and Civilizational Analysis. P. 93.

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If we look at the Social Doctrine and the Doctrine of Human Rights in this perspective, the political nature of these documents will come to the fore. What political impact did these two documents actually have, and how effective were they in shaping the discursive landscape in Russia, given the discussion of values and norms? Some facts, especially the restrictive law on religious organizations of 1997, which gives the Russian Orthodox Church advantages in the Russian Federation in comparison with other religious communities, confirm the civilizational-imperial interpretation of the theological and political strategy of the Moscow Patriarchate; the same should be said about the appeal to the "fatherland" in one of the most controversial passages of the Doctrine of rights human rights: "Individual human rights cannot be opposed to the values and interests of the Fatherland, the community, or the family" (III. 5). Viewed from this angle, it can be said that the Moscow Patriarchate acts in support of the imperial political strategy and that its proposed understanding of social and human rights norms is an attempt to put limits to ideological pluralism.31
This analysis works in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church; however, it does not apply to Romanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, or Greek Orthodoxy, much less to Ecumenical (Constantinople)Orthodoxy The Patriarchate and the churches of the Orthodox Diaspora that belong to it. It is much more difficult to talk about these churches from an imperial-civilizational point of view, and it is impossible to unite all of them in one type of Eastern Christian civilization. Therefore, if we look at the religious situation in Europe from the perspective of the concept of multiple modernities, I would rather agree with the criticism expressed by Peter Wagner: "There is a serious risk that analysts who use the concept of multiple modernities and rely on the discussion of axial time will succumb to the temptation to make a mistake characteristic of European social theory. and the twentieth century, namely, to present the forms of modernity as compact and stable entities, similar to the previous idea of national societies " 32.

31. См. Arnason J. P. Civilizations in Dispute. P. 5.

32. Wagner P. Palomar's Question. The Axial Age Hypothesis, European Modernity and Historical Contingency // Johann P. Arnason, S.N. Eisenstadt and Bjorn Wittrock (eds.). Axial Civilizatoins and World History. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005. P. 100.

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The Orthodox religion fits into the idea of a Europe of multiple moderns, and Russian Orthodoxy can be considered as one of the examples corresponding to this idea; but it is precisely this example that makes it difficult to speak of Orthodox-Christian Europe as a single civilization. An exclusively civilizational approach can lead to a misinterpretation of the religious situation in Europe. Therefore, I will show below how the post-secular approach, which corresponds to the paradigm of multiple modernities, shifts the conflict zone from civilizational borders to the space of tension between secularism and religion within European societies, and also allows us to see ways to overcome this tension.

European Integration and Russian Orthodoxy: a Post-secular Approach (in accordance with the multiple Modernity paradigm)

The collection Religion in an Expanding Europe, edited by Timothy Byrnes and Peter Katzenstein, states that Orthodox Christianity is "a self-conscious European religious tradition that is not very interested in Europeanization as the latter is understood today."33 The authors of the collection enter into a polemic with the current secular definitions of Europeanization, 34 and, in contrast,believe that it is not a religious tradition that is fully aware of itself. that the return of religion "rather requires new ways of living together with secularism" 35. If, from a comparative and civilizational point of view, the religious situation in Europe is a confrontation of Western secular modernity with modernities formed by other religious sources and other secularization processes, Katzenstein draws our attention to the lack of clarity of Western secular modernity itself. From this point of view, the return of religion implies not only a clash with the modernity defined by other religious traditions, but also a clash with the religious and secular identity of Western Europe itself: "Religion is still hidden behind the facade of European secularization... Legal information

33. Byrnes Т.A., Katzenstein P. (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe. P. 296.

34. See in particular the article by Jose Casanova (link in note 23).

35. Byrnes Т.A., Katzenstein P. (eds.). Religion in an Expanding Europe. P. 2.

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and cultural Europeanization has not affected the core of the European project, which remains problematic and uncertain. In the future, religion may well invade this core, becoming the focus of political discussion, activism, and conflict."36 Further in this article, I intend to show that the moment we combine the idea of multiple modernities clashing in one theoretical framework and the notion that this clash leads to a redefinition of Western modernity, we will be able to do so in the same way. Thus, we move from a comparatively civilizational understanding of multiple moderns to a post-secular understanding.

The concept of post-secularism was introduced into the sociological and political-philosophical discussion at a time when the revival of religion in a global context and within secular Western societies raised the question of the relationship between religion and politics, while modern social and political thought considered this issue already resolved during the process of secularization, epiphenomena of which were the separation of church and state, privatization religions and the gradual decline of the latter 37. As part of this broad discussion, Jürgen Habermas coined the term "post-secular society" to describe a social situation in which the continued presence of religion in the public sphere has become accepted as the norm. 38 Although many other authors have taken post-secular positions, 39 In this article we will focus on Habermas ' point of view, who has made a major contribution to the study of religion. philosophical discussion about post-secularism in the last fifteen years 40.

36. Ibid.

37. Casanova J. Secularization // Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds.). International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Amsterdam, Paris et. al.: Elsevier, 2001.

38. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere // European Journal of Philosophy. 2006. Vol. 14 (1). P. 1-25 [Russian translation: Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity / / Habermas Yu. Between Naturalism and Religion, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2011].

39. For example: Rawls J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited // The University of Chicago Law Review. 1997. Vol. 64 (3). P. 765 - 807; Walzer M. Drawing the line. Religion and Politics // Thinking Politically: Essays in Political Theory. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007. P. 147 - 167; Audi R. Religious commitment and secular reason. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

40. Habermas J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press, 1996; Habermas J. Between naturalism and religion: philosophical essays. Cambridge: Polity, 2008 [Habermas Yu. Between naturalism and Religion, Moscow: Vse Mir, 2011]; Habermas J.,

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Habermas ' post-secular paradigm is critically directed in two directions: towards religious citizens and towards secular citizens. It formulates certain requirements for an equal dialogue between both parties. Secular citizens are required to have a post-secular consciousness and a principled openness to religious arguments. Religious citizens are required to change their consciousness in a different way, namely, to "modernize their religious consciousness" in response to the challenges that pluralism, the emergence of modern science, and the spread of positive law and profane morality pose to the religious tradition.41 According to Habermas such modernization involves three steps:

Religious citizens must find an epistemic attitude towards foreign religions and worldviews that they encounter within the discourse universe still occupied by their own religion. This is done to the extent that religious citizens self-reflexively place their own religious beliefs in a relationship with the statements of competing salvation doctrines that does not endanger their own claims to exclusive truth.

Further: religious citizens must find an epistemic attitude towards the waywardness of secular knowledge and towards the socially institutionalized monopoly of scientific experts on knowledge. This is possible only to the extent that, from their religious point of view, they fundamentally determine the relationship between the dogmatic content of faith and secular knowledge about the world in such a way that the autonomous progress of knowledge cannot fall into contradiction with statements relevant to salvation.

Finally, religious citizens must find an epistemic attitude to the priority that secular foundations also have in the political arena. This succeeds only as religious citizens intelligently introduce the egalitarian individualism of rational law and universalist morality into the context of their overarching doctrines. 42
Mendieta E. A postsecular world society? An Interview with Jiirgen Habermas (2010) // The Immanent Frame. Secularism, religion, and the public sphere. Social Science Research Council Blog.

41. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere, p. 13 [Russian translation: op. cit. p. 131].

42. Ibid. P. 14 [Russian translation: ibid., pp. 131-132].

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This process of self-reflection of religious traditions in the modern situation is, from Habermas ' point of view, a necessary precondition for the inclusion of religions in the post-secular public sphere. He is also sure that such modernization is really taking place, and cites the example of the Catholic Church, which theologically clarified its position on modern society at the Second Vatican Council. He adds that "ultimately, the practice of faith in communities depends on whether dogmatic processing of modern cognitive challenges succeeds." 43
Habermas ' understanding of religious modernization provides a new interpretive key to the self-positioning of the Russian Orthodox Church. We can read Social Doctrine and Human Rights Teaching from the perspective of "modernization of religious consciousness" and study these documents in order to understand the nature of such modernization. The Russian Orthodox Church has endured decades of persecution, political collaboration, and theological and institutional neglect. Today, Orthodoxy has on its agenda not only a response to modernization and globalization, but also theological, intellectual, and institutional reconstruction. Both documents show that the Patriarch of Moscow decided to carry out this restoration partly in the modern language of social teaching and human rights.

There are different opinions as to whether the documents under discussion represent genuine modernization or not, 44 and this is not the place to make a final judgment on this issue. I would like to point out something else in this case, namely that by accepting the idea of religious modernization within a post-secular society as an interpretative key, we come to an important theoretical and methodological conclusion: the transition from a comparative civilizational perspective to a post-secular one restricts our ability to draw conclusions; it forces us to see the Russian Orthodox Church "large

43. Ibid. [Russian translation: ibid.].

44. Более негативная оценка: Agadjanian A. Liberal Individual and Christian Culture: Russian Orthodox Teaching on Human Rights in Social Theory Perspective // Religion, State, and Society. 2010. Vol. 38 (2). P. 97-113; more positive: Thesing J., Uertz R. (Hrsg.). Die Grundlagen der Sozialdoktrin der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche. Deutsche Ubersetzung mit Einfuhrung und Kommentar. Sankt Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V., 2001.

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plan" - as a religious actor in the public sphere of the Russian Federation. Not only does this make it much more difficult to generalize from one Orthodox Church to an Eastern Christian civilization, but it also makes the internal state of Russian Orthodoxy and its place in the rapidly modernizing Russian society much clearer. What comes to the fore is the" internal clash " between Russian Orthodoxy and secular society in Russia, a clash in which Social Doctrine and the Doctrine of Human Rights are statements within a broader discussion of values and norms. From this point of view, the "multiplicity" of multiple moderns refers not to cultural and geographical boundaries, but to various actors and their positions regarding modernization and secularization.

This discussion is taking place not only in Russia, but also in all European societies. A good example of how the religious-secular dispute in Europe is shifting from the East-West border to the front line between religious conservatism and secularism is the position of Metropolitan Hilarion, the current head of the Department for External Church Relations, who succeeded Kirill after the latter's election as patriarch. Hilarion sees the Catholic Church as the main ally of the Orthodox Church in the confrontation with "militant secularism":

..militant secularism is inspired primarily by anti-Catholic pathos. In turn, it is the Catholic Church that is now the main opponent of secularism and liberalism in Europe... I am deeply convinced that our main ally in Europe is the Catholic Church45.

Hilarion's statement clearly shows that the Christian and secular-humanist understandings of Europe are in serious conflict and that the opposing sides of this conflict cannot be identified with the East or the West. On the contrary, in some matters, Moscow and the Vatican, North Kazakhstan Region-

45. Metropolitan Hilarion Alfeyev. Christianity and the Challenge of Militant Secularism. Paper read at the International Conference on the Australian and New Zealand Association of Theological Schools, 5-8 July 2004, Melbourne [Hilarion, Bishop of Vienna and Austria. Christianity facing the challenge of militant secularism - http://hilarion.ru/2010/02/25/1044].

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most often, they take up a position on one side of the barricades. Again, multiple modernities do not coincide with civilizational spaces; they cross borders, interact on issues of common interest, and can form transnational alliances despite long-standing historical divisions. With a comparatively civilizational approach based on the idea of multiple modernities, there is a risk of not noticing these alliances.

The post-secular approach, based on the paradigm of multiple modernities, not only draws attention to inter-civilizational parallels, but also sees ways to overcome the gaps that define the religious-secularist confrontation. Post-secular political philosophy takes into account this gap between religious and secularist consciousness. It treats religious doctrines and "secularist secularism" on an equal footing and tries to reduce tensions between them, while keeping in mind the post-secular model of discussion. This normative aspect of post-secular theory is quite appropriate when it comes to a philosophical assessment of the clash between Russian Orthodoxy and secularism and the arguments that Russian Orthodoxy puts forward in the context of a global discussion of human rights, values and norms.

Habermas ' contribution to the discussion of politics and religion is linked to his earlier work on communicative action and deliberative democracy.46 This approach is characterized by an emphasis on universalism as a necessary category of political philosophy. Universalism-and this is the main point in Habermas ' position - is not about certain principles that "come out of nowhere", and we do not need to abandon the idea of universalism in the face of a multiplicity of moral ideas and beliefs; instead, agreement on "principles that work for all" arises in the process of communication and joint discussion, these principles can be the fruit of a process of mutual learning and mutual agreement.

Habermas ' appeal to universalism has varying degrees. It all depends on what we mean by "all" in the expression

46. Habermas J. Justification and Application. Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993; Habermas J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press, 1996.

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"principles that work for everyone." According to the original wording, as well as Habermas 'intention, these "all" were understood as members of a constitutional democratic state. These include both secular and religious citizens, if necessary. If we adhere to the normative view that only equal and democratic discussion leads to universal agreement on political ethics, which is the characteristic of constitutional democracy, then it is quite logical to say that the dialogue between religious and non-religious (secular) citizens should also be conducted on an equal footing. However, such equality is threatened when it is discovered that secular public discourse does not allow religious citizens to make their voices heard. Post-secularism is the answer to this very specific problem. The point here is that not only religious citizens should be asked to translate their statements into the language of secular public discourse, but also non-religious citizens should make their own contribution, namely, to moderate their secularist aspirations. Only in this case it is possible to ensure equal conditions for communication and the possibility of mutual understanding.

A careful reading of Habermas shows that the normative desirability of post-secular discussion is based on two different considerations: on the one hand, it is structurally derived from the general theory of deliberative democracy; on the other, it is a philosophical consequence of the fundamental openness of the communicative situation. We can never know in advance which considerations will best fit the complex reality of the decision-making process. The following lengthy quote from Habermas explains the normative-philosophical aspect of post-secularism very well:

Religious traditions have a special articulatory power for moral intuitions, especially in relation to sensitive forms of humane coexistence. This potential turns religious speech for relevant political issues into a serious candidate for possible truth content, which can then be translated from the lexicon of a particular religious community into a common language... this translation work should be understood as a cooperative task involving non-religious people.

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citizens, if their religious fellow citizens are capable and ready for political participation, should not receive an asymmetric burden... this burden is balanced by the normative expectation that secular citizens are open to the possible truth content of religious contributions and rely on dialogues in which religious grounds appear, if possible, in the transformed guise of publicly available arguments.47
In his later works Habermas defends the idea of a post secular society beyond the concepts of constitutional democracy and the nation state 48 and explicitly denotes the compatibility of post secularism and the paradigm of multiple modernities: "The program of the group formed around Shmuel Eisenstadt and its comparative studies of civilizations seem to me useful and promising. In the emerging global society... today we see only modern societies, but they are represented in the form of multiple moderns, because the great religions of the world have had a great cultural power for centuries, and they have not yet completely lost this power. " 49 The Western self-understanding of modernity arose from a clash with tradition, and the same dialectic of tradition and modernity is again taking place today in other parts of the world. "There, too," Habermas says, " people turn to their own traditions to meet the challenges of social modernization, not to give in to them." With this in mind, the cross-cultural dialogue on the foundations of a more just world order should no longer be one-sided: such a dialogue should be conducted in a symmetrical way, taking into account different points of view, and in this dialogue the West should be only one of the participants.50 The pluralistic and multicultural society of Habermas 'earlier works is now being expanded into a "world society" that is made up of diverse peoples and cultural traditions.

47. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere, pp. 10-11 [Russian translation: pp. 126-127].

48. Habermas J. The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy // The Post-national Constellation. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001. P. 58 - 112. См. также: KratochwilE, Barbato M. Towards a Post-secular Political order? // European Political Science Review. 2009. Vol. 1 (3). P. 317 - 340.

49. Habermas J., Mendieta E. A postsecular world society?

50. Ibid.

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Habermas ' theory of a post-secular world society as a society of multiple modernities, which discusses norms that can be comprehensive and universal, provides a key to interpreting the position of the Russian Orthodox Church on the issue of human rights. Returning to the above statement of the Moscow Patriarch, it should be emphasized that in his speech at the Tenth World Russian People's Council, Kirill actually did not just express the opinion that different concepts of human rights should be considered as legitimate: he spoke in favor of a universal concept of human rights. Quite in the spirit of post-secular thinking, Kirill appealed to honest rules for discussing rules and norms, saying the following: "Actually, even Orthodox people do not object to the existence of some universal rules of behavior in the modern world. But these rules should be truly universal. The question arises: are the human rights that claim to play this role such in the modern version?" Kirill's statement resonates with Habermas 'thoughts on equality and universality:" Regardless of their cultural background, all participants intuitively understand that a consensus based on beliefs is impossible as long as there is no symmetrical relationship between them - a relationship characterized by mutual recognition, the ability to take the other's place, and a willingness on both sides to look at each other." see your own tradition through the eyes of a stranger, learn from each other, and so on. " 51
In the post-secular perspective, which is based on the paradigm of multiple modernities, the normative representations and self-definitions of various modern regimes are subject to criticism and change. For Western modernity, this means that it faces alternative understandings of modernity not only on its borders, but also "inside" - as far as its own normative self-determination is concerned. First of all, this applies precisely to the definition of the relationship between secularism and religion in the West. Here again, the topic of human rights is very important because of its central position in Western self-understanding. If the example of the participation of Russian Orthodoxy in the discussion of human rights shows that in the post-secular world of multiple modernities, specific definitions of the Russian Orthodox Church can be used as an example of the Russian Orthodox Church's participation in the discussion of human rights.-

51. Habermas J. Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights. P. 129.

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If the discussion of human rights, freedoms, and activities is once again open to discussion and controversy, then Habermas ' conceptualization of the post-secular mode of discussion draws attention to the fact that such a discussion takes place not between closed civilizational spheres, but between different actors with their own ideas about modernity, who are able to change their position and thereby - the very essence of the world. a situation of confrontation and dispute.

Conclusion

This article distinguishes between comparative-civilizational and post-secular approaches within the framework of the multiple modernity paradigm. I argue that the first, comparatively civilizational, approach is useful for understanding modernization processes in large cultural and civilizational formations and should be supported by an analysis of the political processes underlying the formation of modern regimes in order to avoid the extremes of the civilizational approach. The second, postsecondary, approach focuses on actors and cultural zones within civilizational entities and emphasizes intercivilizational intersections between modern regimes, as well as ambiguities within these regimes. These two approaches complement each other and thereby enhance the potential of the multiple modernity paradigm, its ability to explain the place of religion in modern societies. Given the popularity of the idea of multiple moderns in current sociological and political theory, one should wish for greater clarity in understanding this idea, so that the reference to multiple moderns does not turn into just a catchphrase denoting multiplicity.

With regard to Europe, it becomes clear that we should approach European cultural and political integration from both a comparative-civilizational (imperial-civilizational) and post-secular point of view, in order to explain both differences and coincidences, both individual cultural constellations and intercivilizational intersections. The example of Russian Orthodoxy allowed us to point out the potential of these two perspectives in explaining the role of religion in European integration. From a comparatively civilizational point of view

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Russian Orthodoxy may appear "different" from secular Western Europe52; at the same time, from a post-secular point of view, it is involved in the ongoing process of defining the meaning of European political and cultural integration. The Orthodox religion is undergoing a process of modernization that involves redefining both its place within the societies in which it has traditionally been present and its position in the broader European religious pluralistic context. European integration, overcoming ideological divisions and creating common institutions is a process of defining a common ground for the multiple modernities of Europe, a process that also involves figuring out the place that religion occupies.

Translated from English by Alexander Kyrlezhev

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